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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

IRAN

PART 11

January to December 1957

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

General Correspondence

<i>No. and Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i>
	1957		
1 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 13 E	Jan. 18	International bank loan to Iran ... \$75 million finally approved by the Majles and the Senate on December 30, 1956.	1
2 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 14	Jan. 18	Iran: Annual review for 1956 ...	3
3 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 37	Mar. 28	Saudi-Iranian relations ...	10
4 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 17	Jan. 18	Political report on Iran for the fourth quarter of 1956 ...	13
5 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 29	Mar. 12	The 1956 census of Iran ...	17
6 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 36	Mar. 23	The Shah of Iran's visit to Saudi Arabia ...	18
7 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 38 E	Mar. 30	Iranian budget for the year beginning March 21, 1957 ...	20
8 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 42	Apr. 5	The new Iranian Cabinet ...	22
9 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 43	Apr. 6	Dr. Adenauer's visit to Iran, March 28-April 2, 1957 ...	25
10 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 52	Apr. 17	Political report on Iran for the first quarter of 1957 ...	27
11 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 55	Apr. 27	Irano-Soviet relations ...	31
12 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 58 E	May 4	Irano-Soviet trade protocol ...	35
13 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 59 E	May 4	Irano-Soviet transit agreement ... Intended to amplify the provisions of Article 10 of the Irano-Soviet Trade Agreement of 1940.	37
14 Sir Roger Stevens ... (1) No. 64 E Economic and Com- mercial Dept. (2) No. ECD 11123/57	May 18 July 13	Revaluation of Iran's gold reserves ...	40
15 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 1823/57	May 31	The Bakhtiari tribe ... Note prepared by Mr. John Russell.	42
16 ...	—	Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and the Iranian Foreign Minister on Wednesday, June 5, 1957, in Karachi ...	49
17 Mr. Bennett ...	—	The oil industry of southern Iran ... (Enclosure to Tehran despatch No. 72 E of June 20, 1956.)	50
18 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 73	June 21	Amendment of the Iranian Constitution ... The new amendments have redressed the Constitutional balance of power in favour of the Shah. They are not necessarily reactionary and should strengthen the parliamentary system in Iran.	53

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>No. and Name</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Page</i>
	1957		
19 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 401 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... (2) No. 697 Sir Roger Stevens ... (3) No. 404 (4) No. 422 Mr. Selwyn Lloyd ... (5) No. 1749 Sir Michael Wright... (6) No. 873	July 8 July 9 July 10 July 15 July 18	Iranian earthquakes ... Her Majesty's Government's provision of aid.	57
20 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 10118/57	July 18	The internal situation in Iran ...	60
21 Mr. Russell ... No. 82	Aug. 1	Political report on Iran for the second quarter of 1957 ...	62
22 Mr. Russell ... No. 87 E	Aug. 2	The Iranian petroleum law ... A law to regulate the conditions under which Iran's oil resources outside the Consortium area are to be developed.	66
23 Mr. Russell ... No. 99	Aug. 24	Iranian earthquake: Her Majesty's Government's provision of aid ...	68
24 ...	—	Record of conversation between the Secretary of State and Dr. Ardalan in the United Nations on Wednesday, September 25, 1957 ...	70
25 Mr. Russell ... No. 114	Oct. 11	Political report on Iran for third quarter of 1957 ...	71
26 Mr. Russell ... No. 126	Nov. 6	Diminished prestige of Dr. Eqlal ...	75
27 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 146 E	Dec. 19	Iranian financial crisis ...	78
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
28 Mr. Russell ... No. 9	Jan. 12	Leading personalities in Iran ...	[1
29 Sir Roger Stevens ... No. 77	July 1	Iran: Heads of foreign missions ...	(1)

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

- Adenauer's visit to Iran, Dr.—9.
 Annual report on the heads of foreign missions—29.
 Annual report on leading personalities—28.
 Annual review for 1956—2.
 Bakhtiari tribe, the—15.
 Census of Iran, 1956—5.
 Disputes between Baghdad Pact members, procedure for settling—
 Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Iranian Foreign Minister on June 5, 1957, in Karachi—16.
 Eqlal, Dr., diminished prestige of—26.
 Internal situation in Iran—20.
 International bank loan to Iran—1.
 Iran's gold reserves, revaluation of—14 (1)-(2).
 Irano-Soviet trade protocol—12.
 Iranian budget for the year beginning March 21, 1957—7.
 Iranian Cabinet, the new—8.
 Iranian Constitution, amendment of the—18.
 Iranian earthquakes, Her Majesty's Government's provision of aid—19 (1)-(6) and 23.
 Iranian financial crisis—27.
 Iranian petroleum law—22.
 Irano-Soviet relations—11.
 Irani-Soviet transit agreement—13.
 Oil industry of southern Iran, the—17.
 Policy in the Persian Gulf—24.
 Political report on Iran for the fourth quarter of 1956—4.
 Political report on Iran for the first quarter of 1957—10.
 Political report on Iran for the second quarter of 1957—21.
 Political report on Iran for the third quarter of 1957—25.
 Saudi-Iranian relations—3.
 Shah of Iran's visit to Saudi Arabia—6.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
IRAN—PART II

UEE 10334/5

No. 1

INTERNATIONAL BANK LOAN TO IRAN

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 21)(No. 13 E. Confidential)
Sir,*Tehran,
January 18, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that the \$75 million International Bank loan, whose difficult passage through Parliament formed the subject of my Despatch No. 135 E. of the 1st of December, 1956, was finally approved by the Majles and the Senate on the 30th of December.

2. Throughout the greater part of December, the opposition to the loan continued, both in Parliament and in the Cabinet. In addition to the reasons which I have already reported, namely suspicion of foreign loans, dislike of the control which is to be exercised by the International Bank and dislike of Mr. Ebtehaj, a further factor emerged in the shape of general scepticism about the value of the expenditure undertaken by the Seven-Year Plan Organisation. In the circumstances, the Cabinet recommended to the Shah that the loan should be allowed to run the gauntlet of Parliament and not merely of the Plan Organisation Joint Committee of the Majles and the Senate. The Shah took the Cabinet's advice and at the same time intervened decisively behind the scenes. The result was that the necessary Bill was hustled through within a week—one of the arguments used being that if the loan agreement was signed before the 31st of December, the Iranian Government would avoid the effect of a $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. increase in the International Bank's interest rates, which was due to come into force at the New Year. The voting in the Majles was 88 for, 4 against and 8 abstentions. In the Senate the Law was approved by 39 votes to 2.

3. I enclose the text of the law⁽¹⁾ setting out the conditions under which the Iranian Government was authorised to sign the loan agreement with the International Bank. The loan is to be for \$75 million and is to be utilised before March 1958 or any other date to be agreed between the Bank and the Iranian Government. Repayment is to be made between March 1959 and March 1962. The most interesting provisions of the agreement are as follows:

(a) The Plan Organisation undertake to give the International Bank access to the accounts of their expenditure and to provide the Bank with any information they may require about how the loan is being spent (Article 6, 1);

(b) The Plan Organisation have agreed to the following ceilings on their expenditure:

	Million \$
August 1956–March 1957	70
March 1957–September 1957	65
September 1957–March 1958	70

These ceilings can only be increased by agreement between the Bank and the Seven-Year Plan Organisation (Article 6, 2). In Mr. Ebtehaj's view these ceilings are already inadequate and discussions with the Bank are due to start soon.

(c) The Iranian Government undertakes not to borrow any further money before March 1958 or whatever date the Government and the Bank may agree as being the end of the utilisation period of the credit (Article 6, 3);

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

(d) The Plan Organisation's share of the oil revenues are to be ear-marked for the repayment of the loan. The exact way in which this is to be done is to be agreed between the Bank and the Iranian Government (Article 6, 4). This flexible formula was a last minute concession to the Iranians.

4. Although opposition to the loan remained considerable to the end, it seems that the Shah handled the situation skilfully and that the episode may not of itself leave too much bitterness behind.

5. I am sending a copy of this Despatch to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, to the Export Credits Guarantee Department, to Her Majesty's Treasury and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 1011/1

No. 2

IRAN: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 22)

(No. 14. Confidential) *Tehran.*
Sir, *January 18, 1957.*

I have the honour to submit my annual review of events in Iran during 1956.

Introduction

The year was marked for Iran by greater success and stability in foreign than in domestic affairs. The highlights on the international horizon were the Bagdad Pact meeting in Tehran in the spring, the Suez affair in the latter half of the year and the Tehran meeting of the four Moslem members of the Bagdad Pact in November. On the domestic front this review might well echo that of last year: the continued growth in the Shah's direct influence, the compliance of his Government and the subservience of the Majles. To this, on the lower levels of everyday life, should be added the continued if scarcely audible underground rumblings of the Tudeh Party, the growing unpopularity of the security régime imposed by the gendarmerie, police and armed forces (especially the Tehran military government) and general dissatisfaction with the standards of living.

The Shah

2. The Shah, during the year under review, reinforced his authority, even if he did not succeed in producing any very solid results. Good intentions coupled with weak execution resulted in an intermittent and hesitant dictatorship. Parliament supplies little in the way of either a check or stability. The new Majles, elected during the spring and summer, is packed with king's men. The Shah is perhaps at his best in the realm of foreign affairs, and his State visits this year to India, Turkey and the Soviet Union were dignified and useful occasions. India perhaps was the least profitable, as there was no real meeting of minds between the Shah and Nehru: Turkey produced the good results that were to be expected from these two countries of very close interests: whilst from the Soviet Union the Shah managed to return with his sovereignty unimpaired and some gain to his prestige. But at home the troublesome question of the succession

remains. The Shah has no heir and has so far resolutely turned his face away from naming one. The forthcoming marriage of his only child Princess Shahnaz to the son of General Zahedi cannot be counted upon to provide a solution.

Iran's International Position

3. Events at Suez put Iran in an international position which she has not occupied for two centuries or more. And it must be said to her credit that she handled it with considerable skill and balance. Both the participation of Dr. Ardalan, the Foreign Minister, in the five-man committee to Cairo, and the four-Power Moslem meeting in Tehran under the Shah's chairmanship during the height of the crisis in November, provided Iran with an active rôle in an international crisis which has no parallel in modern times. She was fortified in her own esteem and that of her neighbours by the visits in the autumn of the Presidents of the Lebanon and Pakistan, and the Prime Ministers of Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan. The year finished, however, on a rather more subdued note, as the Iranian initiative in summoning a general conference of Middle Eastern Powers was wrecked on the indifference and hostility of the Egypto-Syrian bloc.

Suez

4. The main foreign event for which 1956 will be remembered in Iran was undoubtedly the Suez affair. The Persians dislike Arabs in general and would have been more than pleased to see Nasser dethroned. The Shah and the Government eye him askance as anti-monarchist and demagogue: business interests fear his control of the Canal, through which the bulk of Iranian imports and exports normally pass; and the country at large distrusts his expansionist ambitions. Many people in Iran would accordingly have been only too pleased to see him overthrown. But both the manner of our intervention in Egypt and its unsatisfactory outcome deprived us of any public, or more than a little private, sympathy. We now have much leeway to make up.

Relations with the United Kingdom

5. Until the events of November we continued in our own relations with Iran to make steady if unspectacular progress in the consolidation of the "new look." Old suspicions still run close below the surface: we are widely credited with responsibility for and direction of the present Iranian Government: and we are blamed for its failure to produce solid results in the way of raising the standard of living at home. But we have at least continued the process of divorcing ourselves from those elements which used to claim to be our agents and spokesmen and to be able to fix any deal on our behalf. The more educated and responsible elements have at last come to realise that we no longer interfere in all the devious byways of Iranian life. Parliamentary and other visits helped in some small degree to show to the Iranians that we now treat them as an independent, sovereign Power. The Minister of State, Board of Trade, spent over a week in Iran in early January. The Secretary of State paid a flying visit in March, Sir Edward Boyle (then Financial Secretary to the Treasury) led our delegation to the meeting of the Bagdad Pact Economic Council in April, the Minister of Defence led the delegation shortly afterwards at the Ministerial meeting, two Parliamentary delegations and a handful of other important individual visitors came during the year. All this helped with Iranian self-esteem. It is a pity that this process was not supported by the British press, which on the whole showed practically no interest in Iranian affairs throughout the year. Inside the country itself our stock was raised by the success of Costain-John Brown in completing their pipeline with great efficiency and well ahead of the scheduled time.

The Persian Gulf

6. The Persian Gulf, however, cast a longer shadow than usual over Anglo-Iranian relations. In this area Iranian claims suddenly sprang to life in rather unpleasant shape, notably the Iranian Navy's seizure and occupation of the two islands of Farsi and Arabi claimed by, among others, the Ruler of Kuwait. Until the turn of the year it has been possible to handle this dispute with good temper, but only at the expense of our taking no physical action to dispute the Iranian occupation. Throughout the year the Iranian Government has pressed its claim for consular representation in Kuwait, where it lays

claims to a large proportion of the population. In Kuwait it only requests to be allowed to protect these citizens' interests. But in Bahrain it goes further and maintains its historically-unfounded and contemporarily impracticable claim to sovereignty over the island. Ambitions towards naval extension in the Gulf are undoubtedly symptomatic of the same disease, of which an important cause is the desire to exert as great a control as possible over the oil under the waters of the Gulf. As a result of all this, Anglo-Iranian relations in the Persian Gulf cannot long remain as they are.

The United States

7. Aside from her relations with us and with the Arab States, Iran's principal foreign preoccupations have been with the United States and the Soviet Union. American aid totalling some \$40 million (excluding military aid) continued to play a useful part in helping the Government to make ends meet. Serious and intelligent Iranians doubtless appreciate the enormous work that the United States Government is doing in this country. But as much of it is unspectacular training and technical assistance it makes little impression on the common man. It will be many years before he sees any direct benefits from the schemes and other long-term projects which receive American aid. In the army, too, the solid work being done by American training teams goes largely unsung.

The Soviet Union

8. The Soviet Union has during the year made considerable efforts to gain Iranian favour. This campaign has taken various forms, changing throughout the year. In the early months there was some continuation of Soviet bluster against Iranian adherence to the Bagdad Pact. When this was seen to be ineffectual, the Kremlin dropped the stick for the carrot. The early summer was marked by effusive cultural approaches, exchanges of sporting visits, musicians and artists, leading up to the Shah's visit, which the Soviet Government laid themselves out to make a success. The Shah, however, remained firm and the Russians got no change out of him. The Iranian Government indeed continued a tough policy against Soviet infiltration of this country, culminating in the arrest and expulsion on espionage charges of the assistant Soviet Military Attaché. On the economic front, too, the Iranian Government stood firm, and in mid-summer

cancelled the anachronistic (and unproductive) Soviet oil concession in the north. At the same time, however, they refused with admirable poise to allow themselves to be provoked into any gesture which the Soviet Government could have used as a pretext for tough action. On the other hand, towards the end of the year they were embarrassed by attractive economic offers made by the Soviet Government at cut prices. Events in Hungary caused something of a setback in the process of rapprochement, but by the end of the year the Soviet campaign was once again in full swing, with a party of Iranian journalists invited to tour the Soviet Union, singers, wrestlers and footballers once again crossing the frontier in both directions, and a return visit from the Supreme Soviet imminent in the new year. A new Soviet Ambassador (M. Pegov) contributed his pennyworth of fresh goodwill to all this. The year also saw the termination of the work of the Soviet-Iranian frontier demarcation commission, which had carried out its duties with considerable efficiency and in an atmosphere of genuine co-operation.

Other Neighbours

9. The year's events provided Iran with a good opportunity to achieve closer relations with her Bagdad Pact neighbours. The Shah's visit to Turkey appears to have removed the last traces of fear concerning Turkish irredentism in the north-west. With Pakistan there have been several high-level contacts and the prospect of an early solution to a longstanding boundary dispute. With the present Government of Iraq there has been good understanding but no significant progress on boundary and water rights questions, largely owing to other preoccupations. Even with Afghanistan relations have not deteriorated, and serious efforts, not yet successful, have been made to solve the problem of the Helmand River water. But Afghanistan remains the nightmare of the Shah and the Iranian military authorities, and their prognostications regarding future trends of Afghan policy and its potential menace to Iran continue to be full of gloom.

Internal

10. On the domestic front the principal political interest centred in the personalities of the Government and the prospects of change. But in the end no change took place and Husain Ala continued as Prime Minister. M. Ala, for all his old West-

minster tie, is a staunch Iranian patriot with strong nationalist feelings. Although small and apparently frail, he resists the rigours of his office with remarkable tenacity and his reputation for honesty and sincerity stands above reproach. But he is not a strong Minister and is apt to be a pliant tool in the hands of the Shah. The Shah does not like strong men around him and it is probably for this reason that M. Ala remains and has not been replaced in the premiership by Dr. Egbal, the Rector of Tehran University, lately appointed Minister of Court, who in the early part of the year was generally tipped as the next Prime Minister. Nor does the rest of the Cabinet offer any big men. The two greatest names in contemporary Iran are now outside active politics. Musaddeq, who was released from gaol at the end of the summer, remains under surveillance and in ill-health at his country property outside Tehran. Sayyed Zia, the strong man of thirty years ago, who put Reza Shah on the throne (but who is still under seventy) is reluctant to return to political life, at any rate on the conditions now offering.

The Government

11. The rest of the Ministers present a team of men who are distinguished from their predecessors more by their honesty and patriotism than by their distinction or effectiveness. One of the strongest is the Minister of Justice, Gulsha'yan, who during the year fought a sharp and successful engagement for judicial reform and who is now turning his attentions to cleaning up the civil service. The Cabinet at the end of the year carried out the first effective national census of modern times (revealing a total population of 18.9 millions) as a preliminary to drastic revision of the tax laws.

Security

12. Progress continued in the sphere of public and national security, although the Tehran military government grew increasingly unpopular and the name of General Bakhtiar became synonymous for ruthless repression. The Government's campaign against Soviet infiltration and native Communism was marked by the execution of some Tudeh leaders early in the year, the pardon and release of others later. But, although scotched, the snake is not dead. The party has been greatly handicapped by the loss of its leaders and of its

publicity organs, but it maintains its underground organisation and undoubtedly has cells at many strategic points in the country's life. Dr. Egbal claims to have eradicated it in the university; and in the army it is not thought to have regained strength after the revelation and bloody suppression of the 1954 plot.

13. Tribal affairs continue in the doldrums. From the Bakhtiari country there came a continuous flow of economic and civil complaint, whilst the Qashqa'i remained the object of the Government's dislike and suspicions. But it was only against the small, weak and relatively inoffensive Jawanrudi Kurds that the Government was bold enough to take military action. On the religious front the Mullahs continued a steadily regaining influence, although they suffered something of a reverse when forty-three Moslem villages were convicted of the collective murder of seven Baha'i at Yazd in the spring. At the Government's insistence this trial was conducted with remarkable fairness and lack of sectarian prejudice. On the social front one of the Government's main achievements during the year was a good beginning with the suppression of opium production and consumption. The Government's efforts were, however, impeded by a flood of contraband opium which at once started to come in across the open frontier from Afghanistan—thus adding fuel to the Iranian Government's dislike of that neighbour, whom they look upon as a Soviet cat's-paw and the probable platform for a Soviet attack upon Iran.

14. Dissatisfaction amongst the growing *bourgeois* class of Iran continued to increase. This tendency is to be seen at its worst in Tehran, where the superficial veneer of Western luxury and sophistication is thinly spread over a slum city. The towns in general and Tehran in particular continue to exercise an unhealthy magnetism over the inhabitants of the countryside, who flow to the cities for cheap bread and higher wages. Tehran alone now numbers 1½ million people: taken from a total population of 18.9 million this represents a grave disequilibrium. The Government has not yet attempted seriously to tackle this problem. But the Minister of the Interior initiated a useful step when he summoned all the provincial governors to Tehran for a conference in June. It is to be hoped that this may herald a more coherent policy between the Central Government and its outlying agents.

Towards the end of the year, a rigged Majles and partly hand-picked Senate showed itself increasingly restive in the face of royal pressure, and criticism directed at the Government but aimed at the Shah appeared to be mounting. To conclude this round-up of internal items, the army made a little slow progress under the tuition of American training teams and with the provision of American equipment. The Shah relies upon the army as a stabilising element; whether he is justified or not in doing so is another question, as there undoubtedly is much discontent amongst the middle officer class.

Economic

15. On the economic front interest was centred on petroleum, first on the hopes of increased revenue from the Consortium's production and later in the year on the sensational new strike at Qum. In spite of the Suez crisis the oil Consortium achieved part of their aim of increasing production above the Oil Agreement level. They are unlikely to be able to repeat this performance in 1957, but thereafter the increase in production should be rapid. Relations between the Consortium and the Iranian Government have been very satisfactory during the year, though there has been no lack of minor problems. The Iranian public set great hopes by the Qum field which, when its capacity is finally proved, they hope will supply not only the domestic needs of north Central Persia but will also provide a valuable export.

16. Domestic attention—and much criticism—was centred during the year on the operations of the second Seven-Year Plan under its able, honest and unpopular chief Ebtehaj. Constant and often unreasonable attacks were made on him for the Plan's failure to show immediate results. Even the securing of a \$75 million loan from the International Bank was held against him on the grounds that it would be badly used. Within the Plan Organisation solid work was done, but in general the pace was slow, largely owing to the poor quality of the staff and traditional Iranian indecision. Ebtehaj's greatest mistake was perhaps his slowness in helping municipal development which could yield great political dividends.

17. Progress was made in balancing the budget. Revenues increased with prosperity, rising oil revenues made up for the tapering off of American aid and the Ministry of Finance managed, not without effort, to keep expenditure well below the

level authorised by Parliament. The equilibrium, however, remains precarious.

18. In general the country's economic progress was satisfactory. There was considerable prosperity even if it was not widely distributed. We made good progress with our exports while the Germans and the Japanese marked time. But there were indications that the pause in their advance was only temporary.

19. Perhaps the Government's greatest shortcoming in economic affairs was their failure to stimulate agricultural production and free enterprise generally. But, be it said in their discharge, they were mesmerised by their development plans, and also caught in the dilemma that, if they provide more credit and free wheat prices, they will initially stimulate the inflation which such a policy is eventually designed to overcome.

Conclusions

20. To summarise, 1956 has been a year of international strain for Iran, which, all things considered, she has surmounted very well, maintaining a steady and sensible course under the Shah's determined and occasionally forceful leadership. That leadership has, however, been much less happy in its domestic manifestations. Direct intervention by the Shah, though generally in good causes and frequently successful, has often been imprudent and, on occasion, crude. The Government's policy is now nakedly his, and this means that a double unpopularity rebounds on his head, from those such as members of Parliament who do not like royal interference and loss of prerogative and from the larger number of Iranians who are by tradition and temperament hostile to Government in general, and can find plenty to criticise in this one. Yet there is some reason to believe that the Shah, by virtue both of his office and his engaging personality, retains a considerable hold on the loyalty and affections of the people at large. He may still be able to capitalise this, and I think there is a fairly good prospect that the stability and limited progress which have unquestionably been achieved in the past two years will, despite murmurings of discontent and a situation which is always potentially explosive, be maintained and even accelerated in 1957.

21. I enclose a list of the principal events of 1956.

22. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Bagdad, Kabul, Moscow and Washington: to

the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi; and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces (Nicosia).

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

Enclosure

Chronological Summary of Events in 1956

January

- 1 Mr. A. R. Low, Minister of State at the Board of Trade, visited Iran and attended first session of Bagdad Pact Economic Committee presided over by A. H. Ebtehaj.
- 8 Navab Safavi, leader of the *Feda'iyān al Islam*, executed together with Razmara's assassin, Ala's assailant and a fourth *Feda'iyān*.
- Instructions issued to regional authorities for the (piecemeal) holding of the 19th Majles elections.
- Iranian Government appealed to Consortium for substantial increase of 10 million tons in their 1956 production.
- 29 Three Tudeh leaders arrested, including Muhammad Bahrami, formerly secretary of the Tudeh executive board.

February

- 4 Third Soviet note delivered in protest against Iranian adherence to Bagdad Pact.
- 15 Shah and Queen Soraya left for State Visit to India. Crown Council constituted to rule in Shah's absence.
- Trial *in camera* of ten alleged Soviet spies begun: all found guilty and one sentenced to death.
- Consortium, in reply to Government appeal for higher production, stated that they hoped to increase oil production in current year by 2½ million cubic metres.
- 19 United States offer announced in Washington of \$20 million subvention to Iran to bridge the budgetary gap. Iranian chagrin manifested at massive Western support for Egyptian high dam project as reward for flirting with Russia.
- 25 Army completed three-week operation against Jawanrudi Kurds near Iraqi frontier.
- 29 Major Kuznetsov, Soviet assistant military attaché, caught red-handed receiving documents from air force sergeant, arrested and given a week to leave the country.

March

- Press comment on Bahrain stimulated by anti-British rioting there and maintained at high pitch for several weeks.
- 10-11 The Secretary of State, the Right Honourable Selwyn Lloyd, visited Tehran on return from S.E.A.T.O. Conference in Karachi.
- 13 New Seven-Year Plan Bill became law. Provision made for an expenditure of £350 million and allocation of the oil revenues between the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, N.I.O.C. and the Ministry of Finance.

March

- 21 Shah granted New Year pardons to 50 Tudeh officers. Kashani and Baqa'i also released. Military Governor claimed that the back of the Tudeh Party had been broken.
- Iranian relations with Afghanistan worsened; and evidence accumulated of Iranian anxiety over Soviet penetration in that country. Iranian-Afghan negotiations began in Washington over Helmand River.

April

- Iranian reply to third Soviet note (of February 4) handed to Soviet Ambassador. Note again defended Iran's adherence to Bagdad Pact in categorical terms.
- 7 Ardalan made declaration of Iranian claim to Bahrain but emphasised that question would not be raised at forthcoming Bagdad Pact meeting.
- 15 Final session of 18th Majles. Elections to 19th Majles held piecemeal fashion and under firm control by the Shah. Taqizadeh re-elected President of the Senate.
- 16-19 Bagdad Pact Conference in Tehran attended by Minister of Defence, Sir W. Monckton, Economic Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Edward Boyle, and Mr. Denis Wright, assistant Under-Secretary, Foreign Office. Mr. Loy Henderson, as official United States observer, headed a large delegation. United Kingdom offered £250,000 spread over five years to be spent on technical aid. United States decided to join Economic and Counter-Subversion Committee, to contribute staff to the Secretariat and to co-operate with Military Committee.
- Budget and new income-tax law approved by Parliament. Budget gap of about £10 million expected to be covered mainly by United States grant. Price of cigarettes, tobacco and sugar (all Government monopolies) raised.
- Initial approaches made to Western oil companies with a view to their participating with N.I.O.C. in developing Iranian oil resources outside Consortium area and on continental shelf.

May

- 9 Foreign Ministry renewed their request for permanent representation in Kuwait.
- 19 International Monetary Fund made U.S. \$17 million loan to Iran for Seven-Year Plan Organisation.
- 20-29 Shah and Queen Soraya paid State Visit to Turkey.
- 31 The 19th Majles inaugurated by Shah. Sardar Fakher re-elected Speaker.

June

- 5 Small Soviet oil installation at Khurian, near Semnan, occupied by gendarmerie.
- 8 Dr. Egbal appointed Minister of Court.
- 13 Meeting of provincial Governors-General, the first of its kind, held in Tehran, and martial law lifted from the provinces, except on the railway.
- 14 Prime Minister Ala formally resigned and called on by Shah to form a new Cabinet. Gulsha'iyani appointed Minister of Justice and Naseri of Agriculture.

June

- Government received overwhelming vote of confidence from Parliament despite some critical speeches.
- 25 Shah and Queen Soraya left for 14-day State Visit to Soviet Union. Crown Council constituted. While in Soviet Union Shah warmly defended Iran's membership of the Bagdad Pact and refused to sign the usual joint communiqué. Russians suggested joint development of the Araxes River basin should be considered.
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development President, Mr. Eugene Black, visited Tehran for discussions about a loan to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation.
- Critical references made to United Kingdom approval of opium export licence, internationally granted, for Afghanistan.

July

- Majles conferred "double emergency" powers on Justice Minister Gulsha'iyani to introduce "decree-laws" for reform of the judicial system.
- Rainstorms and floods caused great damage to life and property in south and east.
- Representatives of American oil companies and of B.P. and Shell were in Tehran for discussions with N.I.O.C. about partnership possibilities for work on the continental shelf.

August

- 4 Dr. Musaddeq released after serving his three-year sentence and rusticated.
- 13 Laying of 300-mile pipeline from Ahwaz to Azna completed by Costain-John Brown.
- 15 Dr. Ardalan represented Iran at first London conference on Suez, and supported Pakistani amendments to the United States proposal which were accepted by the 18-Power majority; again represented Iran on 5-Power Commission under Menzies empowered to discuss 18-Power resolution in Cairo with Nasser. B.P. and Shell rejected N.I.O.C.'s terms for partnership to drill and exploit off-shore oil deposits in Persian Gulf.
- 26 High quality oil was struck at Qum by an American drilling team under contract to N.I.O.C. and gushed at rate of 150,000 barrels per day.
- Allocation of the United Kingdom £10 million credit successfully completed.

September

- 5 Justice Minister Gulsha'iyani's clash with Parliamentary Justice Commission over judicial reform Bill reached crisis proportions. The Shah intervened; a face-saving compromise was found and the Bill approved.
- 8 New Soviet Ambassador, Pegov, arrived.
- 9 Delegation of four Iranian women left to attend International Women's Conference in Moscow.
- 17 Dr. Ardalan left for second London conference on Suez to discuss formation of Canal Users' Association.
- Iranian sloop *Palang* landed garrison on Farsi Island.

September

- 25 World Health Organisation Eastern Mediterranean Sub-Committee meeting held in Tehran; United Kingdom represented by Sir Eric Pridie.
- 29 Iran joined Suez Canal Users' Association. Iranian-Soviet barter trade agreement concluded on traditional lines.

October

- 4 Iran elected to six-member executive group of the Suez Canal Users' Association.
- 9-16 "Fuel and power" group of four M.P.s (Colonel Lancaster, Sir Robert Boothby and Messrs. Callaghan and Neal) spent week in Iran.
- 13 Government Bill for establishment of a National Security Agency (to be headed by General Bakhtiari) presented to Parliament.
- Justice Minister Gulsha'iyani completed reorganisation of the Supreme Court.
- 14 Party of four senior Ministry of Labour officials began three-week tour of United Kingdom as guests of Her Majesty's Government.
- 15-19 Bagdad Pact Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees met in Tehran.
- 15 Four members of proscribed Tudeh Party sentenced to death.
- 17 Iranian-Russo-Turkish frontier demarcation agreement signed.
- 17-25 State visit by President Chamoun of Lebanon.
- 22 Seven-man Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation from the United Kingdom led by Commander Agnew, M.P., arrived on ten-day visit as guests of Iranian Parliament.
- 26 Sixty political prisoners of Tudeh background amnestied on Shah's birthday.
- 27-29 Shah attended Iranian-United States naval manoeuvres in Persian Gulf.
- 31 President Iskander Mirza of Pakistan arrived for ten-day State Visit.

November

- 2 Severe earthquake in Fars.
- 5 Conference of Asian members of Bagdad Pact in Tehran attended by Prime Minister Nuri Said of Iraq, President Iskander Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy of Pakistan, and Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey.
- 8 Communiqué published by conference calling on Britain and France to cease fire in Egypt.

November

- Military government extended to January 1957.
- Demagogues Kashani and Baqa'i placed under restraint for attempting to stimulate pro-Egyptian sentiment and provoke agitation.
- 19-21 Dr. Ardalan attended further meeting of Asian Bagdad Pact Powers at Bagdad.
- 17 After gushing for nearly two months, pressure at the Qum oil well dropped to nothing and the well was sealed completely.
- U.S. \$75 million International Bank loan negotiated in Washington by A. H. Ebtchaj, director of the Plan Organisation, and required for financing Plan projects during the next three years, met with stiff parliamentary opposition.
- 25 Iranian frigate *Bahr* landed force on Arabi Island, removed 46 Saudi military to Arabian mainland and left Iranian garrison.
- 30 About 100,000 people enrolled in anti-illiteracy campaign.

December

- 2 Soviet Ambassador Pegov invited twelve journalists to visit Russia; and, after Iranian prevarication and Russian pressure, a party left three weeks later.
- 5 Iranian Ambassador in Washington, together with his Turkish, Iraqi and Pakistani colleagues, received by Mr. Dulles; they officially requested United States to become a full member of the Bagdad Pact.
- 9 Dr. Ardalan in course of foreign policy speech to Majles called for cessation of Iraqi-Syrian cold war and stated that Iran was inviting Middle East Governments to conference in Tehran to discuss regional problems.
- 10 First national census placed population at 18.9 million.
- 12 Tenth anniversary of liberation from Soviet influence of Azerbaijan celebrated with military parade and by press and radio.
- 15 Princess Shahnaz, the Shah's only child by ex-Queen Fauzieh, betrothed to Engineer Ardeshtir Zahedi, the son of General Zahedi.
- 25 Iranian proposal for a regional conference rejected by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.
- 30 U.S. \$75 million International Bank loan approved by Parliament.

EP 10325/3

No. 3

SAUDI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 2)

(No. 37. Secret)

Tehran.

Sir,

March 28. 1957.

It will be seen from my despatch No. 36 of March 23 that, as a result of the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia, there is a prospect of a political rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Hitherto, ever since King Saud's visit to Tehran in August 1955, relations have been somewhat distant. Iranians, the Shah included, have tended to regard Arabia as rather an outlandish, *nouveau riche* country with many wrong-headed political ideas, and as a dangerous and potentially hostile neighbour; the Saudis for their part have no doubt been inclined to disregard the Iranians as non-Arabs, and to despise them as second-class Moslems. Moreover, jealousy over the oil production and revenues of one being increased at the expense of the other has overshadowed their relations, at least from the Iranian side. Now, thanks mainly to external circumstances, the possibility exists for the development of greater mutual understanding. The two countries have certain interests in common to bring them together: a genuine fear of Communism; heavy dependence on the United States; extensive underground and underwater oil resources, developed and undeveloped which, while they may have led to jealousy and suspicion in the past, could provide scope for useful collusion; the monarchical tradition; the exploitation of the Persian Gulf. There is material here for closer working arrangements—whether or not these lead to the sort of "bilateral defence pact" about which the Shah has been thinking aloud and which I understand he discussed with my United States colleague before leaving for Riyadh. Do we want to encourage or discourage such tendencies?—always remembering that, so far as Iran is concerned, what we say could possibly be decisive. I do not propose to do more here than set out certain reflexions which might bear on an eventual answer to that question. In doing so, I have tried to take into account the very interesting comments made by Sir Michael Wright and Sir Bernard Burrows on my despatch No. 140 of December 8, 1956.

2. Though they are clearly most important, it is perhaps not necessary to say very much about the broader implications of a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. They are so obviously beneficial from a Western point of view and so basically—though not I daresay superficially—inimical to the *communist* Arab world that one wonders merely whether Saud's pro-Egyptian entourage will not ensure that they are still-born. I would have thought at any rate that the rapprochement with Iraq was more important to Saudi Arabia, and would probably have to precede any closer alignment with Iran. Certainly if we are thinking in terms of defence pacts against Communism there would not seem to be much sense in an arrangement which did not introduce Iraq—but perhaps by means of a separate bilateral treaty, since a tripartite system might savour too much from a Saudi viewpoint of entering the Bagdad Pact through a back door.

3. It is, however, over the more parochial aspects of a Saudi-Iranian line-up that doubts may be felt to arise. What, we may well ask, may this portend for the future of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms and Oman? Could it be that the Shah, having failed to scare us by reference to the Saudi Arabian bogey into giving anything away to him, is now wondering whether it would not pay him better to make his peace with the bogey man and join with him in shaking the tree from which the ripe plums will, he is convinced, eventually drop? If this is really his line of thought, I think that wondering is probably just about as far as he has at present got. I may indeed be attributing to him motives which have not—or not yet—entered fully into his calculations. But I cannot help suspecting that something more than the obvious advantages which meet the eye has played a part in his idea of a bilateral defence pact. It is at least clear that the Saudis are not likely ever to be able to do much to help Iran against Communist aggression, or increase the help which Iran may yet hope to get from the West.

4. What does seem fairly obvious is that, whatever the Shah's intentions may be, a close working arrangement between Iran

and Saudi Arabia would eventually bring both countries up against the problem of the British-protected sheikdoms in the Gulf. The consequences of this would not be necessarily at once inimical to our interests. At the moment we are faced with a paradoxical situation. Saudi Arabia, with whom we are not on speaking terms, is, I understand, well disposed towards the independent rulers of North-East Arabia, with the exception of Abu Dhabi and Muscat; and the Sheikhs, with the same exceptions, are anxious, no doubt for reasons of self-preservation, to maintain amicable relations with King Saud. Iran, on the other hand, with whom we are in alliance, regards the Sheikdoms as rickety relics of British imperialism, is scornful, partly through ignorance, of their independence, and casts longing eyes on Bahrain and certain other islands in the Gulf; while the Sheikhs think, know and care little about Iran. The immediate effect of any pooling of ideas between the Shah and Saud on the subject of the Gulf—apart from bilateral agreements about the Continental Shelf—might therefore well be to introduce some sanity into the thinking of both sides. King Saud could certainly help the Shah to learn some of the facts of life about Bahrain; the Shah might well be ready to exercise a restraining influence on Saud in the matter of Buraimi, though he did once say to me that he thought the eastward expansion of Saudi Arabia was inevitable. The longer term consequences are admittedly more problematical. It is hard not to believe that both would not sooner or later find a common interest in upsetting the British connection of these small States, with a view to eventually swallowing them up—though here their interests might well diverge once more.

5. It is, of course, possible to dismiss these fears as fanciful. Iran and Saudi Arabia may both be big and (actually or potentially) rich, but they are flabby. Neither is in a position to risk major military adventures. We are not proposing to relinquish our responsibilities in the Gulf except in the face of force; and the force is not there. But these arguments, though in a sense true, may not be valid in practice. Recent events have shown that another force, the force of public opinion, has unsuspected vigour. If Iran and Saudi Arabia were so minded they could between them make life very uncomfortable for us in the Gulf. Worse, they could put us in a position where we had to choose between abandoning

our position there, or facing a great deterioration in our relations with them (I am assuming that our relations with Saudi Arabia will have been restored in the fairly near future). And in taking this course they would not have to do anything which would outrage world opinion. The United States, in particular, with excellent relations with both States, would on present showing be loth to exercise any strong restraining influence. And this is not all. In his despatch No. 25 of March 7 Sir Bernard Burrows has suggested that the Ruler of Bahrain clearly does not find his British connection sufficiently rewarding. In circumstances such as those described above, it would surely seem less and less attractive, not only to him but to other Gulf Rulers. Indeed, in the long run, a policy of "what I have I hold" might end up by losing us both our "special position" and our friendship with Iran and Saudi Arabia, with no compensating benefit whatever.

6. This brings me to the question of what I assume our long-term policy aims to be. Naturally, we want to preserve our interests in the Gulf. We want to maintain freedom of navigation, increase the flow of trade, ensure our oil supplies—whether from Kuwait or Bahrain, Iran, Basra or Qatar—and continue arrangements which give powerful support to sterling and our balance of payments. We also want to honour our engagements, which incidentally means keeping the Saudis out of Buraimi and points east, and the Iranians (this should not prove difficult!) out of Bahrain. Finally, we want to maintain the Bagdad Pact in full vigour, and make our peace with as big a slice of the Arab world as we can as soon as we can.

7. Then there is the question of means. Is the best way of preserving our interests in the Gulf to hold on inflexibly to our present position, regardless of consequences? At the moment we are committed to the defence of independent States, some rich, some poor, all without adequate means of defence of their own. Are we in a position to discharge these obligations? We have done so—at great political cost—in Buraimi; but this is not only a military problem. For political reasons the answer, at least in small matters, appears at present to be "No." We find ourselves unwilling to enforce the claims of the Ruler of Kuwait, against Iran, because Iran is an ally, and against Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are friends. May this not happen once too often? Can we really rely

on maintaining our interests in the Gulf by holding on to positions we may not be able adequately to defend even in a physical sense? Do we not, in the event of a show-down, run the risk of being unable to fulfil our commitments towards those States we are pledged to protect, while at the same time by our very presence (albeit more spiritual than material) alienating the sympathies of those against whom we are failing to protect them? These reflections lead me to the inexorable conclusion that the most important element in preserving our interests in the Gulf is the establishment and maintenance of cordial relations with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The rest, though important, must be secondary.

8. How can this be reconciled with our commitments and our obligations? I, for one, am quite clear that it must be. It would do us no good if, in courting the big, we let the little ones go to the wall. But before Saudi Arabia and Iran get together too closely or become rich enough to take effective initiatives to oust us, should we not try to get them jointly, perhaps with Iraq, and with American support, to underwrite the independence and territorial integrity (including seabeds) of the independent States in return for which the States themselves would be associated with any defence arrangements and our protective political relationships, though not our economic arrangements, notably as regards oil and oil revenues, would be progressively terminated? I do not underrate the formidable obstacles in the way of this objective. Buraimi, Bahrain and (if Iraq were included) perhaps Kuwait would rise up to bedevil our discussions. But, at least so far as Iran is concerned, it would be better to deal with them jointly rather than individually. The definition of seabeds would involve hard bargaining for the reasons given by Sir Bernard Burrows in his despatch No. 12 of January 24, but it would be more promising in the context I have suggested than in isolation. I realise, too, that the Rulers themselves might have much to say; but to the extent that they continue to seek our protection—and had opportunities to make it clear that this was their genuine wish and not our wishful thinking—we should have more than half made our case at least in Iranian—and American—eyes; and "progressive" could come to mean "very slowly indeed." It might also be objected

that, with countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, the underwriting was worth the paper it was written on and no more. But if the arrangements could obtain United States backing, and receive the sanction of the United Nations, I believe they would stand a reasonable chance of being observed. None of it would be easy, or pleasant; but would it not be preferable to the alternative of seeing our political position rotting away, our extremely important economic interests threatened, and making bad blood all round in the process? I am steadily coming round to the belief that in the long run the preservation of our vital economic interests in Kuwait, Iran and the Gulf Sheikdoms, and with them our strategic interests in the area, will depend on the progressive transfer of our direct political responsibilities for the small Gulf Sheikdoms to Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq—with all due safeguards both for our own interests and those of the sheikdoms themselves. And the better we can make our relations with the three major Gulf Powers and the relations between those Powers themselves, the more effective these safeguards will be.

9. I have strayed very far off my course, and into the rather distant future. Returning, in conclusion, to the present, I submit that we should not oppose, but should, on the contrary, discreetly encourage, closer relationships between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We should show interest in, and keenly watch the development of, any idea of a bilateral defence pact. We should also, incidentally, welcome any informal contacts between the Shah and certain Gulf Sheikhs—like that reported in the interesting despatch No. 7 of February 26 from the Political Agent at Dubai to the Political Resident at Bahrain—contacts which can give the Sheikhs a better understanding of the Baghdad Pact and the Shah (I would hope) a better appreciation of the value which the Sheikhs attach to the British connection. Finally, we should take any opportunity which presents itself of restoring diplomatic relations, and resuming conversations with Saudi Arabia.

10. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad, Bahrain, Kuwait and Washington, and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Nicosia.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 1013/1

No. 4

POLITICAL REPORT ON IRAN FOR THE FOURTH QUARTER OF 1956

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 22)

(No. 17. Confidential)
Sir,

Tehran,
January 18, 1957.

I have the honour to submit my report on events during the last quarter of 1956, which was remarkable for Iranian activity and initiative in the field of foreign affairs. The quarter began with Iran's election to the six-member executive group of the Suez Canal Users' Association. There followed State visits from Presidents Chamoun of the Lebanon and Iskander Mirza of Pakistan, and the holding of the Tehran conference of the Asian Baghdad Pact Powers. This conference undoubtedly did much to preserve the structure of the Baghdad Pact and helped to quieten anti-British opinion in Iraq and Pakistan as well as in Iran. Late November saw the expulsion of a Saudi garrison from the Island of Arabi and its occupation by Iranian naval forces. In early December Iran, together with her three Asian Baghdad Pact Allies, officially requested the United States to consider joining the Pact. Lastly, in mid-December, Iran rather hurriedly suggested that a conference of Middle East Powers be held in Tehran to consider regional problems, a suggestion which came to nought owing to Egyptian-Syrian opposition.

2. Otherwise, internal security was well maintained by the Military Government; and, after a show of fierce opposition, a U.S.\$75 million International Bank loan for the Seven-year Plan Organisation was approved by Parliament.

Internal Affairs

3. Throughout the quarter, and particularly during the difficult weeks of the Suez crisis, internal security was well maintained. There was no doubt that the British action in Egypt stirred up anti-British feelings and a sense of outrage at the Anglo-French attack on other Moslems in the country at large, and that it stimulated and focussed the emotional anglophobia which colours the views of many middle class and educated Iranians. But fortunately the authorities, and particularly the Military Government in Tehran, blocked virtually all means of communication between the anti-British intellectuals and the potentially anti-British masses; and, so, the head was denied opportunities to articulate any anti-British movement of the body. The extremist politicians and mullahs, exemplified by the demagogues Baga'i and Kashani, were placed under temporary restraint as soon as they attempted to start anti-British agitation; a budding pro-Egyptian students' movement was immediately and effectively nipped by the University Rector, Dr. Egbal; the Government-controlled radio followed a cautious line, and the authorities were able to discourage the holding of any public meetings. During the first days of the crisis some freedom was allowed the Press, which adopted a generally anti-British tone, but the reins were tightened after the Ambassador and Press Officer had expressed their concern to the Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior respectively about sensational headlines. Throughout the crisis period the Shah and his Government clearly realised that if as a result of our action in Egypt anti-British or pro-Egyptian demonstrations got out of hand, it might spell the end of a régime which has staked its future on the Baghdad Pact including *inter alia* association with Britain. In this connexion, the Tehran conference of the four Asian Baghdad Pact Powers during the first week of November provided the Government with a splendid opportunity to create a diversion. The Shah, in reply to a telegram sent by the leading Shi'a divine, the aged Burujerdi, enquiring what was being done to help Egypt, was able to point out that the four-power communiqué calling on the British and French for an immediate cease-fire had been quickly followed by the cease-fire itself.

4. Action against the Tudeh Party continued. It has by now been reduced to a precarious and fragmentary underground existence, but there is evidently some life left in the cells. During October a military tribunal sentenced four party members to death and eight others to heavy terms of imprisonment, while in December arrests of Tudeh members were made in Tehran and Tabriz. Brain washing of prisoners with a Tudeh background continued, and on the Shah's birthday some 60 of those

considered clean were amnestied. Some evidence accumulated that former members of Musaddeq's nationalist Iran Party were banding together for mutual co-operation and future political action. But they are moving cautiously and do not yet appear to present more than a potential threat to the régime or to British interests. However an edition of their clandestine journal the *Rah i Musaddeq* appeared containing a bitter attack on Her Majesty's Government's Egyptian policy and suggesting that the Iranian Government's attitudes had been arranged merely to please Sir Anthony Eden and Her Majesty The Queen.

5. In Parliament, interest centered on a show of rather fierce opposition from both houses to a bill approving a U.S.\$75 million loan from the International Bank to the Seven-year Plan Organisation (S.Y.P.O.), to be used for financing development projects during the next two or three years. This opposition drew together, although for different reasons, conservative supporters of the régime and its nationalist and radical critics. It also has helped to give something of a rough shape to a corporate personality in the 19th Majles which, however, remains as weak in leadership as in principle. A main cause of hostility to the loan lay in the fact that it was negotiated by Abdul Husain Ebtehaj, the Seven-year Plan Organisation director who is, unhappily, detested by nearly everyone. Other sources of opposition were the traditional Iranian distrust of foreign loans and suspicion that this loan would lead to foreign supervision, claims that the loan was too large and would demand too heavy an amortisation, and fears that the loan, because tied to no particular project, would be frittered away on further plans and paper schemes. However, it was generally known that the Shah supported the bill and that when he cracked the whip it would be passed by Parliament. He did so just before Christmas, and almost immediately the bill was passed by both houses with only a few votes against. But in the preceding month Parliament, by digging its heels in and demonstrating hostility towards the loan, was able to make a passive and typically Iranian show of protest against Ebtehaj, the Government and against Ebtehaj's patron, the Shah. There are indications that the development programme, and perhaps by association the British and foreign companies working on its major projects, will be subjected to political attacks in Parliament and elsewhere.

6. Other points of note were a severe earthquake in Fars, the opening of an anti-illiteracy campaign in which about 100,000 people eagerly enrolled, the holding of the first national census which set the population at 18.9 million, and the betrothal of the Shah's only child, Princess Shahnaz, to General Zahedi's son, Ardeshir.

Economic and Financial Affairs

7. Little harmful effect had been caused by the end of the year to the Iranian economy by the blocking of the Suez Canal other than a somewhat slower rate of turnover at the ports. However, it became known that the Consortium may have to cut back immediate future oil production on account of the shortage of tankers, an action which will cause a corresponding decrease in Iran's oil revenues. The oil well near Qum, which struck oil at the end of August and gushed violently for many weeks, finally sealed itself in mid-November.

8. As far as major projects were concerned, good progress continued on the Ahwaz-Tehran pipeline, which is now nearing the capital, and on laying the eastern arm of the Trans-Iranian Railway, which was driven forward to Meshed. After long delay and much procrastination a dozen of Mowlem's road contracts were approved by the Minister of Roads, but a number of other Mowlem's contracts remain outstanding. In October, after the dismissal of Engineer Hami, Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Roads and pertinacious opponent of Mowlems, for continued obstruction of the Seven-year Plan Organisation's road programme, the position of Mowlems appeared somewhat improved. But they remain in a delicate situation, exposed to attacks.

9. Iran's financial situation improved considerably. The foreign exchange reserves mounted and the budget was kept balanced. Revenues increased with prosperity, increasing oil revenues balanced the reduced flow of American aid and expenditure was kept lower than had been anticipated. But the equilibrium remains precarious. The International Bank \$75 million loan, mentioned above as being approved in late December, has secured the financial basis of the Seven-year Plan Organisation for the next two to three years. In addition Iran received an Export-Import Bank loan of about \$5 million for the purchase of United States manufactured road-building machinery and equipment, and it was announced that

United States financial aid to Iran would amount to \$52.5 million in 1957-58. Of this amount, which does not include military aid, some \$12 million will be spent on Point IV activities and salaries and the remainder will be available to finance development projects.

Foreign Affairs

10. Events during the quarter emphasised the pro-Western alignment of present Iranian foreign policy. The period began with Iran's election to the six-member executive group of the Suez Canal Users' Association. It saw a joint and official Iranian-Iraqi-Turco-Pakistani request made in Washington for United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact; and ended with an Egyptian rejection of the Iranian invitation to a Middle East regional conference to be held in Tehran, ostensibly on the grounds of Iranian aggression against Saudi Arabia but probably because the Iranian suggestion of a conference was regarded as a British-inspired initiative.

11. The State visit of President Chamoun of the Lebanon having been amicably concluded in late October with the promise of greater cultural co-operation between the two countries, there arrived on his heels, and simultaneously with the Israeli offensive in Sinai, the President of Pakistan, General Iskander Mirza with his Iranian-born wife. At President Iskander Mirza's prompting the Iranian Government called a meeting of the Asian members of the Baghdad Pact to concert a common policy over the Suez crisis. At this conference the Shah took the lead for Iran with the Prime Minister, M. Ala, and the Foreign Minister, Dr. Ardalan. Iraq was represented by Prime Minister Nuri Said and Turkey by Prime Minister Menderes, while the Pakistani delegation comprised the President together with Prime Minister Suhrawardy and Foreign Minister Sir Firuz Noon Khan. On the 8th of November the conference produced a communiqué calling, *inter alia*, on the British and French to cease fire in Egypt. Behind the scenes there were frequent consultations with Her Majesty's Ambassador which enabled him to obtain modifications of the wording of the communiqué and to concert a reply by Her Majesty's Government in terms satisfactory to the four Powers. The Tehran conference was followed by a similar conference held in Baghdad from the 19th to the 21st of November, with Iran represented by Dr. Ardalan. The latter conference appeared mainly concerned with the threat developing from the pro-Soviet alignment in Syria, and doubtless was one of the factors which drew from Washington on the 30th of November a statement reaffirming United States support for the Asian Baghdad Pact Powers.

12. In addition to this close Iranian co-operation with her Asian Baghdad Pact Allies, was the single-handed and hurriedly-mounted Iranian initiative in inviting eight Middle Eastern Powers to a conference in Tehran to discuss regional differences. This invitation was announced by Dr. Ardalan on the 9th of December in a speech to the Majles during which he called for a cessation of the Iraqi-Syrian cold war. Owing to Egyptian hostility the invitation fizzled out rather damply.

13. While the Iranian connexion with Britain was subject to considerable strain, United States-Iranian relations undoubtedly improved. The American attitude towards the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt was generally welcomed and regarded as correct. In retrospect many Iranians felt that the British failure either to seize the Canal or unhorse Nasser heralded diminishing British, and increasing American influence, in the Middle East. There were suggestions that the Shah (after, rather than during, the crisis) was thinking on these lines—as of course were the many habitual opponents of Britain in Iran. Nevertheless, the Shah and his Government stood by us well at the time of the Suez crisis, both by allowing only a minimum of anti-British criticism to be heard in public and in keeping Her Majesty's Ambassador informed of developments during the Tehran conference. It appeared that if the position in Iraq can be held, and if we can show proof of our intention to provide solid support to the military and economic aims of the Baghdad Pact organisation, then the Shah and Iranian Government will welcome the continuation of the British alliance. Meanwhile, our commercial and social relations with Iranians appeared unimpaired. In October four Iranian labour officials paid a successful visit to the United Kingdom at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government; a group of four Members of Parliament particularly interested in fuel and power visited Iran and just before the Suez crisis reached its climax a seven-man British Inter-Parliamentary Union delegation spent 10 days in this country as the guests of the Majles and Senate.

14. The Iranian Government clearly hoped for greater American support, particularly in the military field where—as the Shah has been remarking—their contribution of arms and equipment to date has been very minor, particularly if compared with Russian deliveries to Egypt or even Syria. Such a consideration, underlined by the apparent British setback in the Middle East, emphasised the general desirability, from the Iranian point of view, of the United States adherence to the Baghdad Pact.

15. On the day-to-day level United States-Iranian relations were supported by the holding of joint manoeuvres in the Persian Gulf attended by the Shah (a joint Anglo-Iranian naval exercise arranged for November had to be cancelled because of the Suez crisis), by the celebration of the 100th anniversary of the opening of United States-Iranian relations with the American presentation to the Iranian Government of a short-wave radio transmitter and by the announcement that United States financial aid to Iran for 1957 would amount to U.S.\$52.5 million.

16. Soviet activities were subdued. However, in December the Soviet Embassy succeeded in overcoming initial Iranian resistance to the despatch of a group of Iranian journalists on a tour of Russia, evidently with a view to countering the setback to Soviet prestige caused by the events in Hungary. It is significant that these journalists, most of whom were quite junior, were received by Marshal Bulganin himself. Other developments were the conclusion of an Iranian-Russo-Turkish frontier demarcation agreement in October, the visit of an Iranian football team to the Caucasus in November and the absence in Russia during December of Ambassador Pegov, who had only arrived in September. The main plank of overt Soviet policy in Iran remained that of offering technical assistance for economic development. This offer, which had been raised with the Shah on his visit to Moscow in June, has been mentioned by Mr. Pegov in public declarations in Tehran (and presumably in his private discussions with the Iranian authorities) and was also referred to in a Radio Moscow broadcast made on the Shah's birthday, October 26.

17. Relations with Turkey and Pakistan remained steady and friendly. In mid-October meetings of the Baghdad Pact Counter-Subversion and Liaison Committees were held in Tehran, and a few minor advances were made on this front.

18. In the Persian Gulf, Iran initiated a more forward policy. In October it became known that the Iranian naval sloop *Palang* had landed a body of troops on the island of Farsi. The Foreign Minister, in reply to a protest by this Embassy concerning the occupation of Farsi, which in Her Majesty's Government's view belongs to Kuwait, vigorously maintained that no alienation of immemorial Iranian sovereignty over Farsi had ever taken place. The Saudi Arabians also protested at the Iranian action and took the step of occupying the island of Arabi, which in our opinion also belongs to Kuwait (though we would be prepared to recognise Saudi sovereignty over Arabi in return for Saudi recognition of Kuwaiti sovereignty over Farsi). A week or two later, during the second half of November, Arabi was captured by Iranians landed from the sloop *Babr*, the Saudi garrison was returned to the mainland and an Iranian garrison left on the island. This incident, which has apparently deeply incensed King Saud, is symptomatic of Iranian ambitions for hegemony in the Persian Gulf and a growing awareness that rich oil reserves may lie beneath the continental shelf.

19. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Baghdad and Karachi, the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Nicosia, Development Division, Beirut, and the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

EP 1822/1

No. 5

THE 1956 CENSUS OF IRAN

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 22)

(No. 29. Restricted)
Sir,

*Tehran,
March 12, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that in December 1956 the first national census of modern times was taken in Iran. This census gave the population of the country as 18,944,821.

2. I enclose as appendices: (1)

(a) Notes on the population figures obtained through this census.

(b) A statistical table showing all towns of over 8,000 people, their populations and the populations of their surrounding regions.

3. The following general points about the population of this country are worthy of note:

(a) The authorities admit that the census figures are minimal and subject to an error of up to 10 per cent.; and it is generally believed that the true population of Iran is nearer to 20 million than to 19 million.

(b) Tehran and its surrounding region now account for 10 per cent. of the population. Since 1939 Tehran has increased its population, largely at the expense of the provinces, particularly Azerbaijan, by about five times to a total of 1.5 million.

(c) The town population of Khuzestan has grown quickly during the last three decades as a result of the exploitation of oil and the development of communications in that province.

(d) 80-85 per cent. of all Iranians still live and work in the country.

(e) Iran is a country of numerous races and tribes with the Persian-speaking Iranian element comprising only about 40 per cent. of the population.

(f) Superficially there does not seem to be a major problem of over or under population in this country (apart from the political and social consequences of the sudden growth of Tehran), but problems may be developing beneath the surface, for example, in such densely populated regions as Gilan and Mazanderan as a result of the preventive medicine campaigns which have been undertaken during the past 10 years and the falling death rate.

I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosures, to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, and the Joint Intelligence Committee.

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

(1) Not printed

EP 10325/1

No. 6

THE SHAH OF IRAN'S VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received March 26)(No. 36. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *March 23, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that the Shah of Iran returned to Tehran on March 18 after a six-day visit to Saudi Arabia on which he was accompanied by some thirty officials including the Foreign Minister, Dr. Ardalan; the Minister of Court, Dr. Eqbal; and the President of the Senate, Mr. Taqizadeh. The party flew in an Iranian Airways D.C.4 direct to Riyadh where they spent three days and nights. They subsequently flew to Jedda travelling by car to Mecca, then to Medina, returning to Riyadh on March 17 for one night before leaving for Iran.

2. As a display of Saudi wealth and hospitality the visit seems to have been an unparalleled success. I have received from the two Ministers involved the most glowing accounts of the splendours of the Royal Palaces at Riyadh, Medina and Jedda and the refinements of taste, service and attention which they encountered everywhere. They found awaiting them in every suite large refrigerators filled with bottles of Coca Cola; the ultra-modern bathrooms were equipped not merely with the usual facilities, but also with razors, combs, toothbrushes, and bottles of Roger and Gallet eau de cologne. At the official banquets three or four hundred guests were seated at magnificent gilded tables of French or Italian origin in illuminated halls; at Jedda there were no less than twenty-five chandeliers in a row. What most attracted the professional eye of Dr. Eqbal was firstly the remarkable standard of service and efficiency at these entertainments, and secondly the harmony and discipline which prevailed within the Royal Family. If he is able to improve local practices in either of these two respects I wish him good luck. The Shah for his part professes to be shocked by the absence of expenditure on schools and social welfare.

3. While a good deal of the visit was spent in ceremonies, both secular and religious, time was also allowed for political

discussions. The party appear to have returned with a fairly favourable view of the state of mind of King Saud and a highly unflattering picture of Yusuf Yasin. Dr. Ardalan, who spent much longer with the latter than was good for him, compared him to the pop-eyed devil in the Iranian mystery plays or *tazzieh*. He seemed like "an old-fashioned terror" and obviously aroused nightmarish boyhood memories. Nor did he have anything good to say about Yusuf Yasin's political views. In the course of a long conversation, in which Dr. Ardalan had avoided the subject, Yusuf Yasin brought up the question of the Bagdad Pact: delivered a violent attack upon it, demanded that Iran should withdraw from it and then expressed satisfaction that Iran should operate as shield against Communism in the Middle East. When Dr. Ardalan said that this was precisely what they were trying to do and must be allowed to choose their own way of doing it, Yusuf Yasin had no reply, but waved aside any idea that Syria constituted a danger, declaring that the country where Communism really flourished was the Lebanon. These two spent the whole last night of the visit drafting the innocuous final communiqué, the text of which is enclosed.⁽¹⁾ This was largely, according to Dr. Ardalan, his own work. Yusuf Yasin first produced a text which was totally unsuitable, full of references to Bandoeng and other subjects which I am glad to say the Iranians find somewhat nauseating.

4. King Saud by contrast appears to have been most reasonable. Though he complained that one of its members attacked a fellow Arab country he did not otherwise criticise the Bagdad Pact; he expressed deep concern about Egypt and Syria, particularly the latter; and he spoke warmly of improved relations with Iraq, saying incidentally that the fact that they had been able to get together as oil producers had already been useful to Saudi Arabia financially. An attempt was made to get the Iranians to agree that the Gulf of Aqaba should be regarded as an inland

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Arab sea; this they successfully evaded on the ground that it was a technical question, that it would require study and would have to be settled in accordance with United Nations principles and so forth. I have the strong impression that they have no intention whatever of giving any substantial support to the Arab thesis on this question.

5. The Shah has returned full of ideas about a bilateral Saudi-Iranian defence pact, which would help to formalise the detachment of Saudi Arabia from Egypt and Syria and improve the standing of the Bagdad Pact in the Arab world. (It would also, one is tempted to suspect, strengthen the position of both countries *vis-à-vis* the British-protected Sheikhdoms in the Gulf.) He claims to have received some encouragement while in Saudi Arabia for these ideas. But I gather from Dr. Ardalan that it is all very much in the air and if anything is to come of it the Iranians will have to take the initiative and do most of the spade work.

6. The two Kings also had some conversations about the future of the islands of Farsi and Arabi on which I have already reported separately by telegram.

7. Finally, they discussed the future of Saudi-British relations. King Saud apparently said that he recognised that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom had a legitimate interest in the

Middle East. This was one of the facts of life which he did not dispute. His quarrel with the British arose firstly over Buraimi and secondly over Suez. These were, for him, deep and serious issues. He added, however, that estrangements should not last for ever and hinted that he would not be averse to a resumption of relations. He coupled this with a suggestion that it would make things much easier if the British were able to make a concrete proposal—presumably regarding Buraimi. To this the Shah apparently suggested that there should be a resumption of negotiation—though whether about procedure, substance or merely the restoration of diplomatic relations is not entirely clear. Since his return he has suggested, privately, to my counsellor, that he believes that if it were possible for us to have informal overtures with the Saudis in some third country (Switzerland, for example, where he believed there was a responsible Saudi representative) we would find them ready to talk about the resumption of diplomatic relations without preliminary conditions.

8. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Bagdad, Bahrain, Beirut, Berne, Karachi, Washington and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Nicosia.

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

EP 1111/7

No. 7

IRANIAN BUDGET FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING MARCH 21, 1957

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 2)(No. 38 E. Confidential)
Sir,*Tehran,
March 30, 1957.*

I have the honour to enclose details⁽¹⁾ of budget estimates for the Iranian year beginning March 21, 1957, which were recently submitted to Parliament by the Government and have since been approved with only minor changes. I also enclose a summary of the estimates for this year and the previous year.

2. The Government's performance during the year which has just ended looks like being quite satisfactory. Although the figures available are scanty and unreliable, revenues other than oil appear to have reached 13.5 billion rials, showing an increase of one-third on the previous year, mainly as a result of a rise in customs receipts, which in turn reflected the country's growing commercial prosperity. There appears, on the other hand, to have been little improvement in the receipts from direct taxation. Expenditure, which looks like being of the order of 18 billion rials, was over 1 billion rials smaller than had been budgeted for. The gap between ordinary revenues and expenditure has been met as to roughly half from the oil revenues and rather less than half from United States aid (which amounted to some \$35 million or nearly 2 billion rials). The Government is likely to end the year with a balanced budget after Aid or, at the worst, a small deficit.

3. The budget for the new Iranian year balances on paper at a figure of 21 billion rials—an increase of 18 per cent. over last year. What appears to have happened, however, is that the Minister of Finance has been obliged to agree to a higher level of expenditure than he thought feasible and that revenues have had to be very optimistically assessed in order to balance the estimates. The main increases in expenditure have been in the field of education, health, agriculture and communications. There have also been badly needed pay improvements for some categories of civil servants. In particular, those serving in the provinces are to be given a bonus in order to counteract the present reluctance to serve outside Tehran. A windfall of £1 million, arising from the repayment of the shares in the First Oil Exploration Company, is to be used to increase the capital of the Agricultural, Mortgage and Building Banks.

4. The revenue figures appear highly optimistic. The anticipated oil revenues stand at the same figure as last year, which seems on the high side since while production will increase the Ministry of Finance's share of the revenues will fall. Last year the Ministry enjoyed the whole of the revenue from oil production in excess of the guaranteed figure. But this year the Consortium are reluctant to agree to an increase in oil production above the guaranteed figure in view of the fact that the development programme which they have in mind will take several years to carry out, that they are nearing the ceiling of production with existing facilities and that they must keep something in hand to maintain an increase in oil production during the next two or three years. The amount which the Government hope to get out of the National Iranian Oil Company is even more optimistic since the Ministry of Finance have so far only been able to squeeze a small sum out of the N.I.O.C's budget and the company are committed to heavy expenditure at Qum. It seems equally optimistic to assume, as the Government have done, that they can double the yield of direct taxes. Finally United States aid is likely to be on a small scale. Washington has so far set its face against the provision of any funds for budget support as such and the best that the Iranians can hope for is that some \$12 million will be made available for what is in fact, if not in name, budget support; also perhaps for a further gift of surplus commodities similar to the one which was made last year and which would provide some \$5 million for the support of the military budget.

5. It looks, therefore, as though the Iranians may be faced with a budget deficit during the coming year and we can expect further appeals to the Consortium or to the United States Government. The latter are likely to be received very critically

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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since, apart from the growing dislike with which Congress view the foreign aid programme, the United States Government are by no means satisfied with the efforts which the Iranians have made to put their house in order. Their performance during 1956 was a considerable improvement on that of previous years and the Minister of Finance, Mr. Foruhar, deserves credit for his efforts, but the final outcome was perhaps as much a matter of luck as of judgment. And the Government still show no signs of attempting a radical overhaul of their budget and their tax collecting system. In particular there is no indication that they intend to carry out the recommendations made by American and British tax consultants alike that they should adopt a tax on farm land and urban property as being the most feasible form of direct taxation.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Treasury, to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, to the Export Credits Guarantee Department, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, to the Middle East Development Division, Beirut and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF THE IRANIAN BUDGET ESTIMATES FOR THE YEARS BEGINNING MARCH 1956 AND MARCH 1957

	Year beginning March 1956 (in millions of rials)	Year beginning March 1957 (in millions of rials)
<i>Revenue</i>		
Income Tax	1,340	2,450
Tax on Petroleum Products	1,150	1,530
Tax on Industrial Alcohol	400	835
Tobacco Monopoly	2,900	3,400
Sugar Tax	450	1,000
Customs Duties	4,875	6,530
Oil Revenues	2,025	2,025
Receipts from N.I.O.C.	1,000	1,400
Other Revenue	1,659	2,550
Total Revenue	15,784	21,715
<i>Expenditure</i>		
Ministry of War	5,871	6,076
Gendarmerie	997	1,190
Police	1,052	1,125
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs	525	726
Ministry of Education	3,583	3,895
Ministry of Agriculture	400	491
Road Maintenance	400	550
Ministry of Health	580	774
Ministry of Finance	676	726
Tobacco Monopoly	1,118	1,019
Ports and Navigation	—	50
Civil Aviation	—	129
Railway Construction	—	76
Other Expenditure	4,663	4,891
Total Expenditure	19,865	21,718

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EP 1015/13

No. 8

THE NEW IRANIAN CABINET

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 9)(No. 42. Confidential)
Sir,Tehran,
April 5, 1957.

I have the honour to report that on the 3rd of April Mr. Hussain Ala resigned and Dr. Manuchehr Eqbal was nominated Prime Minister by royal decree. I enclose a list of Dr. Eqbal's Cabinet which was announced yesterday.⁽¹⁾

2. The new Cabinet, while composed of younger and probably more liberal men than Mr. Ala's, remains essentially conservative, pro-Western and well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government and the United States. The army is strongly represented. A number of the same Ministers have been retained. Mr. Ala returns to the Court Ministry which he has held on three previous occasions; and Dr. Ardalan and General Vusug remain at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War, though it is rumoured that the former may press for a change and rest before long. Departures from the Cabinet include Mr. Alam (Interior), Mr. Gulsha'yan (Justice), who may take over the National Bank, and Mr. Furuhar (Finance). The more interesting newcomers are General Zargham, who has been a most efficient head of Customs, to head a new Ministry of Customs and Monopolies; Aqa Khan Bakhtiar, the president of the Mortgage Bank, who is to hold the portfolio of Labour; and the young and capable General Akhavi, who is to be Minister of Agriculture. General Timur Bakhtiar, the Military Governor of Tehran, enters the Cabinet as a deputy Prime Minister in charge of the Security Service. Mr. Ebtehaj, the director of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, remains but his future is not yet clear.

3. The new Cabinet should be stronger and more effective than its predecessor. Dr. Eqbal himself is a much younger, more forceful and more energetic man than Mr. Ala and he should be able to dominate and direct his colleagues by his industry, energy, administrative ability and attention to detail. Bulky, self-disciplined, ambitious and outspoken, Dr. Eqbal is a French-trained doctor of medicine married to a Frenchwoman. Relatively young (49), he has built up his political reputation and

gained widespread political following by his work as provincial governor and, during the past three years, in reforming and enlarging Tehran university. Dr. Eqbal's leadership should bring greater unity of purpose to the Cabinet. In addition, the main source of discord in the Ala Cabinet—the rivalry between Dr. Eqbal and Mr. Alam—has now been removed by the departure of Mr. Alam. Moreover, Dr. Eqbal appears to be able to work fairly well with the other forceful personalities in present-day Iranian politics, Mr. Ebtehaj and General Bakhtiar.

4. Dr. Eqbal will therefore start his term of office in a stronger position than did Mr. Ala in April 1955. With his considerable university and ministerial experience behind him, an expectant and moderately well-disposed public, and with no rivals of equal capacity, it would seem that his success or failure will depend largely on his ability to share the fruits of power in the right proportion with the Shah. The Shah, a most difficult master, is likely to insist on maintaining virtual control over foreign policy, in which he is interesting himself more and more, and over the army, whose personal allegiance is the keystone of his position as ruling Monarch; and also to retain a definite interest in the elections to Parliament. Presumably the Shah will also seek to balance the increased power of his new Premier by playing off against him other political make-weights who are always available in Iran: for example, a combination of Court Minister Ala and the group of "King's Friends" deputies in the Majles directed by the Shah might well serve as an effective check on Dr. Eqbal. There has been some talk of moving towards a two-party system from now on, with Dr. Eqbal leading a Government majority party and Mr. Alam (the former Minister of Interior) an Opposition party. The very latest indications are that Mr. Alam may become Ambassador in Paris, but this would not necessarily prevent the Shah from fostering a system which would enable him to hold the political balance. It is also believed in well-informed circles that Mr. Alam is being kept, like a rod in pickle, to return as Prime Minister if and when the

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

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Shah falls out with Dr. Eqbal. These tactics, which are based on the Shah's inclination towards a policy of "divide and rule," may eventually provoke a clash leading to much the same rupture between the Shah and his Premier as became evident when General Zahedi was dismissed in 1955 and was developing when General Razmara was assassinated in 1951. Meanwhile, for the time being, both the Shah and Dr. Eqbal should be able to count on running with a fair wind.

5. Apart from preserving his relationship with the Shah, the main task before Dr. Eqbal in the political field is to lay the basis of some form of political settlement between the conservative ruling class and the more moderate elements of its liberal and nationalist middle-class critics and opponents. It was the latter class which both led the constitutional revolution of 1905-8 against the Qajar monarchy and also provided much of the initial impetus behind the tidal bore of Musaddiq's revolution against foreign, and particularly British, influence from 1951 to 1953. As an inevitable consequence to General Zahedi's counter-revolution in August 1953, middle-class nationalism has temporarily been forced beneath the political surface in Iran but it can hardly be kept there indefinitely. Although I have scanty means of judging, since the opportunities for political expression in Iran are still extremely limited, the submerged political strength of the middle class can only be increasing steadily as greater educational opportunities produce, and economic progress demands, a growing body of trained professional men. Such men expect a reasonable measure of political freedom, fair opportunities for economic advancement and a complete equality for Iran in her foreign relations. At present these aspirations are not satisfied in the domestic field, while in the sphere of foreign relations Iranians are still hypnotised by the neurosis that foreign, and particularly British, influence is thrusting into every village and valley of Iran. The persistence of this neurosis, which can only be removed by slow and patient treatment, was emphasised by the Iran Party incident in January (my despatch No. 24 of the 9th of February refers) and by the speculations raised by the recent killing by Baluch bandits of the Point IV director in Kerman province. Although in Iranian eyes he is somewhat tarred with the pro-British brush, Dr. Eqbal, with his Western mind, essentially middle-class qualities, and his experience of pacify-

ing Tehran university, which has been a centre of nationalist and revolutionary sentiment, appears to be an excellent bridge between the Shah and the conservative ruling class on the one hand, and the middle-class liberals and nationalists on the other.

6. Dr. Eqbal evidently intends to pursue a liberal policy. In a press interview on the 3rd of April he announced that his programme would be based on liberty—for the individual, for the Press and for political parties. This announcement has already caused a wave of public sympathy and optimism, since there have been very restrictive and inflexible restraints on freedom of political association and on the freedom of the Press in Iran since Musaddiq was overthrown in 1953. Dr. Eqbal was also able to announce that he had no intention of prolonging the state of siege and military government which was lifted, after a period of nearly six years, on the 4th of April. The ending of military government on the first day of Dr. Eqbal's Ministry is regarded as a most fortunate omen for the future; and the analogy is being drawn with Dr. Eqbal's first action on becoming Dean of Tehran University in 1953. This was to remove the tanks which were stationed in the university grounds as a deterrent to student demonstrations against the régime. In fact, Dr. Eqbal's well-wishers now hope that he will be able—by his liberal but firm policies and his thoroughgoing administrative ability—to do for Iran what he has done for the university during the past three years; that is, to create a favourable climate of opinion and to improve and inspire by patient, modernising reform. Thus, Dr. Eqbal has got away to a good start.

7. Looking back on the past two years of the Ala Ministry, its main achievements clearly lay in the sphere of foreign relations, where Iran stepped well forward on the international stage. The period saw the abandonment after 150 years of Iran's traditional policy of attempting to preserve a delicate balance between Britain and Russia, as the result of the Shah's historic decision to lead Iran into the Western camp, through membership of the Bagdad Pact, in September 1955. It also saw the successful development of the oil agreement concluded with the Consortium in 1954. In internal affairs the Government's achievement is less easy to define, though it continued to provide the foundation of stability, which is essential to any form of progress in Iran, during the relatively long

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period of two years. The *status quo* achieved by the Zahedi Administration and by military government was maintained; there was a good record of public security; campaigns against opium and illiteracy were launched, and the planning and financing of a number of economic development projects were undertaken by the Seven-Year Plan Organisation. The army was strengthened, and increased United States military aid is to be forthcoming. But the Ala Administration inspired little hopefulness for a better future and held no appeal for the professional class and the young people; its passing will be regretted by few Iranians.

8. A change of Government had been predicted as very likely for the past three months. It is now clear that the Shah intended to effect the change after the State visits by the Federal German Chancellor and the Italian President had taken place. By chance, the visit of President Gronchi has now been postponed, and so Mr. Ala resigned on the day after Chancellor Adenauer had left Iran. The reason for the change can, I believe, be attributed to the fact that the Shah felt that Mr. Ala had

held the fort for long enough against generally critical, though indirectly expressed, public opinion; that Mr. Ala, well on in his seventies, wished to lay down his burden; and that the time had now come to allow Dr. Eqlal to move out with more forward-looking domestic policies. The change has been made at a good psychological moment from the point of view of the Iranian people, and is one which appears satisfactory for British interests in Iran and for the Western cause in general.

9. In conclusion, as an illustration of Dr. Eqlal's approach to his new task, I might record that the programme which he laid before the Shah, a document in which a new Prime Minister traditionally sets out his hopes or intentions, usually at considerable length, consisted of the one word—"Work."

10. I am sending copies of this despatch, with enclosure, to Washington, Bagdad, Ankara, Karachi, P.O.M.E.F. and S.N.O.P.G.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 10318/1

No. 9

Dr. ADENAUER'S VISIT TO IRAN

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 9)

(No. 43. Confidential)

Tehran,

Sir,

April 6, 1957.

I have the honour to report that the Federal German Chancellor paid an official visit to Iran from March 28 to April 2 as guest of the Iranian Government. He was accompanied by the State Secretary of the Chancellor's Office, Dr. Globke, the head of the Press and Information Office, Herr von Eckhardt, the head of the Trade Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dr. van Scherpenberg, other officials of the Federal Press Office and Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and a large number of journalists and photographers. His attractive daughter, Frau Werhahn, and his son, Dr. Konrad Adenauer, were also in the party.

2. The concentrated programme arranged by the German Embassy would have daunted many a younger man, and in the event a visit by air to Shiraz and the ruins of Persepolis, some 500 miles south from Tehran, had to be cancelled owing to lack of pressurised aircraft. The programme was, nevertheless, a full one, including banquets given by the Shah at the Marble and Ekhtessassi Palaces and by the Prime Minister at the Golestan Palace, a day-long visit by air to Isfahan, and visits to Tehran University, Tehran Archaeological Museum and the Tomb of Reza Shah for a wreath laying.

3. The Chancellor was everywhere received with enthusiasm and affection, and his erect and dignified demeanour and apparent tirelessness were much admired. The official communiqué (copy enclosed)⁽¹⁾ reflects the evident success and cordiality of the visit as well as the absence of any major result, and indeed a feature of the visit was the conscious and unremitting effort made by the German Embassy and the visitors to emphasise that it was a courtesy visit with no immediate motive, political or economic. Nevertheless, there has been much speculation as to the real motives and results of the visit in the economic field, summed up perhaps in the words of the *Times* Bonn correspondent on

April 1: "Two days of discussions in Tehran have paved the way for large-scale West German penetration of the Middle East and exploitation of the Persian oilfields."

4. I have found little evidence to support this view or the interpretation contained in the acidulous *Times* leader of March 26, about which the German delegation complained repeatedly. The presence of Dr. van Scherpenberg in the delegation gave perhaps some indication of the economic background to the visit, but if the Iranians expected any special assistance or large scale offers on this account they were surely disappointed. In the several conversations which he had with myself and members of my staff, Dr. van Scherpenberg was at pains to deny categorically any major economic objectives of the visit and particularly to deny any intention of offering Government funds or credits for trade promotion, development, or any other purposes (though of course he did not fail to remind us of the enterprise of German industry and the existence of the Hermes credit insurance agency). Similarly, the delegation, through its spokesman, Herr von Eckhardt, strenuously denied allegations of German collaboration with the Iranians in the exploitation of the oil resources of Qum or the laying of the projected pipeline through Turkey. Specifically he announced that these matters had not even been discussed, and that Press stories of German collaboration with Italian interests in the current discussions on exploration in the south were untrue. Germany, he said, was ready to interest herself in the industrial development of Iran, if invited to do so by the Iranian Government, but a distinction must be drawn between the exploitation of oil resources here, which did not directly interest Germany, and the construction of technical installations, including pipelines, in which German industry had a legitimate interest. But he repeated that no discussions had taken place on the subject and, as regards the supply of Iranian oil to Germany, there were agreements in existence

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

with the major international oil companies which had to be taken into account. On the other hand, there have been unconfirmed but plausible reports of talks between the Chancellor and the Shah, in which Dr. Adenauer is said to have emphasised that should any German participation in the development of the Qum oilfield take place it could only be in close co-operation with other interested European countries. It was indeed everywhere evident during the visit that the Chancellor and his party were determined to avoid frightening other European observers with visions of renewed German expansionism in this area.

5. The tangible economic results of the visit therefore boil down to the agreement, referred to in the communiqué, to send a mission of economic experts here to study means of future long-term economic collaboration, and the provision of DM. 4 million for assistance with teachers and equipment for junior technical schools at Tehran and Tabriz. The economic mission may well bring useful benefits to German trade in the future, but no date for it has yet been fixed and its terms of reference are so far vague. The modest scheme of technical assistance, on the other hand is intended as an immediate practical measure and was described to us by Dr. van Scherpenberg as an example of his own cherished policy of helping under-developed countries at the work-bench level, and there is no doubt of the need for teaching and equipment at the few rudimentary junior technical schools which exist here.

6. In the cultural field Dr. Adenauer undoubtedly had a field day on his visit to Tehran University to receive an honorary doctorate of law. Both he and the Rector, Dr. Eghbal (since become Prime Minister)

made the most of the past record of German scholarship in Iran, whilst a reference in Dr. Eghbal's speech to the deposition by the British authorities in 1945 of the American-appointed Mayor of Cologne appears fortunately to have escaped comment and was, according to Dr. Eghbal, taken "blind" from a script provided by the German Embassy. It was slightly unfortunate, if inevitable, that the same speech contained an impressive list of the foreign honorary degrees held by Dr. Adenauer, including several from American Universities but none from the United Kingdom. But to judge from *Who's Who*, this appears to be no less than the truth.

7. The Germans can on the whole feel well satisfied with this short visit, not for any tangible results achieved but for the evident goodwill which it has engendered and the absence of any friction created. Faced with the hopes and perhaps demands of their hosts, they appear to have made it clear, with considerable tact and restraint, that the Federal Government was not prepared to add further to the fund of Governmental assistance being offered to this country, and indeed that the need was not for funds but for brains and skill. This point has been well put over, and if in the process of supplying technical assistance on practical lines Germany should incidentally increase her trade and reputation here there will be few to criticise the methods used.

8. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Ankara, Bagdad, Beirut, Bonn and Washington and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 1013/2

No. 10

POLITICAL REPORT FOR THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1957

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 24)

(No. 52. Confidential)
Sir,

Tehran,
April 17, 1957.

I have the honour to submit my report on events in Iran during the first quarter of 1957, a period which saw a marked strengthening of the country's diplomatic and economic connexions with the Western world, particularly with the United States, Italy and Federal Germany. In the economic sphere, oil production moved ahead steadily, but the Seven-Year Plan Organisation (S.Y.P.O.) had regrettably little achievement to show. In its internal policy the Government did no more than maintain the *status quo*.

2. The most significant events of the quarter appear to have been the initialling of an oil concession agreement with the Italian concern E.N.I./A.G.I.P. and the announcement of United States readiness to join the Baghdad Pact Military Committee.

Internal Affairs

3. The surface calm of political life was broken by a wave of tension, indirectly set in motion by the differences between British and American policies and attitudes in the Middle East revealed after the Suez affair, and directly by a communiqué published by the Iran Party in support of the Eisenhower doctrine. This communiqué provoked much public speculation and sharp reactions from the Government. The Iran Party, which was one of the components of Musaddeq's national front movement, is a small and more or less clandestine group of professional men led by Allahyar Saleh and in opposition to the Conservative Government. It was generally assumed at the time the communiqué was published that Saleh had been encouraged to welcome the Eisenhower doctrine by official contact, overt or covert, with the Americans. Speculation suggested that the Americans were about to draw away their backing from the "British-supported régime" and bestow their favour on younger and more progressive elements. In retrospect, it would seem that the Iran Party, sensing that an opportunity had arrived to exploit the Anglo-American divergence over Middle East policy, made an attempt both to convince their following and the public that the Americans were supporting them because they were a progressive group, and also a bid to catch the eye of the Richards Mission which is known would soon be visiting Iran to consider practical ways and means of implementing the Eisenhower doctrine. The publication of this communiqué may be regarded as the first public move made for the past three years by a section of the submerged, quiescent and disunited Iranian nationalist movement. The Government's reaction was sharp both in the Press and Parliament, where the Iran Party was attacked mainly for its past connexion with the Tudeh movement. In the Majles, a motion was put down calling for the party's legal proscription but this motion was shelved when the affair blew over.

4. Military Government was maintained in Tehran, but its abolition was foreshadowed by the passage through Parliament of two bills on security. The first bill, which devolves special powers on the local authorities for the effective maintenance of security, was passed by the Majles and Senate with some small amendments. The second bill, which gives legal powers to the Security and Information Organisation already established under General Bakhtiari, was passed by the Majles and is now before the Senate.

5. Parliamentary activity was mainly concerned with the two security bills, a bill for increased S.Y.P.O. loans to municipalities, and with the budget for 1957-58, which was passed just before Nouruz without any sustained criticism although it is balanced only in appearance. The bill calling for greater financial assistance from the S.Y.P.O. for municipal development schemes (water, electricity and asphalt) came from the floor of the Majles in early January—an unusual occurrence as nearly all bills are introduced by the Government—and led to a renewal of the recurrent attacks on Mr. Eftehaj. It was generally interpreted as the *quid pro quo*

demanding by the Majles for having approved in late December the \$75 million International Bank loan for the S.Y.P.O. which Mr. Ebtehaj had negotiated. The bill was approved after a compromise had been reached between the appropriate Majles commission and Mr. Ebtehaj. In March, on completion of the Senate three-year term, 30 Senators were balloted out. Their places will be taken by 15 Senators nominated by the Shah and 15 to be elected.

6. The previous good record of public security was broken in late March by the killing by Baluch bandits of a Point IV party travelling in two jeeps through wild country and comprising three Americans and two Iranians. In addition a Tudeh party ring was uncovered in Gorgân, an organisation for selling military arms broken up in Azarbaijân and a further attempt made to coerce the Boir Ahmadi and Qashqai tribes of Pars to surrender rifles. At Nouruz over a hundred junior officers and N.C.O.'s who had been detained for their past connexion with the Tudeh Party were amnestied.

7. Rumours about a change of Government increased steadily and Eqbal, Gulsha'yan and Taqizadeh were regarded as the most likely to take over from Husain Ala. The latter in fact resigned on the 3rd of April and the Shah appointed Dr. Eqbal Prime Minister.

Economic Affairs

8. In the budget for 1957-58 receipts and expenditure were balanced at a figure approximating to £100 million. However, the budget appeared to be balanced only on paper, and since the Americans have decided with at any rate moderate resolution against giving Iran any further budgetary aid, the Consortium may be under pressure later in the year further to increase its production in order to provide the additional revenue required to meet the deficit. Whilst drawing up his budget, Finance Minister Furuhar was forced to allocate higher levels of expenditure than he had contemplated originally on defence, health and education. He therefore resorted to balancing his budget by tabling optimistic and evidently unrealistic estimates of revenue.

9. There was continued criticism of the S.Y.P.O. and its apparent lack of results. Mr. Ebtehaj asked for a British public relations officer with the intention of dressing his shop window more effectively. The new railway line to Meshed which was completed in January was found to be defective, at any rate in part, and its formal inauguration was postponed from April to May. Mowlems suffered a setback when it was discovered that the experimental stretch of road near Qazvin, the first stretch that their contractors had actually completed, was breaking up in places. This discovery fortunately escaped public censure on any noticeable scale and Mowlems are now investigating the causes of the trouble with a view to drawing up new specifications for roads to be built in future. Meanwhile, this company's relations with Mr. Ebtehaj happily improved and they have been allocated several new projects for the design of roads and supervision of their construction.

10. Oil production increased steadily, crude oil produced by the Consortium operating companies in February totalling 2.7 million tons compared with 1.6 million 12 months previously. At Abadan the overhaul of the refinery was almost completed and in February throughput was running at an average rate of 372,000 barrels per day (140,000 in February 1956). Work continued on increasing the harbour capacity of Bandar Ma'shur, on planning a new harbour at, or offshore from Ganaweh, and surveying a pipeline from the Gach Saran field down to the Ganaweh area.

11. While the Consortium was expanding its activities in a quiet and workmanlike manner, Italian enterprise was negotiating to enter the field of oil production in Iran. In January it became known that the Iranians were drafting new enabling legislation establishing ways in which foreign concerns could enter into partnership arrangements for the exploration and exploitation of oil outside the Consortium area. Some weeks later it was learnt that some kind of partnership agreement had been initialled with the Italian concern E.N.I./A.G.I.P. and towards the end of the quarter garbled versions of the agreement appeared in the foreign and local Press. While the terms of the agreement were not published it became evident that it envisaged a concession covering three areas—in an area south-west of Esfahan, bordering the Consortium area east of Masjid-i-Sulaiman, an offshore area in the Persian Gulf south of Bushire and an area in Iranian Baluchistan. A

joint Iranian-Italian company (S.I.R.I.P.) would be formed with capital in equal shares. The initial cost and the risk of exploration over a 12-year period would be borne by the Italian partner alone, which would undertake to spend \$20 million for this purpose. When oil was struck profits would be divided on the normal 50:50 basis between S.I.R.I.P. and the Iranian Government but the latter would in fact be receiving 75 per cent.—50 per cent. as an equal partner in S.I.R.I.P. and 50 per cent. of Italian share (i.e., 25 per cent. of the total profits) as collector of taxes. The agreement will have to be ratified in some form by the Iranian Parliament, or will have to await the passage of an enabling act providing for partnerships. Meanwhile, it is being scrutinised with interest by the Western oil companies operating in the Middle East.

Foreign Affairs

12. In foreign affairs events moved forward smoothly for Iran. Relations were maintained with Russia on a formal but polite basis; there was gratifying evidence of West Germany's desire to strengthen her trading connexion with Iran and of Italian interest in the exploitation of Iranian oil; the United States gave proof of readiness to increase financial assistance to the army and to give more military and economic support to the Baghdad Pact; there was no faltering in the Baghdad Pact partnership with Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq, and the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia was as successful as could be expected. In all it was a good and productive quarter.

13. Relations with the Soviet Union remained formal and polite—the finishing touches were put to the work on the Soviet-Iranian frontier commission, negotiations were begun for reciprocal transit trade and transit flight arrangements, a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Iran and an Ilyushin aircraft arrived as a Nouruz present for the Shah from Marshal Bulganin. There were indications that the present phase of Soviet policy calls for a broadening of the bases of good relations, partly through increased cultural exchanges and particularly through the acceptance by Iran of Soviet economic aid and technical assistance. On their return to Russia, members of the Soviet parliamentary delegation stressed the desire of the Iranian people "for friendship and all round co-operation" with their "great northern neighbour" and they suggested that Iran should follow the lead of other Asian countries by accepting the economic assistance the Soviet Union was ready to give. The Shah and his Government, however, remained wary and disinclined to swallow the bait.

14. There was, however, a Soviet attack on Iran broadcast in January at the time of the Ankara meeting of the Four Asian Baghdad Pact Powers for allowing the Americans to set up an "atomic base" in Iran. This attack was perhaps made with the knowledge that the United States was about to conclude with Iran an arrangement making available \$40 million for the financing of a military construction programme, mainly concerned with building barracks.

15. West German interest in strengthening economic ties with Iran was prominently illustrated by the State visit of Chancellor Adenauer in late March. As a result of Chancellor Adenauer's visit it appears likely that West Germany will send an economic and commercial survey mission to Iran shortly.

16. The work of re-enforcing America's stake in Iran was carried steadily forward by the various United States agencies involved in Iranian affairs. An atomic energy agreement was signed in Washington and an "Atoms for Peace" exhibition held in Tehran; an agreement was concluded for the United States financing of a vast military construction and barrack building programme which calls for the expenditure of \$40 million; Point IV activity continued at a high level; there were frequent visits by United States military men and journalists and, finally, the United States endeavour was capped by the arrival of the Richards Mission at the end of March. The Richards Mission are apparently to recommend that United States military assistance to Iran be increased, while in early April Mr. Richards was able to announce in Baghdad that \$12.5 million would be allocated by the United States administration for the financing of joint economic projects put forward by the Baghdad Pact Organisation. Meanwhile, the United States' decision to apply for membership of the Baghdad Pact Military Committee was well received by the Iranian authorities. It was clear that as far as this country is concerned the Eisenhower doctrine means that the American stake has now been driven even more deeply into Iranian soil.

17. The Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia in mid-March went off reasonably well. Saudi hospitality was oriental in its lavishness and Western in its efficiency. Friendly relations were established between the Shah and King Saud, but the Iranians found Yusuf Yassin, the deputy Foreign Minister, to be extremely opposed to the Baghdad Pact and hostile towards the British. The only immediate result of the visit appears to have been an arrangement between Iran and Saudi Arabia about their disposition on the islands of Farsi and Arabi, in pursuance of which Arabi was evacuated by Iranian forces on about the 22nd of March.

18. The momentum of the Baghdad Pact was maintained by its four Asian members, who held a conference of Premiers and Foreign Ministers at Ankara in mid-January, and by a satisfactory meeting of the economic experts at Baghdad towards the end of March. It became clear as the weeks went by that the Iranian Government had no objection to British representation at the next meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council (which it was then hoped to hold in April). The United States decision to adhere to the Military Committee has now given fresh impetus and solidity to the Baghdad Pact Alliance, which though strong enough to withstand the shock of the Suez crisis had always appeared somewhat flimsy from the military point of view and rather empty economically when looked at from Tehran.

19. Diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom were largely concerned with the question of the islands of Farsi and Arabi. It seems that during the early part of the quarter proposals were exchanged between Iran and Saudi Arabia concerning the future of the islands. It is understood that Iran proposed that she should evacuate Arabi, on which she had placed a garrison and ejected the Saudis in November, if Saudi Arabia undertook not to reoccupy the island. On the 24th of February Her Majesty's Ambassador, acting on instructions, urged the Iranian Government to evacuate both Islands before the Shah's visit to Saudi Arabia and in preparation for a final settlement which should be negotiated between Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom, representing Kuwait. This suggestion was not accepted and the quarter ended with the Iranians remaining in occupation of Farsi and having evacuated Arabi, leaving that island free to be reoccupied by the Saudis.

20. Iran took the initiative towards strengthening her connexion with the African countries of the western Mediterranean. Mr. Abdullah Entezam, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, was sent on a good will mission to Libya, Tunisia and Morocco and it was announced that the Shah would pay a State visit to Spain in late May.

21. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Baghdad, Moscow and Karachi, the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Nicosia, Development Division, Beirut and to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

IRANO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 30)

(No. 55. Confidential)
Sir,

*Tehran,
April 27, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that a Soviet Government mission visited Iran from the 10th to the 19th of April. The occasion of the visit was the signature of a final protocol establishing a new boundary between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This flowed from the agreement between Iran and Soviet Russia dated the 2nd of December, 1954 (my despatch No. 107 of the 22nd of December, 1954); since the ratification of that agreement in the spring of 1955 a joint commission has been at work demarcating the frontier on the spot. The signature of the final protocol marks the successful conclusion of the work of the joint frontier commission. I attach to this despatch the joint communiqué⁽¹⁾ published at the time of the signature of the final protocol.

2. It was originally intended that Mr. P. D. Orlov, the head of the Soviet element in the joint commission, should lead the Soviet delegation to the recent ceremonies in Tehran; at two days' notice, however, the Soviet Government informed the Iranians that Mr. V. V. Kuznetsov, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, would lead the delegation. The signature of the final protocol on frontier demarcation then became a relatively subsidiary part of the business and discussions covering Irano-Soviet relations in general, lasting about a week, took place in Tehran.

3. Among the issues discussed were, first, Soviet assistance for Iranian economic development, especially joint exploitation of the waters of two frontier rivers, the Aras (Araxes) in Armenia and the Atrak, which for the last part of its course forms the frontier between the north-eastern Iranian province of Khorassan and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Turkmenistan; secondly, a trade agreement covering the next three years; thirdly, a civil aviation agreement; and, fourthly, a transit agreement.

4. Negotiations for the trade, civil aviation and transit agreements have been taking

place separately; the Kuznetsov mission merely reviewed progress without entering into details. On the Aras-Atrak river projects, the Soviet delegation said that two years would be required for study. A joint committee is being set up which will concern itself not only with the engineering problems involved, but also with the costing of the project and possible sources of finance. No attempt was made to reach a decision on finance during the recent discussions; that will await the report of the joint committee.

5. Apart from the discussion of these river projects no other new proposals for Soviet economic assistance to Iranian economic development were made. In fact, the question of Soviet economic assistance seems to have been played down to a surprising extent. At his final Press Conference Mr. Kuznetsov spoke of "useful activity being undertaken for the exchange of cultural, sporting and other delegations between the two countries." His only specific mention of Soviet economic assistance was in response to a direct question at the Press Conference by an Iranian journalist. Mr. Kuznetsov then said "the Soviet delegation has not submitted any new proposals for technical or economic assistance to Iran and the discussions were only concerned with proposals which had been made previously."

6. The trade, civil aviation and transit agreements were mentioned by Mr. Kuznetsov at his Press Conference as examples of the useful progress being made in improving Irano-Soviet relations. The trade agreement had, as a matter of fact, already been concluded before the Soviet delegation arrived. I shall be reporting in full by despatch in next week's bag. The civil aviation agreement is still under discussion. Some months ago the Russians suggested that they should send a mission to Iran to negotiate a civil aviation agreement. The Iranians in reply requested the Soviet Government to make proposals in writing. A Soviet draft was accordingly given to the Iranians, who have now prepared counter-proposals. The Iranians deliberately refrained from producing these during Mr. Kuznetsov's visit

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

as they did not wish to become involved in detailed negotiations. The counter-proposals, which were prepared in consultation with the United States Embassy in Tehran, contain a number of features which the Soviet Government will not easily be able to accept and it may, therefore, be that the agreement will not come to anything, at least in the near future. The points on which the Iranians are insisting and which they think the Russians will not be willing to swallow are:—

- (a) The Russians suggested that both airlines should operate between Tiflis and Tehran. The Iranians are insisting that if the Russian airline comes to the Iranian capital, Iranian Airways must go to Moscow.
- (b) The Russians wished to exclude foreign personnel in the operation of the airlines. The Iranians are saying that they must have the right to use foreign personnel on their airline.
- (c) As the Russians would probably be ready to start first, the Iranians are making it a condition that both lines should start simultaneously.

7. The Irano-Soviet trade agreement of 1940 already provides for transit facilities between Iran and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Hitherto little, if any, advantage has been taken of this agreement because, in the first place, transport costs through Soviet Russia have been excessively high and, secondly, the Russians refused to permit the transit of goods through the USSR from countries which had no trade agreement with them. As a result of separate discussions which have been going on in Tehran for some time and which were, I gather, merely reviewed but not actively pursued during Mr. Kuznetsov's visit, the new agreement will provide for:—

- (i) A reduction of Russian transport costs so that the charges on goods in transit through the USSR to Iran will be the same as for goods from satellite countries in the USSR. This means a reduction of about 30 per cent.—40 per cent. compared with present charges;
- (ii) The Russians will give transit facilities for goods from all countries for Iran or goods from Iran destined for any country;
- (iii) The Iranians for their part agree to a 5 per cent. reduction in Iranian railway charges on all goods in

transit through Iran to or from Russia.

- (iv) There will be quarterly consultations between the two countries about the operation of the agreement.

The Iranian Government will set up a transit organisation to control transit of goods through Iran. This will be the counterpart of a similar Soviet organisation. I believe that agreement has not yet been fully reached on the extent to which Soviet personnel will be permitted to supervise the goods in transit in Iran; the Iranians are opposed to having Soviet officials in Iran for this purpose and have so far maintained their opposition successfully.

8. In addition to reviewing the progress made in these economic negotiations, Mr. Kuznetsov's delegation discussed the political relations between Iran and the Soviet Union. Mr. Ardalan, the Iranian Foreign Minister, has given me an account of the discussions and, as far as I can judge, the Russians had no success in getting the Iranians to accept the Soviet point of view. Towards the end of the discussions Mr. Kuznetsov made a prolonged effort to persuade the Iranians to agree to the issue of a joint communiqué. They threw out as a bait a suggestion for including in the text of the communiqué a statement by the Iranians that the Bagdad Pact was a defensive pact, though it was not clear whether the Russians intended to put this in as an agreed joint statement or as a unilateral Iranian view. Mr. Ardalan said that the Russians pressed him very hard indeed to subscribe to the Soviet Middle Eastern policy as expressed in their recent draft Four-Power declaration—no doubt as a counter to Iranian acceptance of the Eisenhower doctrine. In response Mr. Ardalan went no further than saying that Iran would agree with Soviet policy so long as the latter conformed to the charter of the United Nations. This was not enough for the Soviet delegation. Mr. Ardalan refused absolutely to consider issuing a joint communiqué, just as the Shah had refused at the conclusion of his official visit to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1956.

9. In consequence, and in order to put over the propaganda which he would like to have included in a joint communiqué, Mr. Kuznetsov held a Press Conference at the Russian Embassy in Tehran on the 19th of April, at which he issued a prepared statement. I shall be sending an English

translation of this under separate cover. The statement comprises:—

- (i) A derogatory comparison between the aggressive policy of the Western Powers, as exemplified by the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt, and their alleged attempts to obtain control of the natural resources of the Middle Eastern countries and to dominate them, on the one hand, and, on the other, the pacific policy of the Soviet Union, especially as exemplified in the Soviet Union's draft Four-Power declaration. The statement contained the following passage: "The Soviet delegation, in the course of its negotiations with the Iranian authorities, emphasised that Iranian support in any form for the above-mentioned principles (*i.e.*, those set forth in the draft Four-Power declaration) would, without a shadow of doubt, represent an important contribution to the struggle for safeguarding and reinforcing peace in the Near and Middle East. As the negotiations with the Iranian authorities have shown, these authorities agree with the essentials of the declaration proposed by the Soviet Government concerning the peace and security of the Near and Middle East and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries of the region, because these points are in conformity with the charter of the United Nations."
- (ii) An attack on the establishment of American atomic bases in the territory of other countries, particularly Iran. The Soviet statement contained a passage saying "in this connection the leaders of the Iranian Government again confirmed their previous declarations that Iran would not give bases to foreign Powers and would not co-operate in steps directed against the security of the Soviet Union."
- (iii) A review of the progress made on the economic front, on the lines mentioned in the first part of this despatch.
- (iv) A plea for more frequent contacts between Iranians and the Russians, mentioning especially the recent exchanges of parliamentary, cultural, sporting and other delegations.

- (v) A sharp attack on the Bagdad Pact, in which he said "The aggressive character of the Bagdad Pact has been amply proved by the aggression of one of its members against Egypt. For the Soviet Union the Bagdad Pact clearly has an aggressive character, and its recent development has only confirmed this point of view."

10. On the 23rd of April Mr. Ardalan, the Iranian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of question and answer at a Press Conference, commented on the unilateral statement made by Mr. Kuznetsov. He made the following points:—

- (i) The successful conclusion of the frontier demarcation was a useful bit of work.
- (ii) He gave a cautious account of the trade, transit and civil aviation negotiations.
- (iii) He deprecated the allusions in Mr. Kuznetsov's statement to the differences between the Great Powers, and said that they had not formed part of the discussions between the Iranian and Soviet delegations and he was not prepared to comment on them.
- (iv) On atomic bases Mr. Ardalan repeated previous Iranian statements of policy by saying that as long as no attempt had been made against the peace and tranquillity of Iran and as long as Iran was not the object of aggression, Iranian territory would not be used for aggression or attack against any other country.
- (v) In so far as the points in the proposed Four-Power declaration conformed with the charter of the United Nations, it was quite unnecessary for Iran to subscribe to any re-statement of them as she was already bound by the charter. The Iranian Government had two objections to the proposed declaration—first, it involved the Great Powers taking decisions about small independent countries without consulting them, which smacked of colonialism, and, secondly, the proposed prohibition of arms deliveries to any country in the region runs counter to the sovereignty and liberty of action of the countries themselves.

(vi) Mr. Ardalan confirmed once more that the Bagdad Pact was a defensive pact. He replied to Mr. Kuznetsov's allegation that the British intervention in Egypt had proved that the pact was aggressive by a reminder that the steps taken by Iran and the other Moslem members of the pact at the Tehran conference during the first week in November had played a great part in bringing about the ending of hostilities and the re-establishment of peace. Mr. Ardalan went on, "I consider that if the Bagdad Pact had developed and if others among our sister nations had adhered to it, the events of which we speak (i.e., the Suez intervention) would not even have taken place."

11. I would prefer to await developments, Sir, before giving a considered judgment on the significance of the Kuznetsov mission for Soviet policy towards Iran and Iranian-Soviet relations. Soviet policy emerges apparently unchanged and its main elements continue to be:—

(i) Bitter antagonism to the Bagdad Pact. Bringing about the disintegration of the pact clearly remains the major object of Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East and weaning Iran away from the pact, the chief aim of Soviet policy towards Iran.

(ii) As a corollary, and in order to prepare the ground for detaching Iran from the Bagdad Pact, the Soviet Union would like to get Iran to subscribe to its statement on Middle Eastern policy, especially the principles contained in the draft Four-Power declaration, which imply

condemnation of the Bagdad Pact and the Eisenhower doctrine.

(iii) A tentative, step-by-step approach towards Soviet economic and technical assistance to Iran. Perhaps the Russians sense that they would be ill-advised to try and rush the Iranians into anything large scale such as they have agreed to in Afghanistan; or perhaps they are unwilling to commit themselves to any considerable expenditure of resources in Iran, either because they cannot afford to do so or because they are not convinced that it will bring dividends.

(iv) A considerable increase in personal contacts and cultural exchanges between the two countries, no doubt as a preliminary to increasing Soviet penetration of Iran. The Iranians are very wary of this move.

12. The Kuznetsov mission does not seem during its recent visit to have made any real progress towards detaching Iran from the Bagdad Pact. Whether the commercial, civil aviation and transit agreements, together with increasing cultural exchanges and some co-operation on joint economic projects, will eventually increase Soviet influence in Iran, the future will show. It is a long-term policy and one which could in time prove very dangerous.

13. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara, Bagdad, Moscow and Washington, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 11338/3

No. 12

IRANO-SOVIET TRADE PROTOCOL

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 7)

(No. 58 E. Confidential)
Sir,

Tehran,
May 4, 1957.

With reference to my despatch No. 96 E. of the 12th of September, 1956, I have the honour to enclose the text⁽¹⁾ of a recently signed protocol concerning trade between Iran and the USSR during the next three years. The total increase in trade will not be large: trade each way is to increase over the three year period from 2.3 billion rials (£11½ million) to 2.7 billion rials (£13½ million).

2. Previous agreements have been for one year only and the extension of the period of the present agreement has been made at the request of the Russians. This is apparently in line with the policy they are following in other countries. The quotas fixed for the first year are firm, but the quotas for the two subsequent years may be altered before the beginning of each year. The agreement seems a satisfactory one from the Iranian point of view.

3. The increases in Russian exports have been mainly for raw materials, e.g., cement, iron and steel, timber, railway sleepers, chemicals and sugar, and in machinery and heavy vehicles which can be used in Iran's development. Although Russians have in the past been anxious to increase their exports of textiles and cars, they have obtained little satisfaction in the present agreement. The increase in exports is to be small and although exports of cotton textiles will be higher this year than in the previous year, they will thereafter decrease. It is true that a new item has appeared in the shape of linen and artificial silk textiles, but these are not likely to present the same threat to the Iranian economy as cheap Russian cotton textiles.

4. The main increase in Iranian exports will be in the field of minerals, where a new item has appeared in the shape of "ferro-sulphur". It has not been possible to obtain a clear definition of what is meant by this from the Iranians, beyond the statement that it is a dual purpose mineral from which both iron and sulphur can be extracted. The Russians are also to buy Iranian tobacco, which they have taken spasmodically in the past, and carpets, an item to which the Iranians attach great importance but which the Russians have so far bought only very occasionally.

5. Since my despatch under reference was submitted, good progress has been made with the spending of the \$8 million credit opened by the USSR in settlement of wartime debts to Iran. A list of the goods purchased is enclosed. I understand that since this list (which was provided in confidence by the Ministry of Commerce) was prepared, the balance of the credit has been earmarked for purchases of telegraph and telephone equipment.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors in Washington and Moscow, to the Political Office, Middle East Land Forces, the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade and to Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

Enclosure

LIST OF COMMODITIES EXPORTED INTO IRAN UNTIL MARCH 1956 BY THE RUSSIANS OUT OF THE \$8 MILLION CREDIT

						Value in U.S. Dollars
Wheat	932,459
Cement	171,090
Cement	288,666
Sleepers	244,070
3-ply board	55,940

(¹) Not printed.

LIST OF COMMODITIES EXPORTED INTO IRAN—*continued*

	Value in U.S. Dollars
3-ply board	55,940
Repair of ship	10,000
Sugar	2,460,000
Cotton piece-goods	202,600
Paper	8,000
3-ply board	17,800
3-ply board	60,200
Cotton piece-goods	1,823,400
Cranes	82,000
Paper	72,000
Balance	1,253,833
Total	8,000,000

EP 11338/4

No. 13

IRANO-SOVIET TRANSIT AGREEMENT

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 7)(No. 59 E. Confidential)
Sir,*Tehran,
May 4, 1957.*

I have the honour to report that an Irano-Soviet transit agreement was signed on April 27 (see my despatch No. 55 of April 27, paragraph 7). This agreement, negotiations for which were the subject of reports ending with the Economic and Commercial Department's letter of April 12 to Eastern Department, is intended to amplify the provisions of Article 10 of the Irano-Soviet trade agreement of 1940—a copy⁽¹⁾ of which is enclosed for convenience of reference. It consists of a published agreement and of a confidential exchange of letters concerning the freight rates which are to be charged by both countries. Copies of the agreement and of the letters⁽¹⁾ are also enclosed.

2. The agreement provides for freedom of transit for goods of all kinds other than arms regardless of their country of origin. The transit through Russia of goods intended for Iran is to be handled by the Soviet Government and the transit of Soviet goods through Iran is to be handled by the Iranian Government. The Iranian Government have undertaken in the confidential exchange of letters to give a reduction of 5 per cent. on existing railway tariffs to Russian goods and the Russians have undertaken to give reductions ranging up to 50 per cent on goods in transit for Iran. It has not been possible to obtain a copy of the tariff laying down the rates to be charged on Iranian goods passing through Russia. But I understand that this tariff is the one appended to an agreement between Russia, the Satellites and China (described in the Soviet Iranian exchange of letters as the International Railway Transport Agreement). The new Soviet-Irano transit agreement gives far greater freedom than Article 10 of the 1940 agreement which, in any case, has remained a dead letter in recent years except as far as the transit of goods from Satellite countries through Russia was concerned. It also simplifies the payment arrangements.

3. The initiative for this agreement came from the Russians, but it has been welcomed by the Iranians for whom it will mean the re-opening of a traditional route and cheaper imports as well as an addition to the earnings of their railways if the Russians use their transit rights through Iran. The Russians made strenuous efforts to secure the right to handle traffic in Iran between the Soviet frontier and Tehran and have offered considerable help in the improvement of the Julfa-Tabriz railway and of the Caspian port facilities. They had probably three objects in mind—to provide themselves with further facilities for infiltration, to remove what is likely to be a serious bottleneck in the transit of goods intended for Iran and of Soviet goods moving through Iran and, finally, to show what they could do in the field of development. The Iranians have successfully resisted the request that the Russians should handle transport in Iran and are showing no alacrity to accept the offers of improvement of ports and railways.

4. Although it may have modest beginnings, this transit agreement may in time assume considerable significance, both in speeding up the arrival and reducing the cost of imports from Western Europe (a development from which British exports may suffer) and providing increased facilities for Soviet exports to the Middle East or to the Indian sub-continent. Although it is early to express an opinion, I would hazard the guess that the first development is likely to be more serious than the second.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Moscow, to the Political Office, Middle East Forces, to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade and to Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

Enclosure

Sa Majesté Impériale le Chahinchah de l'Iran, d'une part, et le Présidium du Conseil Suprême de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, de l'autre.

Prenant en considération les relations amicales existant entre les deux Pays et désireux de développer le commerce de transit à travers leurs territoires, ont décidé de compléter les dispositions de l'article 10 du traité de commerce et de navigation conclu entre l'Iran et l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes le 5 Farvardine 1319 (25 mars 1940) et ont désigné, dans ce but, leurs plénipotentiaires comme suit :

Sa Majesté Impériale le Chahinchah de l'Iran
Monsieur HAMID SAYYAH.

Le Présidium du Conseil Suprême de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes
Monsieur M. L. YEZHOV.

Lesquels, après s'être échangés leurs pleins pouvoirs, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

Article Premier

L'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes complétant le droit que l'article 10 du dit traité mentionné ci-dessus accorde à l'Iran et en modifiant les alinéas 3 et 4 de cet article, accorde le droit de libre transit aux institutions gouvernementales iraniennes et aux sociétés commerciales à travers son territoire, à destination de l'Iran, pour tous les produits, quel que soit le pays d'origine ou le pays producteur.

Le dit droit mentionné ci-dessus ne comprend pas le transit d'armes et de matériel de guerre d'un pays tiers.

Article 2

L'Iran, complétant le droit que l'article 10 du dit traité mentionné ci-dessus accorde à l'Union Soviétique et en modifiant l'alinéa 6 de cet article, accorde le droit de libre transit aux institutions gouvernementales et économiques soviétiques, à travers son territoire à destination de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, pour tous les produits, quel que soit le pays d'origine ou le pays producteur.

Le dit droit mentionné ci-dessus ne comprend pas le transit d'armes et de matériel de guerre d'un pays tiers.

Article 3

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes ne transporteront pas en transit les produits destinés à l'entretien des animaux et des plantes dont l'importation, pour des raisons d'hygiène, est interdite dans l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes ou en Iran.

Article 4

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes ne percevront aucun droit de douanes, impôt ou taxe sur les produits en transit, que ces produits en transit soient transportés directement ou qu'ils soient déchargés et rechargés, qu'ils soient déposés dans des entrepôts ou qu'ils soient emballés de nouveau pour le transport.

Le paiement des frais de transport des produits en transit et des services annexes (entreposage, déchargement, chargement, entretien, manutention, etc.) sur le territoire de chacune des Hautes Parties Contractantes s'effectuera selon le tarif le plus bas prévu.

Article 5

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes, afin d'accélérer le transport des produits en transit, prendront les mesures nécessaires pour faciliter la réalisation des formalités de douane et pour réduire au minimum les délais nécessaires au dédouanement des produits.

Article 6

Les opérations de transport concernant le transit des produits à travers le territoire iranien seront confiées aux sociétés gouvernementales iraniennes de transport et celles concernant le transit à travers le territoire de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, aux sociétés de transport soviétiques. Ces sociétés conclueront entre elles des accords concernant le mode des transports en transit, le trajet, le système des comptes et de la liquidation des comptes, l'échange des informations sur le volume des produits pris en considération pour le transport et toutes autres conditions.

Article 7

Les Hautes Parties Contractantes décident de constituer une commission mixte chargée de surveiller l'application du présent accord, ainsi que pour aplanir les difficultés qui pourraient survenir dans son exécution.

Article 8

Le présent accord sera soumis à l'approbation des Parlements des deux pays et entrera en vigueur à la date de l'échange des instruments de ratification qui se fera le plus rapidement possible à Moscou. Sa durée de validité est de trois ans. Si aucune des Parties, trois mois avant l'expiration des trois ans susmentionnés, n'annonce pas sa décision de ne pas le reconduire, le présent accord sera automatiquement reconduit d'année en année, jusqu'à ce qu'une des Parties, trois mois avant l'expiration du délai d'une année, communique sa décision de ne pas le reconduire.

Fait à Téhéran le vingt-sept avril mille neuf cent cinquante-sept en deux exemplaires originaux persan et russe qui font tous deux foi.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires susmentionnés ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

EP 1111/12

No. 14

REVALUATION OF IRAN'S GOLD RESERVES

(1)

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 21)(No. 64 E. Confidential)
Sir,*Tehran,
May 18, 1957.*

I have the honour to enclose the text⁽¹⁾ of a bill amending the 1954 Note Cover Act which formed the subject of my despatch No. 71 of September 8, 1954.

2. Iran's gold reserves have hitherto been valued on the basis of a gold/rial parity equivalent to an exchange rate of 32.50 rials to the dollar. The bill, which has just been submitted to Parliament, fixes a new gold/rial parity equivalent to an exchange rate of 75.75 rials to the dollar, which is the effective rate for commercial transactions. In other words, Iran's gold reserves, which during recent years have been greatly undervalued, will now be estimated at their true worth. The effect of this will be that a smaller amount of gold will be required to meet the obligation established in the 1954 Act to maintain a 40 per cent. cover for the existing note cover.

3. The surplus gold, which is worth some \$93 million, is to be placed in a special account in the Bank Melli and to be used as backing for loans for productive purposes, but excluding any Seven-Year Plan or other projects for which foreign exchange is already earmarked.

4. The bill also authorises the Government to increase the note issue to an indefinite extent, provided they deposit 100 per cent. backing in gold or gold guaranteed currencies for any notes in excess of those authorised by the 1954 Act.

5. The bill is the result of two main trends of thought. The Bank Melli have for a long time wanted to have greater latitude in managing the note circulation. With the resumption of the oil revenues and of the country's economic development, the demand for notes has been increasing, and although the Bank Melli still had a certain amount of leeway under the terms of the 1954 Act, they knew a day would come when the authorised issue would prove inadequate. But the violent inflation of the Musaddeq era has made the Iranians extremely sensitive to any measures affecting the note issue and hitherto the Government had not dared to suggest modifying the 1954 Act for fear that it might start a wave of speculation.

6. The initiative for introducing the new bill seems to have come from the Shah who, in his determination to press on with the development of the country, was anxious to see part of these unnecessarily high gold reserves used for productive purposes. The Bank Melli have been more cautious in their approach to the problem, but after having been for a long time partisans of a tight money policy as the best defence against the inflationary pressures in the economy, they now seem to have come round to the view (which is probably the right one) that a better defence against inflation is to increase loans for productive purposes. Imports have been freed, but they can only meet a small part of the country's needs and unless home and, in particular, agricultural production is greatly increased, there will be too much oil money chasing after too few goods.

7. The only danger of the new policy is that the Government may be tempted to use the \$93 million of gold as an easy way out of its budgetary and other difficulties rather than for genuinely productive purposes. There is, however, little likelihood of such a policy being followed so long as Mr Nasser is Minister of Finance since, though not a strong personality, he was, as Governor of the Bank Melli, one of the leading exponents of financial orthodoxy.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

8. In order to reduce to a minimum the speculation which would be liable to occur if lengthy debates took place in parliament, the Government have tried to hustle the bill through. After holding a closed session, the Majles approved it in a day, but the Senate have been more restive under Government pressure and Dr. Egbal had to threaten resignation in order to secure the desired priority for the bill. It looks, however, as though the Senate will also approve the bill quickly.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch (without enclosure) to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, to Her Majesty's Treasury, to the Export Credits Guarantee Department and to the Middle East Development Division.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

EP 1111/12 B

(2)

*Economic and Commercial Department to Eastern Department. (Received July 17)**Tehran,
July 13, 1957.*

Dear Department,

Would you please refer to your letter EP 1111/12 of July 2nd about the bill to amend the note cover act.

2. The bill was passed by the Senate on May 18th and has now become law.

Yours ever,

ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL DEPARTMENT.

SECRET

EP 1823/1

No. 15

THE BAKHTIARI TRIBE

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Riches. (Received June 4)

(No. 1823/57. Restricted)

My dear Derek,

Tehran,

May 31, 1957.

I enclose herewith an interesting note on the Persian tribes prepared by John Russell following a stay with one of the heads of the Bakhtiari earlier this year.

2. I have only minor comments. The first sentence of paragraph 2 might give the impression that nobody at all from this Embassy has travelled in tribal territory since the break. I myself went into the heart of the Bakhtiar country last September when visiting the Kuhrang dam; I took tea with the local tribal khans and their wives in their black tents, and witnessed extraordinary displays of their equestrian skill. I did not, however, have the same opportunities from the khan level of observing the composition of the tribes as John Russell had in the company of Abdul Khan Bakhtiar. George Hiller too succeeded, after great difficulty, in getting to Firouzabad which is the headquarters of the Qashgais, in April; but his object was not (luckily) the Qashgais but archaeology.

3. There are two other points perhaps worth making on John Russell's comprehensive report. Firstly, although what he says in paragraph 3 is accurate, the Bakhtiari are usually thought of as a separate tribe and not as Lurs. It is true that they speak the same language but their characteristics are very different. The Lurs are particularly wild and unamenable to discipline, whereas the Bakhtiari are unusually sophisticated. This difference is due partly to the second factor which has played an important part in the evolution of the Bakhtiari, namely the discovery of oil in their territory. This has not only made them richer but has also brought them into relationship with Western civilisation, (if one can so describe oil!) in a manner which has not happened in quite the same way to any other tribe.

Yours ever,

ROGER STEVENS.

Enclosure

The tribes of Persia to-day are by no means a picturesque anachronism or a quaint piece of folklore for the student of ethnography. They form one-fifth of the population of the country and are responsible for the greater part of its pastoral economy. Politically their support, or at least their good behaviour, is a matter of considerable importance to the Government in Tehran. In the first decade of this century the Bakhtiari forced the abdication of Mohammed Ali Shah and in living memory the Qashgai have held Shiraz against the Central Government.

2. Nobody from this Embassy has, I believe, lately travelled much in tribal territory, at any rate not since the break in diplomatic relations six years ago. It is still difficult to get permission to enter the Qashgai country. So the following notes on a short visit to the Bakhtiari at No' Ruz may be of interest. I only saw the settled area on the western edge of the Bakhtiari country in the plain between Dizful and Shushtar. (The great Sassanian dams at both these towns are of interest, built by Roman prisoners-of-war after the defeat of the Emperor Valerian by Shahpur I at Edessa in 260 A.D.) But naturally there was much talk about the way of life amongst the migratory part of the tribe as well. There seems to be little printed material available about the Bakhtiari, so I have expanded these notes to give a wider picture of their historical background, their present civilisation and their place in the social economy of modern Iran. Part of this is drawn from direct observation, part from what I was told when down there and part from conversations with my host's brother Aga Khan Bakhtiar (lately head of the Mortgage Bank, now Minister of Labour) and with some of the Bakhtiari at Court in Tehran.

SECRET

3. There are six main tribal groups in Iran—the Kurds, the Lurs, the Qashgai, the Turks, the Arabs and the Beluchi. No accurate figures are available and the recent census carefully avoided any assessment of the tribes as such. But the total must be somewhere around four million. (The population of Iran is a little under 20 million, 40 per cent. of whom were shown in the recent census as being non-Persian.) The Kurds are the largest group, numbering about 600,000. Next in size comes the Lur group, divided into Great Lurs and Little Lurs. The Great Lurs in turn fall into three divisions—the Kuh Gelu, Mammasehi and Bakhtiari. The numbers of the Bakhtiari are difficult to assess with any accuracy. In 1881 Curzon reported 170,000; the Admiralty Handbook on Persia, basing itself on a count of tents, put the figure at 235,000 in 1942; to-day the Bakhtiari khans hazard a guess of 250,000 which is probably about right. Finally, the Bakhtiari themselves are divided, first into two main groups known as Haft Lang and Chahar Lang, then into tribes, sub-tribes, families and tents.

4. The Bakhtiari are a people of the oldest Persian stock. They are probably one of the indigenous Indo-European peoples of Fars. They speak (and sing) in the Lur language, which is not a dialect but a pure tongue close to old Persian. To this day they dislike being called Persians or Iranians—a term they apply only to outsiders. Even the settled Bakhtiari in the Shushtar plain have never mixed with their immediate Arab neighbours whose language, character, economy and way of life are radically different from their own. Similarly they never intermarry with the people of the Armenian villages settled in their mountain country by Shah Abbas. A large percentage of their manpower is permanently employed in the oilfields; but even they return to the tribe to find a wife. Work in the oilfields, for the most part in the mountain country far away from the towns, does not seem to have impaired their tribal health and virility. They are on the whole a good-looking people, sturdy and independent, healthy and upright in the free mountaineer tradition—if not perhaps, as George Nathaniel Curzon said, "wholly free from the abominable vices of the Persians".

5. The history of the tribe during the last two centuries has been one of sporadic rebellion and repression. In the early 1740's Nadir Shah broke a Bakhtiari revolt and deported 3,000 families to Khorassan. But by the end of the decade the Bakhtiari, in all but name, were ruling Persia. Ninety years later there was a general rising against the extortions and inefficiencies of Mohammad Shah. For 30 years after that the tribe led a prosperous independent existence under the last of its really great leaders, Mohamed Taki Khan. But Nasr-ed-Din Shah was not prepared indefinitely to tolerate a state of contumacious autonomy. Mohamed Taki Khan was tricked and strangled. The same fate befell his successor the II Khan of the Haft Lang in 1882 at the hands of the Zil-us-Sultan in Isfahan. The last flash of tribal greatness came in 1909 when the Bakhtiari horse 3,000 strong rode on Tehran and with British support restored the Constitution and forced the abdication of the reactionary, Russian-supported Shah Mohamed Ali. But three years later the Central Government broke the military power of the Bakhtiari, using its new and well-armed force of 7,000 Swedish-officered gendarmerie. The final "pacification" was carried out by Reza Shah in 1925; the tribe was disarmed, its horses impounded, its fortresses demolished and its khans taken hostage to Tehran. Some disorders followed Reza Shah's abdication in September 1941; and German agents were active in the country in 1943. But during the last decade we seem to have seen the end of the long tale of the Bakhtiari's greatness and independence. Disarmament, spotter aircraft, roads, telegraph and radio have brought a reluctant peace to the mountain valleys.

6. The Bakhtiari country proper forms a rough triangle, some 25,000 square miles in area, with its apex at Burujird (Borujerd) (33° 50' N., 48° 45' E) in the north and its base on a line running from Ram Hormuz 31° 15' N., 49° 30' E. in the south up to Isfahan on the east. This triangle encloses a high section of the main Zagros watershed, with peaks up to 13,000 feet. On its base it marches with the Qashgai country, a similar mountainous tribal area: on the north-east it is bounded by the settled plain that runs up from Isfahan to Qum; and on the west by the alluvial valley of Khuzistan. Within this area, sparsely inhabited and difficult of access, the Bakhtiari "Nation" lives, with its centre at Chahar Mahal on the head-waters of the Karun River. There you can still see traces of the great paved road that the Achaemenid Kings laid across this wild country 2,000 years ago from Suza to Isfahan.

SECRET

7. Approximately two-thirds of the Bakhtiari are still based on a migratory pastoral economy. They are not nomadic in the proper sense of the word, having clearly defined summer and winter quarters—"yeylak" and "kishlak", "garmsir" and "sardsir". Between these they move up and down along traditional routes in spring and autumn—men, women, children, horses, mules, donkeys, cattle, sheep, goats, fowls and dogs. The passage of the mountains in the spring is a dramatic and incredibly arduous operation, a six-day non-stop trek, in single file, the men cutting steps in the snow; and the bridge-less Karun River has still to be crossed on inflated bullock-skins. The cost in life, human and animal, is sometimes high. The finest picture of this age-old movement is given in a film made 30 years ago, called "Grass". It is a picture practically unchanged to-day.

8. My host, Abdul Khan Bakhtiar, farms 14,000 hectares of land around Aqili in the fertile plain between Dizful and Shushtar, which lies along the banks of the Karun River at the foot of the Zagros mountains. In his 26 villages he has 11,000 people, all of them Bakhtiaris. Nine thousand are permanently settled in these villages; 2,000 are migratory. These spend the winter in black tents at the foot of the hills and in spring go up north and east into the mountains, where they find grazing for their herds until the autumn. Before coming down again in the fall they plant a little winter-barley, to be reaped on their return to the hills in the early spring. But the main economy at Aqili is a settled agriculture, enjoying considerable prosperity. It turns its back on the mountains and looks rather to the plains of Khuzistan, the Biblical Elam, down the Karun, known to the ancient Greeks as the Lesser Tigris, out into the Shatt-el-Arab and the Persian Gulf and ultimately to India, with whom much of the country's trade is done.

9. Abdul Khan struck me as an intelligent, hard-working and enlightened type of landlord. He studied agriculture at Birmingham. He is a man of abstemious habits and rather serious disposition. You have only to ride through his fields to see that his farming is efficient and successful. He has 4,000 hectares of irrigated land under cultivation, the operation of half of which is fully mechanised. A further 10,000 hectares of dry land are under seasonal cultivation. Much of this he hopes to bring under irrigation when the long-awaited Karun dam is completed. (I met two of the American engineers working there for Justine Courteney, who told me that the survey and plans should be completed by this fall; how soon the project will thereafter be brought to reality will then be in the lap of the Seven-Year Plan.) On the irrigated land the main crops are cotton, rice, wheat, potatoes and tobacco; on the dry land spring wheat, barley, oats; clover, lupin, various self-sown grasses and vetches; mustard and lucerne. Improved and hybrid wheats, (such as that experimented with successfully near Tehran on his farm by Seyid Zia Tabatabai), have been tried out but do not do well on the dry land. Sheep, goats and cattle, horses, mules and donkeys are grazed on the peripheries by the migratory element of the population. (The Bakhtiari do not raise camels.)

10. There being no primogeniture in Persian law, the estate was left by their father equally amongst the 12 brothers. Abdul has now bought out all the others' shares except that of his brother Mejid. Aga Khan (the Minister of Labour) is the only other surviving brother to take an interest in the estate; but, being fully employed in Tehran, his concern is necessarily remote.

11. The women play an influential and emancipated part in Bakhtiari life. True, they have no inheritance; but tribal marriages frequently have powerful dynastic significance, as witness that of my host's mother. The daughter of a Chahar Lang khan, her marriage to the head of the Haft Lang was of considerable tribal importance. Whilst I was there she never appeared in the house (except at picnic lunches after shooting), but her presence was felt and respected. The household is run by her handsome daughter-in-law, the wife of Abdul's brother Mejid.—Garagozlu father and American mother—who has sole charge of the horse breeding and training establishment and is treated with the greatest respect by the tribesmen. Economically the Bakhtiari women make a considerable contribution to the tribal finances, as they have entire control of the carpet-weaving. Perhaps the most significant indication of their position is that the Bakhtiari women have never been veiled.

12. The picture of the tribal prince lolling in luxury amongst the women in his silk-lined tents turned out, alas, to be cut from the whole cloth of fiction. The house or fort at Aqili is distinguished mainly by its excessive discomfort.

I was given the best bedroom; but in it besides two beds, a chair and a washstand, there was not a single piece of furniture, not so much as a hook on which to hang your hat. My room gave direct entry, through a scantily curtained doorway, into the main living room. The living room furniture consisted of battered tubular steel chairs with canvas seats, a long side-board, a radio and a frigidaire. There was neither electricity nor telephone nor running water. (The nearest telephone is an hour and a half away at Shushtar, the nearest railway station two and a half hours—in good weather—at Andimeshk.) You do your washing in the hammam down at one end of the garden, (when the ladies of the household are not using it); and everything else at the opposite end of the garden. The food, however, was excellent; great piles of rice, meat, vegetables, yoghurt, cheeses and fruit, all eaten at speed and without ceremony. The house was full of family, guests, children, nannies, undefined elderly females—either aunts or maids one was never quite sure which, and numerous young men in Bakhtiari caps and wide black cotton trousers, who sometimes seemed to be retainers, sometimes cousins or neighbours. All very informal and all very friendly. The only approach to comfort or elegance was in the big tent to which we withdrew after dinner each night. Here on rugs and cushions the Bakhtiari recapture that dignity and style which they lose in the unnatural setting of upright furniture and quasi-European fixings. The atmosphere is not unlike that of a Scottish castle in the middle of the last century, where the ghillies and the stalkers all bore the same name as the Laird and the lines of economic and social distinction were overlaid and softened by the democratic structure of the clan. So here the small khans, the shikari and the grooms joined easily in the singing and the dances, sharing the chieftain's water-pipe and teasing him amiably for having ridden a shabby mule during that day's shoot; but never forgetting to use the respectful form of address—"Abdul Khan". One of the most amusing of the evening diversions was the "stick-dance"—half single-stick half sword-dance, executed by two men to pipe and drum. But as I discovered by sharp personal experiment, it was less painful to watch than to participate.

13. Every morning we rode out 20 or 30 strong to shoot—either wild boar, driven by 200 villagers from the jungle on the banks out into the Karun River; or black partridge, ridden up in the young wheat fields; or ibex on the cliff-face that rises 400 metres sheer from the edge of the plain. This shoot is one of the most astonishing natural spectacles that I have ever witnessed. To escape from the leopards on the top, the ibex drop down the cliff-face at night and seek shelter in the caves and crannies which they alone can reach. Twice a year the Bakhtiari come to chivvy them out. This they achieve by a method that would bring white hairs to the head of any European alpinist. There is one man who climbs the cliff-face; he is 65; he goes up barefoot, alone and un-roped; it takes him an hour to reach the top of the cliff, which is practically vertical. When he reaches the top he uncoils 50 fathom of rope with a camel-bell at the end of it and then starts to inch his way across the cliff-face, spreadeagled onto the rocks like a fly on a window-pane, dropping his rope down to jangle the bell in the mouths of the caves where the ibex are laying up for the day. Suddenly through your telescopic sight, you see a great pair of curling black horns spring out into the sun-light; if you are quick, you get a shot; and if you are lucky, you retrieve something of the carcass on the rocks 900 feet below. We shot five that afternoon. The day closed with a vast meal over an open charcoal pit between the black tents, followed by endless little glasses of tea, pipes of opium for the khan and his guests, dances and songs in the musical Luri language. And then the long ride home through the quiet valley, with the stars coming out over the Zandeh Kuh.

14. The Bakhtiari are inordinately proud of their horses—who, by contrast to the family, live in luxury. There were two large yards with about 50 stallions in each, two dozen mares and as many foals. There are all of a well-established and carefully preserved Arab stock, originally imported by Abdul Khan's grandfather some hundred years ago. The family never sell a horse and look upon the stud as their chief treasure and pride. By contrast to most Arab horses that I have met, these were well mannered, well schooled and well mouthed. We had 20 or 30 of them out shooting each day and practically all were gun-proof, so that you could shoot partridge from their backs without stopping or dismounting. The Bakhtiari are natural horsemen and I noticed that even the peasant boys who brought our horses along for us from time to time when

we got off to shoot all had a natural ease and elegance in the saddle. The tribesmen pride themselves on their horsemanship, which they are delighted to demonstrate to the visitor, shooting gazelle at a gallop, with shotgun and ball cartridge.

15. The system of land tenure, which used to be almost entirely share-cropping, has lately been changed in a large measure by Abdul Khan to one of tenant farming. Both parties apparently find this more satisfactory. Although the landlord has to continue furnishing for a number of years a high proportion of the seed, fertiliser and animals and to finance co-operatives for the purchase of machinery, experience shows that the new system gives the peasant more incentive and encourages him to plough more back into the land, both literally and financially.

16. The economy of this settled farmland has nothing in common with that of the migratory part of the Bakhtiari nation. The latter still live largely from hand to mouth, supporting themselves directly from their flocks, both in food and clothing. I enquired how they handled their surplus produce and how they dealt with the world of money and was told that each group of families employs an agent in the town, to whom it despatches all its meat, cheese, skins, wool and so forth for sale. He in turn purchases such things as sugar, kerosene, pots and pans, needles and ammunition, which he sends back up to the tribe. He banks the balance of the cash. In lean years a good agent will himself make advances at modest rates of interest.

17. Health in general is said to be good, although one would have expected these hot low-lying plains to be damp and malarial. But the mosquitoes have been virtually eradicated by D.D.T. The main problems now are trichinosis and trachoma. Syphilis has recently made its appearance, introduced by men returning from their military service. Abdul Khan has founded a small hospital in the main village on the estate and is buying equipment for it. But his trouble is to get any decently qualified doctor to live in this remote and unattractive part of the country amongst people who do not even speak Persian.

18. Education labours under much the same handicaps. Here again Abdul Khan has built a school in his main village, but finds it hard to get a schoolmaster. He has hopes of persuading the Government to find him an elementary teacher next spring to accompany the migratory element of his people when they move up into the mountains and teach the children to read and write as they move from camp to camp. At the moment 95 per cent. of the men in the migratory families are illiterate; and all the women.

19. In religious matters the Bakhtiari are pious, but not fanatical. Nominally Shia, they have their own Mullahs who travel with the tribe, but are insufficiently educated themselves to give any but the most basic Koranic instruction. The Bakhtiari are much given to the veneration of "pirs" or ancestral saints, whose obelisks you see perched on hill-tops throughout the country. And there are more than vestigial traces of the cult of trees and springs. They have no mosques.

20. Opium is scarcely used either by the tribesmen or by the sedentary Bakhtiari peasantry. It is a habit restricted to the khans and at that has only been known in the country, so my host told me, for the last 20 years. Lunching out in the open after shooting there was usually someone preparing or smoking a pipe, either my host or his mother or his sister-in-law or a poet friend who had come down from Tehran for the holidays. No opium is now grown in the country; they get their requirements from Khorassan. The price has risen sharply since the new law forbidding cultivation, sale or consumption came into force. The cost of a meskal (five grams) has gone up from 12 to 80 Rials. One meskal is enough for about four pipes; from each pipe you inhale five or six deep lungfuls; and an ordinary smoker needs from three to six pipes at a time if he is to derive any appreciable satisfaction. It has thus become an expensive habit—at eight or nine shillings a session.

21. Politically, the Bakhtiari keep themselves to themselves and expect the rest of the world to do the same. In Musaddiq's time, I was told, there was an attempt at Tudeh penetration, but it met with distrust and hostility in the villages. To-day all they ask of Tehran is that the politicians shall leave them alone. Perhaps the Bakhtiaris' greatest blessing is that they have no Effendi class. Never having suffered under a feudal or baronial system, they seem content enough

with their traditional social system. I was struck when riding through the villages and across the farmland by the close acquaintance which Abdul Khan had with practically everybody. He greeted the farmers by name and they all seemed pleased to see him. The relationship appeared pleasantly free from any trace of overbearing on the one side or servility on the other. Apart from the traditional habit and influences, I imagine that this must be due to the fact that Abdul Khan spends eight months of the year there (and in summer, with an average temperature of 100° F. and a humidity of 85 per cent, this is no joke); and that he is a successful and intelligent landlord. He is, I am told, the only Bakhtiari Khan of any importance who lives on his land; and the only one who is worth anything at the Bank.

22. The Shah to-day respects the traditional Bakhtiari privilege of having one of their own people as Governor. And a special Deputy represents them in the Majles. But they exercise no direct influence on the political life of the country and appear to have little desire to do so. Relations with the Central Government have changed out of all recognition since the days of Reza Shah. With the daughter of a Bakhtiari Khan sharing the throne of Persia, the tribe now basks in the reflected royal favour. But it is noticeable that with very few exceptions the Bakhtiari who batten on the Court in Tehran are people of the slightest consequence in their own country. The raw Welsh squireens at the court of the first Tudor must have presented a similar spectacle. Not even the Queen's father, for instance, nor the now all-powerful Security Chief, General Taimur Bakhtiar, were people of any great standing back home. Influence at Court and hopes of benefit under the Seven-Year Plan have changed the educated Bakhtiari's feelings towards Tehran. But the tribe still remember the treatment they received at the hands of Reza Shah and look with distrust on the Central Government, whose sole incidence on tribal life is the army, the gendarmerie and the tax-gatherer. The "pacification" of the tribe and the breaking of the khans is still a very recent memory. There is at Court to-day an old gentleman called Amir Hossein Khan Bakhtiar, who is one of the last survivors of the 40 khans invited to Tehran by Reza Shah in the early 1930s, only 12 of whom emerged alive again to tell the tale. Out shooting one day we passed the ruins of a little castle standing amidst the stumps of what had once been a fine orange grove. This, Abdul Khan told me, had been the summer residence of his father; but one day around 1937 a regiment of troops came out from Dizful, on the direct orders of the Shah, burned the house, cut down the orange trees, and left again without a word.

23. The army has again been enforcing conscription in the tribal area since 1955. This, however, is not as unpopular as it used to be, since the tribesmen now realise the value of the education which their sons can get whilst doing their military service. The Bakhtiari are only partially disarmed. In this respect they have been much favoured by comparison with the other tribes; 300 rifles were issued to them last year by the Government for purposes of self-defence. (A rifle is still an object of pride and joy in the tribe and my Winchester was passed from hand to hand with loving pats and comments.) It is to be noted with what care the Government picks the people it is going to disarm—in my year here the army has only been bold enough to tackle the small and isolated tribe of Jawanrudi Kurds, never the real toughs like the Bakhtiari or the Qashgai. And it took the murder of a party of Point IV Americans to screw up the gendarmerie's courage to the point of entering tribal territory in Baluchistan.

24. The great weakness of the Bakhtiari has always been their internal disunity and the absence of a universally recognised leader of the whole tribe. The Qashgai, numbering less than 200,000 have played a more effective part in recent Persian history mainly because they are much closer knit and recognise one tribal chieftain—at present one of four brothers. But the Bakhtiari, in their sharp family pride and refusal of baronial authority, have been prevented by their own endless internal dissensions from filling that role on the Persian stage which their numbers and undoubtedly military qualities could have led them to claim. There has never for long been a recognised chieftain, whose writ ran throughout the tribe. Except under occasional great leaders of the calibre of Assad Khan in the early 19th century, Mohamed Taki Khan 50 years later, or Sirdar Assad and Samsam-us-Sultana at the beginning of our own century, they have never for long remained united for a single tribal purpose. All too soon they split up into the basic components of family or tent. And this fissiparous tendency has

of course always been encouraged and used by successive Shahs and their ministers. Without it the Bakhtiari could have been the Kingmakers of Persian history.

25. To conclude these notes it might be tempting to speculate nostalgically on the imminent passing of a romantic way of life and to deplore the 20th century's threatened assimilation of one of the last of the free peoples. But I came back from the south with no such melancholy inclination. What I saw and heard of Bakhtiari life was robust, genuine and prosperous; by contrast the encroachments of urban civilisation struck me as effete and ineffectual. Psychologically too the atmosphere is healthy and realistic: you see a people enjoying their traditional way of life not because it is artificially imposed upon them but because it suits their needs and they like it. Reza Shah tried to destroy them because they were not only independent and free-spirited but un-modern, oriental and excessively traditional—everything he most disliked. But they survived: and to-day they continue to lead the same life—real, vigorous, healthy and self-contained. What education may do to them when eventually it creeps into the black tents is another question. For the moment the Bakhtiari seem well satisfied with the life they have always known.

JOHN RUSSELL.

*Tehran,
May 1957.*

EP 1081/25

No. 16

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 5,
1957, IN KARACHI**

After the Foreign Minister's dinner I had a word with Dr. Ardalan about Farsi and Arabi. I said that I had meant seriously the suggestion which I had put forward in my remarks about political consultation, that some procedures should be considered for settling disputes between Bagdad Pact members. One of the matters which I had in mind was these islands. I understood that they were in fact only bits of rock sticking up out of the sea, and I thought it was extremely foolish for good friends like Iran and the United Kingdom to quarrel. We had this special position of protecting the foreign interests of the Gulf Rulers. In Buraimi we had had to take extreme action. We had done it because we believed it was the only way of keeping our word to the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat.

It was being suggested to us that we should take the same sort of action with regard to the islands which Iran had occupied. My own view was that that would be a disaster. I could not conceive of anything more foolish from both our points of view than that such a situation should be created. Could we not consider

between us some means of evolving a procedure for dealing with this kind of question.

Dr. Ardalan said that he thought there was great force in what I had been saying and that such a procedure applied to all islands might prevent trouble between us.

I said that of course Bahrain was in a different category. I did not want to get involved in an argument about them, but so far as these pieces of rock sticking out of the sea were concerned I thought that we would be willing to submit all of them to some kind of Bagdad Pact procedure for settling disputes between the members. I emphasised that we were under considerable pressure in this matter, and that our relations with the Ruler of Kuwait were very important to us. On the other hand, we regarded our friendly alliance with Iran as a matter of great importance and we wished to reconcile these two positions by some procedure which might be evolved within the framework of the Bagdad Pact.

Dr. Ardalan repeated that he was in agreement with me, and we parted on the basis that both of us would consider further how to tackle the outstanding matters along these lines.

EP 1535/15

No. 17

THE OIL INDUSTRY OF SOUTHERN IRAN

Mr. Bennett to Sir Roger Stevens (Tehran)

(Enclosure to Tehran despatch No. 72 E. of June 20, 1956) (Received June 25)

Sir,

As my first tour of duty in Khorramshahr draws to a close and as the majority of the overseas staff working in the oil industry of the south are ending their first contract period, I am of the opinion that this is a convenient time to review the future of the oil industry as we see it from the south, and to examine the problems and frustrations that are facing management.

Production and Development

2. The last year has witnessed this great industry once again in advance. During the year since my last despatch on this subject (No. 5 of the 5th of May, 1956) the industry production-wise has moved steadily forward. Crude oil exported as such or delivered to the refinery for export for the contract year ending on the 28th of January, 1957, amounted to 30,200,000 cubic metres, which was nearly 10 per cent. above the target laid down in the original agreement and 12,204,000 cubic metres above production in the year ending on the 28th of January, 1956. In May this year the refinery was running at an average of 310,900 barrels per day, compared with 229,220 barrels per day in May 1956. To describe a few of the major projects in hand will illustrate the extent to which the operating companies have decided to develop and expand. First, and by far the largest project, is the development of the Gach Saran field. The operating companies have already voted £20½ million for the bringing in of this field. The aim is to drill within the next two to three years 43 holes, which will give an estimated flow of 600,000 barrels a day by 1960. Second, to provide an outlet for the Gach Saran field, survey work is in progress for the building of a new 24-inch pipeline and a loading terminal capable of taking tankers up to 100,000 tons. At the moment work is concentrated near Ganaweh, but as yet no final decision has been taken as to the most suitable place. Wherever it is decided to build the new port, a sum of at least £20 million will be required for its construction and that of the pipeline. Third, two new loading quays are under construction at Bandar Mashur, one of which is scheduled to be completed by August of this year and the other in 1958. Fourth, there are to-day eight rigs working in the Fields area compared with three at this time last year. Fifth, during the autumn and winter of 1957-58 a sum of £24 million will be spent on survey and exploration in the areas around Bandar Abbas and Lingeh.

3. These projects, some of which are already under construction, will ensure that production from the fields of South Iran will be capable of competing and keeping pace with the neighbouring oil-producing States of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The large development programme outlined above is surely conclusive evidence that the operating companies not only realise the importance of South Iran as an oil-producing area, but that they have sufficient confidence in the future of Iran to justify these large capital expenditures.

Staff and Workers

4. In Abadan to-day there are 286 Americans, British, Dutch and French, and in Fields 146. Both General Managers, *i.e.*, of Abadan and Fields, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. O'Brien, agreed to renew their contract and return for a second tour. This was fortunate for the industry, as it has helped to give continuity, which is very much needed. In Fields, Mr. Dalley (B.P.) was during the year appointed Deputy General Fields Manager and from all I have heard and from my own observations he has done a resoundingly good job. Indeed he, to a very large extent, carries the Fields operation. In Abadan Mr. Forgan (Shell), who was Assistant General Manager, was replaced by Mr. Jochem (French Shell) as Deputy Refinery Manager. In Abadan out of the 286 overseas staff around 70 operators who were brought in to teach Iranians the technical operations of the refinery

SECRET

will be returning, having completed their jobs, to their parent companies at the end of their contract and will not be replaced. In addition there are a further 20 or 30 British or Americans who at the end of their contract period will not be invited to renew their contracts. Of the rest, all the British in Abadan with one or two exceptions who have been asked to come back have agreed. Similarly all the Dutch will return. Of the Americans approximately 50 per cent. in Abadan of those asked to renew their contracts have accepted. In Fields, the British and Dutch have almost to a man agreed to return and out of all the Americans invited back only one has refused. Apart from the lack of amenities in Abadan and Fields and disregarding the climate, conditions for overseas staff are good—pay is excellent, staff stores are well stocked, clubs are running smoothly, modern films are available and by and large staff is well off.

5. In spite of the satisfactory position outlined above, there remain problems on the overseas staffing side. First, it has become more important than ever that the greatest care is taken to recruit qualified staff. There have been examples during the last two years of overseas staff being recruited who have not had the technical qualifications necessary to fit the post to which they have been appointed. This has caused resentment among Iranian staff. Indeed there are still overseas staff holding down highly paid posts who simply have not the necessary qualifications. In order to avoid a possible cause of friction in the future the greatest care should be taken in the selection of staff. Secondly, there are a number of technical jobs both in Abadan and Fields which require the services of overseas staff equivalent to shop steward's rank in England. To give one or two examples, welders working on the tank farm at Bandar Mashur (with wives and children there are to-day 70 British in Mashur), masters and mates of tugs in Abadan and Mashur, foremen employed in supervising the construction of prefabricated houses, &c., &c. This class of staff, the majority of whom are British and for the most part direct hire, is fairly tough and outspoken. Whilst they carry out their technical jobs efficiently, they tend in their spare time to criticise openly the shortcomings and incompetencies of the Iranians, which causes friction. Again care should be taken in future recruitment.

6. In my opinion perhaps the worst problem facing management is the lack of loyalty staff have to management. Mr. Scholtens, the General Manager, is openly ridiculed in Abadan—this perhaps more by the Americans than the British. On the other hand it is more the British than the Americans who criticise Mr. Kuhl, saying that he is a person incapable of taking a decision and that he does not inspire leadership. There is no doubt that these feelings are known to the Iranians and of course they immediately and inevitably make capital out of these differences. Mr. Forgan, the Acting Refinery Manager, feels strongly—and I agree with him—that these outbursts must be dealt with firmly by management if discipline is to be maintained. It is vital for the smooth working of the whole complex operation that staff are loyal to their respective General Managers and to the General Manager in Tehran.

Iranian Staff and Workers

7. During this last year there have been several major administrative changes and these have tended to make for an unsettled atmosphere. The most important change has been the implementation of the job classification. This has caused a certain amount of friction, especially among those members of the staff who have been informed that they were "frozen", which means that they have no chance of further promotion. In the long run there is little doubt that the new classification system will be for the benefit of the industry but meanwhile it is the cause of certain unrest. Second, the cost of living has gone up during the last year and the workers are finding it more difficult to maintain their standards than they did one year ago. Whilst the operating companies might be prepared to review the cost of living figure with a view to granting an increase in the basic wage, the Government has intervened and ruled against a further increase as it would upset the other industries of Iran. In order to try to get over this the operating companies have again reverted to subsidising certain basic commodities, such as rice and flour, in the company stores. Third, the problem of surplus labour remains and in spite of a slight improvement during the year is still a cause of worry to labour. Approximately 900 workers were transferred off the books of I.O.R.C. when a private company took over the operation of buses in Abadan. Also the Ministry of Labour agreed that a number

SECRET

of labourers could be retired. But there are still 24,250 labourers in Abadan alone. It is hoped that other private enterprises will be started up in the area which will help to draw off some more of the labour. Fourth, there is criticism among some of the Iranian staff against those overseas staff who are holding down positions that they are not technically capable of filling and of course it is well known to all Iranians that the overseas staff are in receipt of salaries far higher than those earned by Iranians. This is a sore point.

8. The shuffles and re-shuffles which have taken place and are still taking place, together with shortage of housing, have caused a certain number of Iranians to say to me at various times how unsettled they feel and how they wish they could go back to the days of A.I.O.C. But this is a rather typical Iranian reaction. Unrest in the south presumably always existed and it is difficult to foresee a time when Iranian staff and workers could be satisfied. The lack of amenities, the climate and the fact that Iranians in the north tend to look down upon those who work in the south (which they still regard as a foreign operation) make for unsettled conditions. However I do not anticipate serious labour problems in the immediate future. Provided the political scene in Tehran remains stable, there is likely to be no trouble in the south. But if the politicians in Tehran should ever wish to cause unrest they could in my opinion do so with the greatest ease. The key to future stability in this area lies in Tehran.

Relations Between the Operating Companies and the National Iranian Oil Company

9. With the appointment of Mr. Naghavi as General Manager of N.I.O.C. for the agreement area relations between the operating companies have improved out of all measure. Mr. Naghavi is a most exceptional person and has worked closely with the operating companies and he has their complete confidence. He has built N.I.O.C. up to a place of importance and now for the first time during my tour of duty one sees N.I.O.C. coming forward and taking a lead, thereby allowing the operating companies to withdraw more into the background.

10. No further non-basic operations have been taken over during the last year but much work has been done and is being done to prepare for the eventual hand over of housing. Both N.I.O.C. and the operating companies realise that it is important to iron out beforehand the many problems which arise out of the hand over of non-basic operations, rather than hand them over and then try to work them out as they did in the case of the Medical Services.

11. Personal relations between N.I.O.C. and the operating companies are good. Perhaps the only place where there is a little friction is on the accounts side, where N.I.O.C. have certain British financial advisers who temperamentally do not get on too well with their opposite numbers in the operating companies. This should not be exaggerated, especially as N.I.O.C. auditors—the British firm of Cooper Brothers—enjoy excellent relations with I.O.R.C.

Conclusion

12. This year has seen major plans laid for the expansion of the oil industry of South Iran. Production of crude has gone steadily up, and the refinery is gradually climbing back to its pre-1951 figure. Care must be taken to ensure that overseas staff are fully competent to carry out the tasks for which they are chosen and are the best available. A spirit of loyalty must be developed towards management. The various administrative changes that have taken place should now be allowed to settle and work themselves out and if possible further changes should be avoided. In spite of the many problems and many frustrations which faced management I think that one can be proud of the advance that the operating companies have made during these last two years and can hope that this progress will continue smoothly over the coming year.

I have, &c.

JOHN BENNETT.

SECRET

EP 1015/29

No. 18

AMENDMENT OF THE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 25)

(No. 73. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *June 21, 1957.*

Last month certain amendments to the Iranian Constitution were approved by a joint congress of the Senate and Majles, and were published by royal decree on the 18th of May. Coupled with the constitutional amendments approved by the Constituent Assembly of 1949, these new amendments have redressed the constitutional balance of power in favour of the Shah. The actual power and authority enjoyed by the present Shah has now been augmented by an increase in the royal prerogative. Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi has thus regained for the Iranian monarchy a measure of the constitutional power which was conceded by Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah Qajar to the Majles brought into being by the constitutional revolutionaries of 1905. But the new amendments are not necessarily reactionary and should strengthen the parliamentary system in Iran.

2. The granting of the Iranian Constitution and the opening of the first Majles in 1906 were the fruits of victory gained by the liberal and middle class revolutionaries of 1905 over the despotic Qajar monarch, Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. The fathers of the Constitution, when drafting the constitutional law of 1906 and the supplementary law of 1907, were most conscious of the need to preserve their delicate child from destruction at the hands of a despotic ruler; and they naturally weighted the constitutional scales against the executive power of the Shah and in favour of the legislature. The safeguards which they then devised left the Shah no opportunities to have the Constitution amended or to dissolve the Majles. The expedient chosen to prevent the Shah from dissolving the Majles was a procedure calling for Senate approval of the royal decree of dissolution and the statutory basis for the establishment of the Senate was deliberately left not approved by the Majles during its early years. The rule calling for a large quorum in the Majles before business and voting could be conducted was a further device intended to preserve the Majles against the Shah and his

Ministers. In addition the Shah was bound to approve all legislation without delay and although the Shah appointed Ministers these could be dismissed by a majority vote of the Majles.

3. For the following four decades the Senate remained a mere constitutional possibility. It was not called into being until May 1949, when finally the Senate Bill received the approval of the Majles. During the intervening years the Majles itself had had a hard struggle for survival. In 1908 the Majles building was all but destroyed by artillery fire from Iranian Cossacks commanded by the Russian Colonel Liakhoff in an attempt by Muhammad 'Ali Shah Qajar to dissolve Parliament (literally) and regain absolute royal power; and later there were long years of parliamentary atrophy under the dictatorship of Reza Shah Pahlavi, followed by the confusing period of allied wartime occupation from 1941-46. As the result of its stunted development, by the late '40's the Majles, which had started life as a symbol of progress and a bulwark against tyranny, had become a barrier to constructive legislation and had almost ceased to carry out the normal function of a legislature. Its constitutional power, which had fallen into desuetude under Reza Shah, was now used to thwart the executive. Political deadlock ensued and the situation was skilfully exploited by the Communist and fellow travelling Deputies in the Majles. There was, for example, no question of the 15th Majles (1947-49) passing a normal budget, and the financing of Government expenditure was by monthly appropriations.

4. It was to break this deadlock and to redress the equilibrium of the Constitution that the Shah, after consultation with certain leading personalities, convened the Constituent Assembly of 1949. This Assembly, to which each Majles constituency elected twice the number of members it normally returned to the Majles, was opened by the Shah in late April and adjourned a fortnight later after having approved by virtually unanimous votes the two amendments for which it had been convened. The first amendment took the form

SECRET

of a new article added to the Supplementary Constitutional Law of October 8, 1907, laying down the future procedure for revision of the Constitution and stating that the 16th (i.e., the next) Majles and Senate (whose statute the Majles approved on the 4th of May) would, as soon as their session began, proceed to revise Articles 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Constitutional Law and Article 49 of the Supplementary Law. The second amendment approved by the Constituent Assembly revised Article 48 of the Constitutional Law and empowered the Shah to dissolve the Majles and Senate either separately or together, subject to stating the reasons for dissolution and ordering new elections so that the Chamber dissolved might convene within a period of three months.

5. In February 1950 the Senate was inaugurated with the veteran liberal of the 1905 revolution, Sayyed Hassan Taqizadeh, as its first President. The Constitution therefore now gained a third leg on which to balance; and at the same time, the Shah gained an effective brake on the initiative of the Majles. For the Senate is composed of 60 members of whom 30 are nominated by the Shah and 30 are elected. The Shah can therefore be confident of majority support in the Senate and the Senate can return to the Majles for a second and third reading all legislation excepting financial Bills regarding which it can only express an advisory opinion.

6. In the same month of February 1950 the Shah, in his speech from the throne at the inauguration of the 16th Majles, expressed the hope that the two new chambers would complete the revision of the constitutional laws enumerated by the Constituent Assembly of the previous year. This reference to further revision of the Constitution met with hostility from leading politicians and from the late Qavam us Sultaneh in particular. And, during the turbulent years which followed and saw the assassination of Razmāra and the rise and fall of Musaddeq, no revision of the Constitution as had been envisaged and provided for constitutionally in 1949 could be undertaken.

7. However in May 1957 the plan finally was carried through. It is of interest to note that this plan had been set back seven years—like many other plans in Iran—by the wave of anti-Shah and anti-ruling class socialism and of anti-Western nationalism ridden by Musaddeq. In April the Shah

had spoken at separate audiences to Senators and Majles Deputies about the constitutional amendments to be considered by a Congress of both chambers and, incidentally, suggested the formation of a two-party system now there was political stability in Iran. The following month the Congress of both chambers was convened by royal decree, met under the presidency of the Senate President, Mohsen Sadr (Sadr-ul-Ashraf), on the 7th of May and elected a working committee of twenty-four members drawn equally from both houses and under the chairmanship of Senator Sa'ed to consider the amendments suggested by the royal decree and report to the full Congress. The committee of twenty-four having made some minor changes to the proposed amendments, these were approved by the Congress with only one vote against (Senator Lesani) and two abstentions on the 16th of May and were published by royal decree on the 20th of May.

8. The six amendments considered and approved are as follows:—

(a) *Constitutional Law*

- (i) Article 4 now provides for the number of Majles Deputies to be 200 (the previous number was 136) and for new Deputies to be added every 10 years if the population has increased and on the basis of one Deputy for every 100,000 people.
- (ii) Article 5 extends the term of the Majles from 2 to 4 years, and includes the present 19th Majles, which was elected in spring 1956, under this provision.
- (iii) Article 6 lays down that the Majles may assemble when two-thirds of the total number of Deputies are in the capital. Previously, in the absence of the provincial Deputies, the Deputies for Tehran alone could form a quorum for assembly.
- (iv) Article 7 states that (when the Majles has assembled) deliberations can proceed with any number of Deputies present, but that voting can only take place when more than half the Deputies then in the capital are present. Previously the presence of two-thirds of the Deputies present in Tehran had been required to form a quorum and of three-quarters to take a vote.

- (v) Article 8 remains as it was originally. It provides for the Majles to regulate its own holidays and sessions and to reassemble after the summer recess on the 6th of October.

(b) *Supplementary Law*

- (vi) Article 49 deals with the Shah's veto powers. Under the Article 49 drawn up in 1907 the Shah had been obliged constitutionally to sign and issue by decree all laws passed by the Majles. He may now return to the Majles for reconsideration laws concerning financial matters. If they are again passed by a majority of three-quarters of the Deputies present in Tehran, they must then be signed by the Shah.

9. Of these amendments, the new Articles 4 and 5 increasing the size and extending the term of the Majles are likely in the long run to strengthen the influence and effectiveness of that Chamber which, in its past two-year terms, hardly had time to take shape as a corporate entity before the season for elections came round again. The amendment to Article 7 about the quorum for deliberation and voting should allow the conduct of Government business to go forward more smoothly and make it more difficult for minority factions to obstruct procedure. Lastly, the amendment to Article 49 increases the royal prerogative. Here it should be remembered that the Senate acts as a constitutional brake on the Majles in all spheres except finance; and the lever of this brake is held by the Shah. Through the approval of this amendment the Shah has now gained the means of checking the Majles in the one sphere of finance where in the past it previously enjoyed complete independence.

10. In consequence of the constitutional amendments passed by the Constituent Assembly of 1949 and the Congress of 1957 and of the establishment of the Senate in 1950, the royal prerogative in Iran has been strengthened considerably. Nine years ago the Majles was undoubtedly the centre of gravity in the Iranian body politic. To-day, this centre both in fact as well as in constitutional theory is to be found in the person of the Shah. The Shah has meanwhile gained the power to:—

- (a) dissolve both the Senate and the Majles whenever the need arises;

- (b) use the new institution of the Senate to check undesirable initiatives on the part of the Majles, except over finance Bills;

- (c) return finance Bills to the Majles for a further reading.

In addition, the Shah has in practice extensive influence over the nomination for election of Majles Deputies and of the thirty elected Senators.

11. With the Shah now dominating the political scene as a benevolent if suspicious ruler, the Iranian Constitution has the appearance of being better balanced and more workmanlike than at any time in the past fifty years. Unfortunately, it lacks the affection and respect accorded to it by the Iranian people when it was drawn up by Taqizadeh and the other heroes of the liberal revolution of 1905. It was noteworthy that in April of this year Taqizadeh resigned from the presidency of the Senate which he had held since its establishment in 1950. Various factors may have combined to prompt his resignation, but one of them undoubtedly was that he did not wish to preside over the Congress of both Chambers in May because either he regarded it as unconstitutional (on the grounds that the Congress should have been held in 1950) or because he did not agree with the amendment to Article 49 increasing the royal prerogative. But otherwise criticism of the Congress was only expressed openly by the political groups in opposition who are not represented in the Majles and who at present control no newspapers. These small groups—such as the more or less clandestine and pro-Musaddeq Nationalist Resistance Movement, the Nationalist Iran Party, the clandestine Tudeh (Communist) Party and the vaguely socialist Progressive group—taking advantage of the occasion in order to come out on record against the Government, distributed pamphlets declaring the Congress unconstitutional and attacking the Shah as an autocrat. There was, however, little public reaction to the Congress; people in general being concerned with the price of meat and the overcrowding of buses and apathetic towards a Constitution which they feel has become the preserve of the Shah and the ruling class.

12. The Iranian people are traditionally and with the rarest of exceptions mistrustful and passively hostile towards the Iranian State. Such is their attitude to-day, and such will remain their attitude towards the newly vamped Constitution until the two

SECRET

chambers and particularly the Majles become more representative of professional and lower class opinion and are no longer, as at present, monopolised by the ruling class and the Shah's nominees. An opportunity to broaden the base of representation in the Majles now exists as some sixty new Deputies are due for election during the coming months and changes in

constituency boundaries are also likely to be made. It remains to be seen whether the Shah will take the opportunity.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Bagdad and Karachi.

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

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EP 1701/6

No. 19

IRANIAN EARTHQUAKES: HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PROVISION OF AID

(1)

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 8)

(No. 401. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Tehran,
July 8, 1957.

My telegram No. 399 (not to Ankara, Bagdad and Karachi): Iranian Earthquake.

Red Cross team has now returned. They estimate 1,500 deaths, several thousands injured, 10,000 families homeless and 200 villages destroyed. Director of Public Health in Mazandaran has told Alexander Gibb's representative in the area that he himself actually saw 300 corpses from the village of Sang Chah. Worst damage is in an inaccessible area between Mount Demavend and Amol and many of the worst hit villages cannot be reached save by one or two days' journey by horseback. It is reported that many of these have not yet sent out information or asked for help because they have fully been occupied with emergency self-help and in some cases are demoralised. These factors make reliable estimates still very difficult to obtain.

2. Heads of Moslem diplomatic missions in Tehran have already collected locally and presented a cheque for rials 50,500 (£240) to the Foreign Minister. United States Ambassador has made tour of surrounding district distributing rice *en route* and has arranged for three Embassy aircraft to drop supplies. Head of Point IV has been instructed to establish himself in the area, effect close liaison with local authorities and meet gaps in requirements by purchasing foodstuffs locally with Point IV funds. No request for outside help has yet been made to Washington.

3. I am assured that, at present, neither food nor medical supplies are required from outside. All accounts suggest, however, that there is a serious shortage of doctors and medical facilities in the area and that there is a *prima facie* case for sending several surgical teams. On the other hand, local conditions both geographically and organisationally, are so difficult that I am not at present satisfied that these teams could operate effectively. My recommendation is that a qualified medical officer from Headquarters Middle East should fly here urgently, if possible with Air Vice-Marshal Bower on July 10, and be prepared to spend up to four days reconnoitring in the area. Preferably he should bring personal emergency medical kit, though this would not be essential. I would arrange transport and for a senior Iranian speaking member of my staff to accompany him.

4. A crying and long-term need is for tents. The Prime Minister told me last night that at least 10,000 were required; 2,000 have been sent from Tehran and manufacturers are being instructed to accelerate and maximise output. I agree that it would only be practicable for imports to come by surface routes. Most promising sources seem to be Pakistan, and possibly Iraq. I suggest it is a case for action on United Kingdom initiative by the Baghdad Pact countries, who should anticipate the establishment of the Economic Committee disaster service by at once creating, as a first step, a £50,000 fund (enough I fear to purchase only part of the tents required). My specific recommendations are that:

(i) immediate financial authority should be sought to enable us to contribute our share to this fund, viz. £10,000;

(ii) thereafter a special meeting of the Deputies in Bagdad should be called, on our initiative, to make recommendations to Governments and to consider ways and means of procuring and shipping the tents.

5. I have not approached my Baghdad Pact colleagues here, but think it would be desirable for me to do so as soon as I have your authority.

SECRET

EP 1701/11

(2)

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Roger Stevens. (Tehran)(No. 697. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)*Foreign Office,
July 9, 1957*

Tehran telegram No. 401 (of July 8. Iranian Earthquake).

Her Majesty's Government have agreed to contribute up to £10,000 for the relief of distress caused by the earthquakes. I propose that we should offer to the Iranian Government to send at once to Tehran from Cyprus the first two officers mentioned in P.O.M.E.F. telegram No. 944 to advise on practicability of an army surgical team operating in Iran. In addition we should offer to send a consignment of tents in the aircraft bringing the two officers.

2. Please approach the Iranian Government accordingly and report their reply by immediate telegram repeating to P.O.M.E.F. If offers are accepted, P.O.M.E.F. should arrange for a Hastings aircraft to take officers concerned and a full load of tents to Tehran as soon as possible. The aircraft's E.T.A. at Tehran should be reported by immediate telegram to Tehran and the Foreign Office.

3. I do not (repeat not) favour proposal in paragraph 4 of Tehran telegram under reference that action by Her Majesty's Government should be related to the proposed disaster service of the Baghdad Pact, or that action proposed in paragraph 2 above should await action by the Baghdad Pact. There is no indication that the other members of the Economic Committee would be prepared to match our contribution, and in any case action would be delayed and favourable publicity for us diminished.

4. No (repeat no) publicity should be given to our offer before 1430 G.M.T. tomorrow.

EP 1701/6

(3)

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 10)(No. 404. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)*Tehran,
July 10, 1957.*

Your telegram No. 697: Iranian Earthquake.

Offer gratefully accepted. Permission for aircraft landing must be sought before close of business tomorrow July 11, i.e., 0900 G.M.T.

2. Grateful for earliest indications E.T.A.

EP 1701/21

(4)

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 15)(No. 422. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)*Tehran,
July 15, 1957.*

My letter of July 12 to Riches: Iranian Earthquake.

General officer has now returned and advises that there is no (repeat no) case for surgical team. Although there is evidence of substantial number of deaths, toll of wounded so far evacuated from mountain villages for hospitalisation appears very small and in hospitals at Amol and Shahi less than 20 earthquake victims could be found.

2. I recommend, therefore, that balance of £10,000 should be spent on conveying maximum number of tents by most economical means. Spare tent poles have been distributed so as to enable inner and outer tents to be used separately.

SECRET

thereby housing double the number. We should now be supplied with as many further tents with corresponding number of tent poles as possible. Unless these can come from Cyprus on a service and training flight (in which case flight of July 11 should surely be put into same category and not charged against £10,000), I recommend despatch from Habbaniya.

3. It should be remembered that we are publicly committed to supplying 90 tents and so far have only had 57. Thirty-three is, therefore, the minimum further quantity; and I would hope that finance would allow a considerable increase over these, particularly in view of considerations and facts listed in paragraph 10 of my letter under reference.

EP 1701/21

(5)

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir Roger Stevens (Tehran)(No. 1749. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)*Foreign Office,
July 15, 1957.*

Tehran telegram No. 422 (of July 15: Earthquake relief)

Now that surgical team is not required we can make available 50 repeat 50 160-pound tents from Habbaniya. Please arrange for their despatch to Tehran free by Iraqi Air Force if possible or failing that by road.

EP 1701/21

(6)

Sir Michael Wright to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 18)(No. 873. En Clair)
(Telegraphic)*Baghdad,
July 18, 1957.*

Foreign Office telegram No. 1763 to Baghdad.

Two Royal Iraqi Air Force Bristol freighters, each carrying 25 tents, will fly to Tehran tomorrow morning, July 19.

SECRET

EP 1015/33

No. 20

THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAN

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Riches. (Received July 23)(No. 10118/57. Confidential) *Tehran, July 18, 1957.*

On the eve of my departure on leave the internal situation, and the future of the Eghbal Government, remain obscure. There is every reason for a change of Government, but no indication that it will take place immediately.

2. The circumstances of the Shah's return have not made the situation between him and his Prime Minister any easier. The Shah was brought back, probably unwillingly, by the appeals of Mr. Ala. Dr. Eghbal appears to have been doubtful whether his return was necessary. Although the Shah has now visited (rather cursorily) the earthquake area and found the damage, or at least the casualties, less than he was led to believe, it is reliably reported that he has upbraided Eghbal for not supporting the move to get him back.

3. Eghbal himself is profoundly depressed—as my United States colleague puts it “resigned but not resigning.” We both had an hour with him yesterday, and he poured out his heart once more about his difficulties with his master. He had worked with him for fourteen years; he came to the Premiership with an unblemished record; he had selected a team of Ministers who were absolutely “clean”; he had really supposed that he, unlike his predecessors for many years back, would be trusted by the Shah and allowed to get on with his job. Instead, he was faced with obstructions at every turn; it was only too obvious that the Shah had no more confidence in him than in any one else. It seemed to be part of his technique of government to listen unceremoniously to people who were not in authority, and to mistrust, and continually cross-check the behaviour, of those who were. While abroad, he had received a constant flow of *louche* characters, and engaged in many obscure operations on his own initiative. (My United States colleague was told that the Shah has concluded a deal with Mr. Greif about the Lar Valley Development project.) The first thing the Shah had done after his return was to have a *tête-à-tête* lunch with Mr. Alam, the self-styled leader of the Opposition. He had received the

Chief of Police (General Alavi Moqaddam, Eghbal's sworn enemy) but not his superior the Minister of the Interior. He had ordered Eghbal's successor as Rector of the University to join Alam's People's Party, thereby undoing all Eghbal's good work in keeping politics off the Campus. He had summoned a meeting of Ministers since his return and told them that he was the fountain head of all authority, and that he expected to be told in detail what was happening in every department of Government. He, Eghbal, found the position of being Prime Minister without responsibility an intolerable one. Nevertheless, in response to a direct question, he told my United States colleague that he did not intend to resign.

4. Nor is there at the moment of writing any solid evidence to suggest that the Shah intends to throw him out—yet. He may first wish to gauge his popularity. He may be genuinely anxious to study the Government's record during his own absence before reaching any decisions. He may also be struggling with the problem of a successor. The only candidate who is being hotly canvassed at the moment is General Hedayat (Personalities Report No. 64), who has certainly been very pleased with life for the past week; but he may not yet be ripe, or the Shah may hesitate to launch out with another general so soon after Zahedi. Perhaps, too, he is waiting in the hope of tripping up Eghbal in a big way. He is known to be very angry with him for giving way to the Majlis about the clause in the revised Oil Bill requiring reference of all agreements concluded to Parliament. He is annoyed about the earthquake. He no doubt resents Eghbal's puritanical efforts to discourage gambling, reform the Royal Household and restrict the Shah's extramural contacts. It is certain that they had a flaming row some time ago about the artificial creation of parties. But none of these are popular issues. Nevertheless, it is hard to see that so ill-matched a partnership can last for very long.

5. If Eghbal is removed, or resigns in disgust, it will be a dismal day for the country and, I fear, a watershed in the reign of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. It will have

SECRET

been conclusively proved that the Shah cannot work with an active, hardworking, courageous, honest and competent Prime Minister. If latterly Dr. Eghbal has been impudently outspoken, and superficially disloyal—and on this ground alone the Shah might seem justified in removing him—I am convinced this is the effect of the frustration arising from the Shah's attitude towards him, and not its cause. No man of comparable calibre (even if there was one in sight, which there is not) could be expected to work with the Shah again on such onerous and even humiliating terms. The Shah will have assumed full responsibility for governing the country—something which, unaided by men of ability, goodwill

and strength of character, he is not capable of discharging. It will be a naked autocracy, tempered only by intrigue, good manners and inefficiency.

6. The tragedy is that if only the Shah would concentrate on military and foreign affairs, and leave the running to his Prime Minister on the internal front, they would make an effective team. But I fear it is too late to hope that this may yet happen.

7. I am copying this letter to Bowker, Wright, Symon, Caccia and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

Yours ever,

ROGER STEVENS.

SECRET

EP 1013/3

No. 21

POLITICAL REPORT ON IRAN FOR THE SECOND QUARTER OF 1957

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 7)(No. 82. Confidential)
Sir,*Tehran,
August 1, 1957.*

The distinguishing feature on the Iranian scene during the second quarter of 1957 was the uneasy relationship persisting between the Shah and his Prime Minister.

2. The quarter also saw the Soviet Embassy working vigorously to increase cultural exchanges and to bring about co-operation over the development of border areas between the Soviet Union and Iran.

3. British exports ran at the new high level of £33 million per annum.

Internal Affairs

4. In early April the Shah replaced Ala as Prime Minister by Eqbal, who had been holding the appointments of Court Minister and Rector of the University. Ala had held office for two years, and while he had proved a faithful executive under the Shah's direction he had little drive or leadership. His substitution by the younger, more vigorous Eqbal, who commanded considerable good will amongst the educated, academic, bourgeois and professional classes, was a well-timed move on the part of the Shah. The question immediately asked was how would the Shah share the fruits of power with his new premier? Eqbal, ambitious, immensely industrious and blunt spoken, was obviously eager to assume greater authority and initiative than had been permitted to Ala. Would the Shah allow this while retaining for himself the direction of foreign policy, control of the army and, through Ebtehaj, supervision of the Seven-Year Plan? Among Eqbal's Iranian well-wishers the question generally was answered with scepticism. They were convinced that the Shah, having had his fingers burnt so badly by Musaddeq, would never again allow a Prime Minister to build up a position of strength which might eventually rival his own. The Shah would carefully limit Eqbal's sphere of influence by throwing around him a ring of political opponents. The new premier's evident ambition would, of course, tend to make the Shah far more suspicious of him than he had been of his obedient servant Ala.

5. Events since early April have borne out this line of thought—although the pattern of the Shah-Eqbal relationship has been somewhat obscured by the Shah's absence from Iran from late May onwards. Eqbal came in with a flourish; a sensible and (mainly) honest cabinet was chosen by the Shah and Eqbal between them; military government was immediately lifted; limited freedom was promised to the Press, and some encouragement given for a renewal of party political activity. It was known that there would be no change in foreign policy, based on the Western alliance, or in Ebtehaj's direction of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation, while Eqbal summed up his domestic programme in the word "work". But since those first weeks of hope for better government and a more liberal atmosphere, Eqbal's prestige has fallen rapidly and he has lost popularity through his clumsy and overbearing attitude towards Press and Parliament, and his reckless criticism of previous ministers. There have been few signs, unfortunately, of his ability to formulate policies and get things done. He has displayed prodigious energy in dealing with the petitions which pour in from every corner of the country but on major public issues such as improving the Tehran bus service or reorganising the Tehran meat company, he has proved disappointingly ineffectual. Throughout he has been hamstrung by the Shah's refusal to allow the removal of his man, General Alavi Muqaddam, from the post of police chief, or to compel the provincial governors to work through the proper channels rather than to the Shah direct. The sceptics are already convinced that Eqbal will make no headway in gaining from the Shah what he regards as the measure of authority due to him unless the United States and Britain are prepared to intervene in an attempt to limit the Shah's autocratic powers. Eqbal has laid the blame for his lack of progress on the fact that his hands have been tied by the Shah. His complaints on

SECRET

this score have, of course, been drawn to the Shah's attention. Relations between the two men are now bad. While they may well be patched up, they are not likely to show any real improvement in the near future.

6. During the quarter criticism of the Shah increased to a noticeable degree; and this trend was not only confined to the overcharged political atmosphere of the capital. It was, for instance, also noted in Isfahan. This criticism ranged over a wide field of dissatisfaction but a number of specific examples can be mentioned: Eqbal's complaints that his hands have been tied; Taqizadeh's resignation before the constitutional congress in May; the resentment of former ministers, such as Furuhar, at being kept in the dark while the Shah and emissaries from the Court were negotiating the Italian oil agreement in the early spring; public disappointment in Tehran over the Shah's refusal to have returned to the Senate Khajehnuri, an honest and well liked man who had led criticism of the Ala Government in the previous Senate; and widespread disapproval of the informal photographs which were eagerly published by the Press of the Shah and Queen Soraya on holiday in Europe. Previously, this type of criticism directed against the Shah could be expected from the submerged nationalist and Left-wing groups. But now it has also begun to seep through the conservative upper and middle class as well. The latter now tend critically to identify the Shah as the mainspring of government, whereas in the past they were more content to voice their dissatisfaction against the cabinet in office. This resentment springs largely from dismay at the increased power and influence of the Shah who 10 years ago was a lesser man than his Prime Ministers but who to-day towers above them and their political followers. The Shah is now entrenched in his political position, with the army (and, in Iranian opinion, the Western Powers) firmly behind him, and need fear no immediate challenge from any quarter. However, it is disquieting to note that the tide of middle class opinion which has run with him for nearly four years is now turning against him.

7. As directed by the Shah a constitutional congress of both Houses of Parliament took place in May. It amended the Constitution in order to increase the number of Majles Deputies from 136 to 200, to extend the term of the Majles from 2 to 4 years and in order to allow the Shah to send back financial bills to the Majles for one further reading. These amendments were passed unanimously but it was noteworthy that Taqizadeh, the veteran liberal resigned from his presidency of the Senate in order to avoid presiding over a congress whose task was to approve an abdication by the Majles, previously the sole repository of power concerning financial appropriations, to the Shah. Various semi-clandestine opposition groups published pamphlets attacking the congress and the Shah.

8. The promise made by Eqbal in April of more freedom for political association did not in fact produce any great party political activity. Dr. Baga'i's Toilers Party held one meeting; the hard core of Musaddeq's faithful adherents who form the National Resistance Movement appeared to be gaining ground and produced a couple of well written anti-Government and anti-Shah pamphlets, and Asadullah Alam made some progress in forming the conservative, official Opposition (People's) Party, desired by the Shah.

9. The first labour trouble which has occurred on any large scale during the past three years broke out at Agha Jari in the Khuzistan oil fields on the 26th of June, where a strike of a thousand oil workers took place for a revision of wage scales. This strike, which was soon quietened, may well be a harbinger of more labour trouble to come in the oil fields, although the Government took prompt action to set up a committee to investigate the circumstances. It also suggests that the low wages of many classes of workers throughout Iran will have to be increased shortly if further outbreaks of labour trouble are to be avoided. The strike appears to have been quite genuine in its origin.

10. The main business of the Majles was to discuss and approve a bill enabling the Government to negotiate oil concessions with foreign companies. This bill, which is required to replace oil legislation outstanding from the Musaddeq era, had a rapid passage through the Majles, which retains its constitutional right to ratify or reject concessions negotiated by the executive. The bill has (since the end of the quarter) been approved by the Senate and now only awaits the royal signature. The way is then clear for the Shah to present the E.N.I.-A.G.I.P. oil concession agreement to the Majles (whose members are

SECRET

being kept back in Tehran for this purpose) and for N.I.O.C. to negotiate in earnest with the various international oil companies who are showing interest in Iran.

Economic Affairs

11. In May Eqbal announced to the Majles that his Government was faced with a serious budgetary deficit as the result of false accounting employed in the presentation of the 1957-58 budget by his predecessor's Government. The Government are finding difficulty in meeting payments, but the recent increase of about 13 per cent. in the posted prices for Iranian crude oil and the hoped-for increase in oil production above the guaranteed figure may enable the Government to scrape through.

12. The International Bank made known its willingness to make further loans for development projects to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation which, although its prestige remains low in Iranian estimation, scored a minor success in April through the opening of the Tehran-Meshed railway line. The rate of flow of pilgrims to Meshed has more than doubled in consequence and land values in the holy city have risen impressively. From Isfahan and other provincial centres came reports of local prosperity due to an extremely good harvest. In Tehran the bazaar continued to prosper and new buildings and shops mushroomed up faster than ever.

13. In Khuzistan, the oil operating companies (Consortium) went ahead steadily with development and expansion. During June, crude oil production totalled 2.9 million tons (compared with 2.26 million in June 1956), and throughput at the Abadan refinery was 1.2 million tons (compared with 0.9 million for the same month last year). At Tehran, the standing of the Consortium, which was unaffected by the speculations concerning the new oil legislation, remained good. Abdullah Entezam succeeded Bayat as Chairman of the National Iranian Oil Company.

Foreign Affairs

14. Iranian foreign policy, based on the Western alliance and the Baghdad Pact, was undoubtedly given further strength by United States adherence to the Military Committee of the Pact at the Karachi meeting in June. While there is little popular regard for the pact in Iran as yet, it is beginning to be looked upon as a more or less permanent institution which, with the promise of American and British financial support, may now bring material benefit to Iran. But the permanence of Iranian attachment to the pact must always be considered in relation first to the Shah's political position and then to the possibility of the Russians exploiting a weak internal situation in order to detach Iran from the pact. While the Western alliance and the Shah's position both appear strong and stable, there is now evidence to show the Russians have launched a persistent and vigorous sapping operation. This operation appears designed to remove Iranian apprehensions as to Russian intentions through the promotion of frequent sporting and cultural events and exchange visits; then to arrange for Russian technical assistance for economic development and, finally, to neutralise Iranian opinion and detach the country from her Western friends in much the same way as Afghanistan has been squeezed into the position of benevolent neutrality to the Soviet Union. As yet, these Russian sapping operations have not included serious attempts to resuscitate the Tudeh Party or directly to undermine the Shah's régime. But they have, of course, included attacks on the Baghdad Pact and pressure on the Iranians to increase economic co-operation with the Russians. For their part, the Iranians have resisted this pressure staunchly.

15. Russian activity during the quarter included the bringing down from Moscow in April of a delegation led by Kuznetsov, a senior under-secretary in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, for the final signature of the Irano-Soviet frontier delimitation agreement; and the reception in Moscow during May of General Jahanbani for the signature of an agreement on the procedure for settling frontier incidents. A delegation of university professors led by the Rector of Tehran University, Dr. Farhad, was also received on a state visit to the Soviet Union which may be reciprocated by a visit of Russian academicians to Iran. (The Rector returned profoundly impressed by what he saw.) In addition, three Soviet football teams and a small group of musicians came on tour to Iran. An

Irano-Soviet trade agreement, on routine lines as far as the nature of goods to be exchanged is concerned, but covering a three-year period, was signed as was an agreement on Irano-Soviet transit trade. The latter may have considerable future importance, but it has yet to be implemented. Also under negotiation, with pressure from the Russians and prevarication from the Iranians, was an air transit agreement. And, lastly, a party of Soviet engineers arrived in Tehran to hold preliminary discussions for joint Irano-Soviet development of the Aras and Atrek Rivers on the north-western and north-eastern frontiers between the two countries. All in all, the Soviet Embassy had a busy and versatile quarter.

16. The British relationship with Iran gained from a steadily improving trade, our exports running at the rate of £33 million per annum, which surpassed the pre-oil dispute peak. There was, unfortunately, no marked improvement in the position or prestige of Mowlems, the largest and most controversial British firm in this country. A flurry of British Press articles about Iran caused a temporary excitement and were eagerly scanned for suggestions that they heralded a change of British policy. Those written by Miss Elizabeth Monroe in *The Economist* and Mr. Maurice Green in *The Times* were by and large welcomed for their sane analysis of the faltering economic and uneasy political condition. But most considerable impression was made by Mr. Anthony Nutting's article in the *New York Herald Tribune*, which contained some critical, true but undiplomatic sentences about the Shah and Princess Ashraf. It said what everyone wanted to read about them, and so intense was this desire that roneoed copies of the article were fetching up to £3 in the bazaar. The article drew a protest from the Court Minister to Her Majesty's Ambassador, and excited the easily-aroused suspicions of the Shah, who at the time of its publication was on a state visit to Spain. (Subsequent impressions unfortunately confirm the fact that this article has in fact done us serious and perhaps lasting damage.)

17. It was ascertained that the Saudis had re-occupied the island of Arabi. As regards Farsi, which remains under Iranian occupation, the Iranian Foreign Ministry in a note dated the 17th of June again rejected the Sheikh of Kuwait's claim to sovereignty over the island, which had been reiterated by this Embassy in a note dated the 4th of May.

18. The massive American support for Iran continued without apparent discord, and the West Germans moved quietly ahead in trade and with their plans to establish technical high schools at Tabriz and Tehran.

19. All in all it was a period of suspense and disappointment, tapering off to an uneasy lull in the relations between the Shah and his Prime Minister and to a sour-tempered resumption of the country's infinitely slow and painful advance towards social and economic improvement.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Baghdad, Karachi and Moscow, the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Cyprus, Development Division, Beirut, and to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL.

UES 1171/217

No. 22

THE IRANIAN PETROLEUM LAW

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, (Received August 6)

(No. 87 E. Confidential)

Sir,

Tehran,

August 2, 1957.

1. I have the honour to enclose the text⁽¹⁾ of the newly approved law which regulates the conditions under which Iran's oil resources outside the Consortium area are to be developed. This law is intended to be the keystone in the Iranian Government's newly declared policy of developing their oil resources either themselves or in effective partnership with foreign companies rather than by acting as a landlord and sleeping partner as was the case in the 1954 agreement with the Consortium.

2. The genesis of this law is as follows. Having failed last summer to interest the major oil companies in the idea of an effective partnership, the Iranians proceeded to negotiate an agreement on this basis with an Italian Company (A.G.I.P.). This agreement, which was initialled in March, is valued by the Iranians as much for the stimulus which it is hoped it will provide for the other oil companies as for its expected benefits. The next step was to prepare a bill which would provide blanket cover for this and other agreements with foreign companies. The original draft, which was inspired by Mr. Meybudi, the Shah's unofficial adviser on oil matters, did not provide for any alternative to partnership. The Iranian Government subsequently decided to call in an American expert, Mr. Batzell, to redraft the bill and to leave the door open to arrangements other than partnerships. Subsequently, the Iranian parliament proved unwilling to accept the provision in the bill that only agreements other than partnerships should be subject to parliamentary ratification, and in the end the Government conceded that all agreements should be made subject to parliamentary ratification. A number of other minor modifications were made, but the law which finally emerged is, I believe, broadly acceptable to the international oil companies.

3. In a recent statement⁽¹⁾ (a copy of which is enclosed) Mr. Entezam, the head of the National Iranian Oil Company (N.I.O.C.) has explained the philosophy behind the bill. There are two courses open to the Iranian Government: one is to leave the development of their oil resources to the international companies and content themselves with collecting a share of the revenues, the other is to develop these resources themselves and thereby receive a greater share of revenue. Mr. Entezam stressed all the factors which are needed to do this—capital, technical knowledge and a marketing organisation, and he explained that while in time Iran hoped to carry out all these operations herself, it would be necessary in the early stages to go into partnership with foreign companies. Finally, he explained that the Iranian Government would be prepared to enter into agreements other than partnerships, provided the additional benefits they received made it worthwhile for them. For example, the Iranians might expect a heavier initial payment in order to compensate them for the loss of the additional revenues which a partnership would have produced.

4. The law makes the N.I.O.C. responsible for negotiating and entering into oil agreements subject to the approval of the Government and of parliament; these can be of two main kinds—partnerships and other arrangements. The law distinguishes two kinds of partnerships—mixed organisations and joint structures—but this is a distinction of little intrinsic importance which was introduced for the convenience of the American oil companies. A joint structure is a partnership which is also a single legal entity and a mixed organisation is a partnership in which the partners retain a separate legal existence. In any partnership, the N.I.O.C.'s share must be not less than 30 per cent.; the law also offers more favourable conditions for partnerships if the N.I.O.C.'s share is 50 per cent. or more than for partnerships in which it is less than 50 per cent. The law is deliberately vague on the obligations of N.I.O.C. in a partnership. Although

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

the implication is that N.I.O.C. should contribute to the operating costs, as well as receive profits in proportion to its shareholding, the door has been left open to arrangements whereby the other partner meets most of the operating costs.

5. The law does not define the arrangements other than partnerships, but these would presumably be on the lines of the Consortium agreement. In any case, whatever the type of agreement entered into, the Iranian Government will collect 50 per cent of the difference between the cost of the oil and its market value. In the case of partnerships they will in addition receive their share of the profits; in other words, if N.I.O.C. enter into an agreement in which they have a 50 per cent. share-holding, Iran will receive 75 per cent. of the oil revenues.

6. The law provides for the division of the area outside the scope of the Consortium agreement into zones (there will probably be 25) of which one third will be treated as national reserves which can only be developed by N.I.O.C. acting on its own; N.I.O.C. can employ foreign contractors for this purpose but cannot enter into partnerships or other arrangements in respect of these areas. It has been announced that the Qum field will form part of the national reserve. The remaining zones will be put out to international tender, an operation which it is expected will begin within a month.

7. In addition to paying tax and possibly a share of the profits, the foreign companies entering into agreements with N.I.O.C. will have to pay a rental until such time as their tax liability exceeds the rental. Part of the rental will be payable as a lump sum when they sign the agreement; alternatively, they may be allowed to undertake to meet all the exploration costs including N.I.O.C.'s share.

8. There is likely to be a long queue of applicants of all degrees of reliability. The first agreement to be signed will probably be the one with A.G.I.P., which is going to be submitted for approval by parliament in the form of a single article bill within the next few days. It has also been announced that the representatives of a Japanese group will come to Tehran in August to negotiate an agreement, probably in respect of the Chahbahar area. Although most of the oil companies have been playing their cards very close to their chests, it seems clear that a number of major oil companies, including Standard of New Jersey and Shell, are interested, as well as several of the larger American Independents. The latter seem to be interested both in the possibility of making agreements with N.I.O.C. to act as contractors and buyers of the oil from the Qum field and also in bidding for other areas. It also seems that while the Independents are likely to accept partnership arrangements, the major oil companies are not at present willing to do so. Although the door is open to agreements other than partnerships, the major oil companies will find themselves under considerable pressure, both from the Iranian Government and Iranian public opinion, to enter into partnerships, and in the next few months they will have to balance the risk of losing some of the best areas in Iran to smaller companies against the consequences to their world-wide position of accepting a partnership. The Iranian Government, for their part, will no doubt take into account the greater resources which the major oil companies can offer. Heavy down payments and rentals may initially secure the major oil companies non-partnership agreements, but in the long run there is likely to be mounting pressure in favour of partnerships.

9. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Tokyo, Baghdad, Karachi, Ankara, Paris, The Hague and Rome, to the Political Resident at Bahrain and P.O.M.E.F.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL.

SECRET

EP 1701/31

No. 23

IRANIAN EARTHQUAKE: HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT'S PROVISION OF AID

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 27)

(No. 99. Confidential)
Sir

*Tehran,
August 24, 1957.*

The time has come to sum up the steps taken by this Embassy and the British Community in Tehran to organise relief in the recent earthquake. The last connected account of this was given by Sir Roger Stevens in his letter 1702/57 of the 12th of July to Mr. Derek Riches.

2. The visit of General Officer to the stricken areas (paragraphs 6 and 7 of Sir Roger Stevens' letter under reference and Tehran telegram No. 422) proved that we could most usefully help the afflicted by concentrating on the provision of tents. There was no case for a surgical team.

3. Of the 57 tents we had originally received from Cyprus, Mr. Hardman, Assistant Press Officer at this Embassy, distributed 30 through the Red Lion and Sun Society at Amol between the 12th and 13th of July. (Copies of his report and of those of the other members of the Embassy who distributed tents are enclosed⁽¹⁾.) We later received 50 more tents from Habbaniya. Of the tents which now remained, Mr. Martin Berthoud, 3rd Secretary at this Embassy, distributed 47 on two expeditions (from the 16th to the 20th of July in the Larejan area and the 31st of July to the 4th of August in the Lafur area) and Mr. Hugh Franks, 2nd Secretary Commercial at this Embassy, took 30 (between the 24th and the 27th of July) to the Zirab area. With our experience of Iranian charitable and other organisations we thought it wiser if possible to distribute the tents ourselves direct to the needy villagers rather than hand them over to the Red Lion and Sun Society. In the event, of a total of 107 tents we gave out 77 personally and handed 30 over to the Red Lion and Sun Society. The direct operation was of course conducted at a certain risk of offending the Iranian authorities. At a high level I think they were a little put out, but their representatives on the ground seemed to understand perfectly well why we wanted to give the tents out personally and to sympathise with our attitude. Apart from the four journey reports, I enclose copies of a report⁽¹⁾ written by Colonel McLean, which gives useful factual and technical information about the earthquake.

4. On the financial side the British Community's earthquake relief fund collected a total of £1,964. Of this sum £500 was contributed by "The Save the Children Fund" of Australia, £200 by "The Save the Children Fund" of the United Kingdom, £250 by Ruston Hornsby Limited, £250 by Rendel, Palmer and Triton, and £200 by John Mowlem & Company Limited (firms which have interests in Iran). The remainder is made up from contributions by the British Community (including this Embassy) and other miscellaneous donations from the United Kingdom and Iran. The British colony committee, of which I am in the chair, has decided to give half of this sum to the Red Lion and Sun Society and half to the new Queen Soraya orphanage at Amol, which is taking in children whose parents perished in the earthquake.

5. In retrospect I think we can be satisfied that we did all that could be expected of us. In fact, given our slender resources both in finance and in manpower, we did extremely well. The earthquake was not really a major disaster. It was over-reported at first, as I was able to see for myself at first hand, when on the first and second days I happened to be driving back from North-East Iran through practically undamaged areas, which the Tehran Press was reporting totally destroyed. But this was only on the edge of the real quake area. This, as was later learned, was concentrated in a few mountain valleys, high up in remote places excessively difficult of access. There the final total was around 1,000 dead, 500 seriously injured, and 10,000 homeless. Bad enough, in all conscience. Our efforts were much appreciated here and got good publicity. I was

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

told by a representative of the International Red Cross from Geneva that the British response was far and away the best in Europe. In these circumstances I did not venture to question the decision (Foreign Office Telegram No. 798 of the 29th of July) not to make a cash gift of the £1,500 or so balance unexpended from Her Majesty's Government's approved £10,000 maximum contribution in kind.

6. To wind up this business, I should like to mention the excellent work done by certain members of the staff of Her Majesty's Embassy, both in organisation here in Tehran and in convoy and distribution work at the scene of the earthquake, the latter an arduous, delicate and usually ungrateful task. Particularly active and effective were:

Mr. Martin Berthoud, 3rd Secretary
Mr. Hugh Franks, 2nd Secretary, Commercial
Mr. Alan Read, Labour Attaché
Mr. James Hardman, Assistant in Press Section
Mr. Willy Amin, Registry Clerk in Commercial Section.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador, Baghdad, and the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces in Cyprus, who both gave material assistance, and to Her Majesty's Ambassador in Ankara, and the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Karachi, both of whom may have a general interest in such operations.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL.

SECRET

EP 1051/17

No. 24

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AND DR. ARDALAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1957

Dr. Ardalan had a conversation with me this morning. He raised the following points:

1. Dr. Ardalan said they were anxious to help us in any way they could in the Persian Gulf. He wondered whether it would be a good thing for the Shah to invite some of the Gulf Shaikhs, like the Shaikh of Qatar, to Iran. He had been made a great fuss of in Cairo and he thought that if the Shah made a fuss of him in Tehran it might turn his eyes away from Egypt. He said he did not want us to think that this suggestion was put forward with the idea of weakening British influence in any way. I said I would consider the idea and let him know our views.

2. He then went on to ask whether it was not possible for Iran and Britain to work out a common policy in the Gulf. He referred to an article, in the *New York Times*, saying that it should be called the Arabian Gulf. Of course the Iranian Government did not like that idea at all. He wanted to emphasise again that they fully recognised our position and they wanted to strengthen it and not to weaken it. That had not always been the view of the Iranian Government. There had been times when they had wanted to diminish our influence and increase their own. Their present attitude was quite different: having regard to the Communist danger they wanted to improve the situation there. He referred to Egyptian teachers. I told him about the difficulties of getting teachers from elsewhere. He said he hoped that we were not thinking of a rapprochement with Colonel Nasser. He was certain that Nasser was fully implicated in the Syrian business and that it would be disastrous for us to think that we could advance Western interests by coming to some agreement with Nasser. I said that that was my own view. So far as British interests were concerned, I did not rule out an agreement with Nasser, but it would have to be one in which the Egyptians paid by way of definite concessions for everything they got. We were not going to be led away by vague promises.

3. He said that the Iraqis were hanging back on agreement about the disputed frontier in the Shatt-al-Arab. Some Iraqis were saying this was because the United Kingdom Government did not want an agreement. The Iranian Government did not believe that at all, but if we could give the Iraqis a prod it would be a good thing.

4. He asked whether we could not agree to an Iranian Consulate in Kuwait. I said that the difficulty, as he so well knew, was that if we allowed one, we had to allow others and it was very difficult to draw the line. Therefore we thought it was really in the interests of all of us to maintain our present line.

5. He said that the King of Iraq was going to pay an official visit to Tehran. He thought on the 11th or 12th of October. There would be three days of official visit and then he would stay on to shoot for about a week.

6. Later in the day, before luncheon, I raised the question of the Oman. I said that I understood there was a representative of the Imam hanging about the United Nations and pressure was being brought to bear upon the Arab States to support inscription of the Oman question. I hoped that he would do his best by way of quiet discouragement to prevent this happening. Dr. Ardalan undertook to give Mr. Abdoh instructions to that effect. He quite agreed it would be most undesirable to have the Oman discussed.

SECRET

EP 1013/4

No. 25

POLITICAL REPORT ON IRAN FOR THIRD QUARTER OF 1957

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 15)

(No. 114. Confidential)
Sir,

Tehran,
October 11, 1957.

During the third quarter of 1957 the Shah directed Iranian energies towards the fulfilment of two policies—greater participation in the development of her own oil resources, and forward movement in the Persian Gulf.

2. The approval given by Parliament at the end of July to the legislation which forms the keystone of Iran's new oil policy was followed by the ratification in August of the partnership agreement between the N.I.O.C. and the Italian concern A.G.I.P.—Mineraria. Over Persian Gulf affairs, Iran sought closer understanding with the United Kingdom, and took the initiative in establishing relations with the Trucial Coast sheikhs.

3. The Shah's position appeared stronger than ever before. On his return from abroad he made it quite plain to his Prime Minister and to the public that he would continue personally to direct all affairs of importance in this country. In various declarations, public and private, he expressed his belief that it was Iran's destiny to become a great power in this part of the world. The internal situation remained exceptionally stable under the firm control of SAVAK—the efficient and loyal security organisation—a new phenomenon in recent Iranian history.

4. Foreign activities always loom large on the Iranian scene and in the Iranian mind, and during September important moves were made by the two rival power blocs: on the 18th of September the Russians chose to present a note about the situation in the Middle East to the Shah, and a few days earlier Standard Oil of New Jersey (in association with Shell—a fact which has not yet reached the Press) offered a large sum of key money for an off-shore oil concession in the Gulf.

Internal Affairs

5. The Shah, urged by the Minister of Court, Husain Ala, cut short his Mediterranean holiday and flew back to Iran on the 12th of July in order to visit Mazanderan, where a severe earthquake had occurred 10 days earlier causing considerable destruction in several score of mountain villages and the death of perhaps 1,000 hillmen. Having made his personal appearance in the earthquake area, the Shah quickly came to grips with his immediate political problems, which were to define his relationship with the Prime Minister, Eqbal, and to drive the oil law and the N.I.O.C.-A.G.I.P. agreement through Parliament.

6. During the Shah's absence on holiday, Eqbal had been complaining openly that his authority as Prime Minister was being undermined by the Shah's proclivity for dealing direct with Ministers, provincial Governors, and, in fact, with all comers on matters of Government business. Eqbal felt, with some justification, that his due measure of power was being denied him, and said so. The Shah was, of course, informed of Eqbal's complaints and, at the time of his return, it seemed that if Eqbal maintained his attitude then a showdown, probably leading to Eqbal's dismissal or resignation, would have to take place. But as it happened, Eqbal, when faced by the Shah, did not press his case; he knuckled under, and has since assumed his true function as a hard working executive who does not attempt to impose sweeping new policies on the mould of Iranian political life. Developments have shown that it will require either a man of no ordinary political skill or a nationalist movement fired by strong emotions to challenge the power of the Shah. 10 years ago the Shah was a lesser man than his Prime Minister, and four years ago the division of power between the Shah and General Zahedi was fairly evenly balanced. But to-day, in the 17th year of his reign, the Shah has at last consolidated his power and towers far above his Ministers and Generals. The Shah made this fact quite clear to Majles deputies whom he addressed in a boastful and domineering manner on the 28th of July.

SECRET

7. In his speech the Shah spoke in the most confident tones about Iran's oil policy and boasted that the N.I.O.C. would one day be the biggest oil company in the world. On another occasion the Shah spoke of his determination that Iran should have a tanker fleet of 500,000 tons in 10 years' time. Negotiations for this are proceeding with various countries, including Japan. There is no doubt that most of the impetus behind the new oil policy came from the Shah who, in this and other matters, has shown himself determined to push Iran forward on the international stage. The original draft of the oil law (which regulates the conditions under which Iran's oil resources outside the Consortium area are to be developed) was inspired by the Shah and Ahmed Mehbud, his unofficial adviser on oil affairs, and only provided for partnerships between the N.I.O.C. and foreign companies. However, when it became apparent that a regulation of this nature would be unacceptable to the major American and British oil companies, an American expert called Batzell was called in to redraft the Bill so as to leave the door open for other agreements as well as partnerships. It was thus Batzell's Bill which finally went before Parliament and emerged as law with only one major modification and in a form broadly acceptable to the international oil companies. This modification, over which the Majles asserted its constitutional prerogative, somewhat to the Shah's displeasure, was that all future oil agreements (and not only agreements other than partnerships as envisaged in the Government's Bill) must be subject to Parliamentary ratification.

8. The internal situation remained exceptionally stable thanks largely to the emergence of SAVAK, General Bakhtiar's security and information organisation, as an efficient, loyal and feared secret police. SAVAK enjoyed a great success in early July when they captured Ruzbeh, the Tudeh Party leader, who had been in hiding in Tehran for the past four years.

9. There were indications that the Shah intends to make use of SAVAK in a wide and versatile manner. In addition to its security and intelligence duties it has been used to control the Press, to promote a settlement of the wage dispute in the oil industry and to keep in touch with the Persian Gulf Rulers.

10. Slow progress was made in establishing the official political parties desired by the Shah, public opinion being apathetic and cynical towards this venture. However, Asadullah Alam has already formed the Mardum (People's) Party as the official Opposition, Sardar Fakher has been prodded by the Shah into making it known that he will lead a pro-Government Social Democrat Party and Hassan Arsanjani, an energetic journalist, has been given leave to start the Azadi (Freedom) group whose appeal will be directed specifically towards the middle class.

Foreign Affairs

11. The conclusion of the N.I.O.C.-A.G.I.P. agreement on terms which appear very favourable to Iran marks the inauguration of a new policy of independence in oil matters. The success of A.G.I.P. in securing what are thought to be the most likely exploitation areas must now be followed up by striking oil quickly and then making a settlement with the major American and British oil companies over marketing arrangements. But this is largely an Italian problem. From the Iranian point of view, the great gains made are to have kindled Italian interest in economic co-operation with Iran and to have raised the price for foreign oil concessions to the level of partnership with 75 per cent. of oil revenues accruing to Iran. The N.I.O.C. are now engaged in mapping the other concession areas available outside the Consortium zone and, when this has been done, the offer made by Standard Oil of New Jersey-Shell will be considered together with any other bids.

12. In the Persian Gulf also the Iranians have taken the initiative by inviting leading sheikhs from Dubai, Qatar and Sharjah on the Trucial Coast to visit Iran as guests of the Government. In the event only the sheikh of Dubai turned up. However, the object of the Iranian exercise was presumably to enter into some informal but friendly association with the sheikh and this was achieved in this case.

13. Meanwhile, the Shah and his Ministers have been active in suggesting to this Embassy that the time has now arrived for closer co-operation between the United Kingdom and Iran over the disposition of affairs in the Gulf. The

Shah has also set his heart on having a bigger and better navy in the Gulf and, the Americans having turned a cold shoulder, has made several requests for British assistance in this matter.

14. The Shah may have scored an international success with his A.G.I.P. agreement, and he has at least moved forward in establishing contact with the Gulf Rulers, but his effort to convene a conference of Middle Eastern Heads of State to discuss regional problems such as Syria has so far proved to be a failure. This was his second attempt to call such a conference, the first having been made in December 1957; and its lack of success must be attributed partly to faulty timing and partly to the fact that the Shah tends to over-estimate his standing and influence in the Arab countries.

15. United States relations with Iran remained close, but were subject to some criticism over the alleged American opposition to the A.G.I.P. agreement. Should American financial aid to Iran, in the shape of contributions to the military budget and Point IV activities, be cut down further, then coldness and flashes of hostility towards the Americans may well be shown by the Shah and the ruling class. Meanwhile, the Shah is maintaining great pressure on the Americans to provide him with the most modern and new-fangled items of military equipment. He seems at times to have flashed past the stage of being satisfied with conventional armaments suitable for internal security such as tanks and armoured cars.

16. Russia remained friendly and continued to cultivate the Iranians strenuously. The main Russian success was the signature on the 11th of August of a convention for the drawing-up of engineering plans for irrigation and hydro-electric barrages on the Araxes and Atrek Rivers. The Russians can now be expected to press forward with this work at stakhanovite speed, and the Iranians to drag their feet. Meanwhile, the Russians are doing all they can to promote exchange of visits of all kinds, and Iran tops the list of countries at which Soviet broadcasts are directed.

17. On the 18th of September a long and ably written note from President Voroshilov was delivered to the Shah. This note, which has not yet been published, appears to be an attempt to define the latest Soviet attitude towards the Middle East and, by extension, to the whole Asian-African bloc. The note maintains that the Soviet Government support the independence and national aspirations of the newly established countries, whereas the Western Governments, while paying lip-service to their independence, want to keep them in political and economic subjection. The note makes specific mention of Syria and was undoubtedly intended to have some effect in relieving Western and, particularly, Turkish pressure on that country. The Shah has accepted the note calmly and is in no hurry to reply. Meanwhile, the Iranian Government have protested robustly to the Russians against Marshal Vershinin's speech of the 8th of September in which he claimed that conventional Soviet rockets would be enough to destroy Iran and Turkey.

18. British prestige in Iran has unfortunately now become enmeshed—as far as the Iranian public is concerned—with the Mowlem affair: Mowlems, the largest British firm operating in Iran, are responsible as road construction consulting engineers to the S.Y.P.O. for supervising the biggest and most costly single project financed by the plan; in over two years of operation they have made singularly slow progress for a variety of reasons, and the rate of their achievement is inevitably regarded by many Iranians as the criterion of the British (Government and people's) desire and ability to assist and fortify Iran. Mowlem's are now engaged in negotiating a new contract covering a smaller mileage of road with the S.Y.P.O. Their prospects of being able to have a sizeable section of road built in the immediate future are bad; and, as the result of the unfortunate predicament of this British company, we as a nation are likely to forfeit a large measure of the goodwill which we might otherwise hope to enjoy in Iran.

19. Otherwise our position here was well held. The suspicion which the Shah entertained in the early summer that the British were contriving to weaken his position by inspiring Press attacks wore off and was replaced by a friendly attitude; the British Council opened its first provincial centre at Tabriz; British governmental and private contributions to the Mazandaran earthquake relief were timely, fitting and well publicised; liaison over the production of anti-Communist material was organised under Baghdad Pact auspices; Costain-John Brown were

on the point of securing a large new pipeline contract in the south, A.C.V. sold 250 buses to the Tehran municipality and on the 30th of September the first repayment of £1.65 million of the £10 million credit extended to Iran in 1955 was duly made. These were routine advances on a front where our flanks may soon be exposed to nationalist inspired attacks against Mowlems and against the British position in the Persian Gulf.

Economic Affairs

20. International developments in oil mainly having been dealt with above, it remains to be noted that the Consortium announced an £18 million programme for expansion of production in the Agha Jari and Gach Saran oil fields and for the construction of a floating jetty in the Persian Gulf to handle 20 million tons of crude oil exports per annum. In July and August there were strikes among oil workers in the southern fields which led to the raising of the minimum wage for the industry in Khuzistan from 82 to 99 rials (9s. 6d.) per day, an increase which apparently will cost the Consortium and the N.I.O.C. some £2.7 million per annum.

21. Ebtehaj, the director of the S.Y.P.O., who was confirmed in his appointment for a second three years, left for the United States in mid-September for the plenary session of the International Bank. It is believed that Ebtehaj will attempt to secure from the Bank further loans for S.Y.P.O. development projects, such as road building and the ambitious Clapp-Lilienthal plans for agricultural and industrial expansion in Khuzistan.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Baghdad, Moscow and Karachi, the Head of the Political Office with the Middle East Forces, Cyprus, Development Division, Beirut, and to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies Station.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL.

EP 1015/45

No. 26

DIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF Dr. EQBAL

Mr. Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 12)

(No. 126. Confidential)

Sir,

*Tehran,
November 6, 1957.*

Dr. Eqqal's Cabinet has been in office seven months to-day. Its record during that time has not been bad, although it has few major constructive successes to its credit. It has, however, put the final touch to the Italian oil agreement and achieved a number of unspectacular but useful administrative improvements inside the country. But in the course of this Dr. Eqqal's own reputation has unfortunately not gained. Although he is still respected as a well-meaning, hard-working and personally disinterested man, he has shown himself a poor politician and a worse psychologist. The academic, intellectual, professional, liberal and bourgeois classes had high hopes of him when he took office. But these hopes have been largely disappointed. Dr. Eqqal now seems to these people to have surrendered his liberty to the Shah and to have become just another King's man. To this unhappy impression Dr. Eqqal himself gave added colour last week when he addressed the Majles deputies about the recent arrests of nationalist elements. This speech was a masterpiece of political ineptitude.

2. To place the speech in true perspective, I should like first, if I may, to recapitulate the story of the arrests. These began in late September, when a number of small fry belonging to the National Resistance Movement (the ex-Musaddiq National Front) group were brought in, here and at Meshed, apparently for having helped write, print and distribute the National Resistance Movement pamphlet of last July which attacked the Government's oil policy and the Shah's autocracy. On the 23rd of October, the day after General Bakhtiar's return from Europe, Sayyed Reza Zanjani, the brains behind the National Resistance Movement, and Dr. Abdullah Mo'azzami, a leading National Front figure who was Vice-President of the Majles under Musaddiq and whose brother was Musaddiq's Minister of P.T.T., were arrested. In all some 60 or 70 people were rounded up; of whom about half have now been released after interrogation. Among those taken the only other personalities of consequence were Milani, a mullah from Tabriz who attached himself to Musaddiq and became a Majles deputy; and Shariati, a religious scholar. Both were living in Meshed. Meanwhile, no Press comment about the arrests had been allowed and no Government statement issued. In consequence, the atmosphere was highly nervous and full of rumour.

3. On the 8th of October, Behbehani, an independent-minded Majles deputy, had tabled a motion calling on the Prime Minister to explain and justify the arrests. This is what Dr. Eqqal tried to do in his speech of the 29th of October. But before the Prime Minister began, Behbehani had a chance to set the stage. He said that Musaddiq used to throw into prison everyone who opposed him, claiming that they were traitors; and that now Eqqal (i.e., the Shah) was doing the same. The people arrested could hardly have been in touch with foreign enemies, he said, as present conditions were very different to those obtaining in Musaddiq's day. Now the Russians were hard at work praising the A.G.I.P. oil agreement and the Americans were giving Iran a great deal of economic aid and military co-operation, whilst the British were allies of Iran through the Baghdad Pact. It was therefore unlikely that foreign Governments were intriguing against the country. He then went on to say that in spite of four years of oil revenue nothing had been done for the people of Iran, who should at least be allowed to express their opinions. Why had those who did so been secretly arrested? And why had the Press been silenced?

4. Dr. Eqqal did not have many concrete facts to offer in reply, but he laboured the point that those arrested were traitors, had confessed to being in touch with foreigners and would be tried. He went on at intolerable length trying to justify the Government's action in language which was hectoring throughout and sometimes coarse, vulgar and even blasphemous. He had been appointed

Prime Minister by the Shah; and he was going to stay Prime Minister whatever any deputy, journalist, or intriguing foreigner thought, or said, or did. He would be Prime Minister just as long as the Shah wanted him.

5. Putting things this way Dr. Eqlal stripped away the façade of democratic Government which responsible people are trying to create and uphold in Iran, and exposed with quite unnecessary blatancy the facts of the direct imperial autocracy which at present runs this country. (That such an autocracy is probably essential in Persia to-day is another thing. It is bad politics for the Shah publicly to echo King Farouk's auto-biographical epitaph—"I was the power behind the Throne".) This frankness, combined with Dr. Eqlal's abject servility to the Shah and his irresponsible language, has upset his upper and middle class supporters and, I fear, permanently lost him the sympathy of most of the deputies.

6. Dr. Eqlal's references to foreigners have been generally taken to mean the Americans. It seems reasonably certain that some of the innumerable American intelligence personnel here have been in touch with men like Mo'azzami even if only for the sake of the information they can collect. There is no evidence whatsoever that either they or the American Embassy proper are running the National Resistance Movement group as a shadow alternative Government. It is humanly only too understandable that the Iranian authorities should wish to give the Americans a rap over the knuckles every so often and I know from what Dr. Eqlal has told me himself recently that he finds the Embassy's activities tactless and impertinent. The Ambassador lectures him in a heavy paternal manner and he resents it. But his way of showing it to the Majles has not helped to improve things.

7. In the Eqlal Cabinet things keep more-or-less going, although the Ministers have little opportunity for any imaginative policies. So far there has been no real attempt to tackle Iran's perhaps most serious problem—Civil Service Reform. There have all summer been rumblings of resignations, but these have only come to a head in one case, that of Agha Khan Bakhtiar, the honest and decent Minister of Labour, an old and true friend of Britain. Under the combined stress of ill-health, disappointments in his Ministry and pressure from interested groups in the course of a Cabinet investigation which he was conducting into some contract irregularities, Bakhtiar finally handed in his resignation. The Shah, however, has refused to accept it and insists that Bakhtiar shall continue as Minister of Labour, although giving up his second (and much preferred) position as Head of the Mortgage Bank.

8. This is the only major sign of wear and tear so far showing in the Eqlal Cabinet. And a partial reconstruction will be enough to tide it over this trouble. The Shah evidently intends to keep it in office for some time yet, as early this week he made it clear to the deputies (to whom he now gives a monthly audience) that he would not tolerate any harrassing tactics designed to bring down the Government. But on present form, it is hard to see how Dr. Eqlal can last beyond next spring.

9. The Shah's strategy is quite simply to keep a series of puppet Prime Ministers in power while he himself continues to pull all the vital strings behind the scenes. This is becoming increasingly evident and is beginning to do him political damage, at any rate in liberal, constitutional circles. This discontent however should not blind us to the fact that the Shah is running the country with some skill and great determination. There is a noticeable and widespread increase in domestic prosperity. (Dr. Eqlal's favourite illustration of this, which he quoted when I went to have a talk with him in his office one day last week, is that there are now 25 times more bicycles in Esfahan than there were seven years ago.) In foreign affairs the Shah has consistently shown himself steadfast, courageous and determined in the face of all Soviet bluster and blandishments. For this, in his exposed position and with a weak, irresolute and backward country behind him, I submit that he deserves great credit.

10. This despatch started as a review of the record of Dr. Eqlal's Cabinet. It brings up to date the picture which I last drew in my letter of the 28th of August to the Head of Eastern Department. There I reported that Dr. Eqlal, after a few months fighting for his head, was answering to the bit and beginning to come back into his master's hand. This process is now almost complete. The country is by comparison with past form quite well run, probably better and more

honestly than at any time since Reza Shah's prime; but the liberals' hopes of Parliament or Cabinet taking over the realities of power from the Throne continue to be disappointed. The Shah both reigns and governs. And on balance, given the immaturity of constitutional and political thought and practice in this country, it is probably better for Iran (and for her allies) that in the present disturbed state of the world he should continue for the present to do so. It will require many years of internal and external stability before this country can safely enjoy the luxury of democratic Parliamentary rule, without a strong and arbitrary hand somewhere behind the scenes.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Ankara, Baghdad and Washington, the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi, and the Political Adviser in Cyprus.

I have, &c.

J. W. RUSSELL.

EP 1111/18

No. 27

IRANIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 24)

(No. 146 E. Confidential) *Tehran,*
December 19, 1957.
 Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 38 E. of March 30 last and my telegram No. 799 of December 12, I have the honour to report that it is now evident that the Iranian Government will be faced with a serious budgetary deficit in the current year and that this situation is likely to grow worse during the Iranian year 1337 which opens next March.

2. The over-optimistic estimates of revenue for the current budget which were to have exceeded those of the previous year by some 35 per cent. have so far been only two-thirds realised, whilst expenditures have exceeded the estimates by about 10 per cent. Although it is too early to form any precise idea of the eventual deficit, it is generally assumed that this will not be less than three milliard rials.⁽¹⁾ The deficit will be financed by drawing down the balances of the independent State agencies with the Ministry of Finance, thereby forcing these agencies to borrow from the Bank Melli.

3. The outlook for 1958-9 is more serious still. As you are aware, the Government's share of the oil revenues, which normally covers the bulk of the operating deficit, is due to be cut from 30.6 per cent. to 10 per cent. next year in accordance with the Seven-Year Plan Law. In addition the Government is faced with increased expenditure for higher army and civil service pay (6 milliard rials), expansion of the armed forces (1 milliard rials) and of the health and education programme (1 milliard rials). Higher revenues from import duties and taxation are expected to bring in an increase of revenues of some 2 milliard rials, but unless unexpected windfalls of revenue turn up, this year's deficit of 3 milliard rials is likely to be increased by a further 6 milliard rials next year, a serious situation for a budget totalling only 22 milliard rials in all this year.

4. There have been a series of exchanges in recent months between the Iranian Government and the United States Embassy, arising out of an interview

between the Minister of Finance, Mr. Nasser and Mr. Dulles in Washington in September. At that interview Mr. Nasser, acting on instructions from the Shah, shocked the American Secretary of State by an unexpected request for special budgetary help for the current year, in spite of many protestations during the year that such help would not be required or asked for. On the American side it had been repeatedly said that aid would no longer include assistance to the budget.

5. The Iranian request was repeated by the Shah to the American Ambassador in October, and figures of budgetary aid ranging between \$50 millions and \$150 millions have since been put forward for the financial year beginning next March. Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities had evidently been looking around for alternative means of balancing next year's budget, and suggestions were made to the Shah, during Mr. Ebtehaj's absence in Washington, that the increased oil revenues accruing to the Plan Organisation next year (80 per cent. of the total) should be raided. This provoked a violent outburst from Mr. Ebtehaj and had to be abandoned for the time being. Pressure was then renewed upon the American Embassy who produced, early in November, an unofficial memorandum for the benefit of Mr. Ebtehaj containing suggestions for covering the deficits which appeared unavoidable both this year and next. The memorandum firmly rejected any idea of American aid, pointing out that even if it were to be forthcoming, it would not solve the problem of finding the necessary rials. The memorandum went on to suggest that in view of the adequate resources of gold and foreign exchange the deficits should be financed by borrowing from the Bank Melli and by using the recently created reserve revaluation fund of 7 milliard rials.

6. This memorandum, intended for the private information of Mr. Ebtehaj, was widely circulated in the Iranian Government, and a copy was produced to me by an indignant Prime Minister during my first interview with him after my return. It

⁽¹⁾ 210 Rials = £1.

SECRET

provoked a sharp riposte from the Bank Melli, who rightly said that the suggestions made were inflationary. The American Embassy thereupon drew up a second and more studied memorandum, pointing out that their suggestion had been made in view of an inflationary situation which had already occurred and simply concerned one method of inflationary financing compared with another. They argued that unless public investment (i.e., the Plan's programme) were drastically cut or taxation dramatically increased, some form of deficit financing would be inevitable next year, and that it was fortunate in the circumstances that the Bank Melli reserves were adequate to stand a substantial increase in the note issue. Their revised recommendation dropped the idea of using the revaluation fund (as this is now more or less committed to investment projects) and put forward a combination of measures designed to reduce the deficit and finance it. The suggestions made were (a) some reduction in public investment; (b) some borrowing from the Bank Melli; (c) civil service and army pay increases to be kept to a minimum; (d) tax collection to be tightened up further and (e) some borrowing abroad to relieve any strain on the reserves.

7. Cuts in the Plan Organisation budget, or at least in the Plan's actual expenditure, seem to be the only way of reducing State expenditure and it is significant that there is already talk of amalgamating the Budget of the Plan with the general Budget. Mr. Ebtehaj can, however, be relied upon to resist with tooth and nail. Borrowing from abroad will no doubt be resorted to where

possible, and borrowing from the Bank Melli seems inevitable. Tax collections will perhaps be tightened up somewhat, and the Finance Minister issued a warning on November 30 that sharper taxation might be imposed on the wealthier classes. Few, however, and least of all the Shah himself, seem to realise or to face up to the fact that the basic problem of inflation will not be solved until the inevitable rising expenditure of Government is met from Iranian resources. The clumsy approach of Mr. Nasser in Washington, and subsequent threats of the Shah in private that he would if necessary turn to the Russians for aid, seem to have had the effect of hardening American official opinion still further against any form of budgetary aid, and my American colleague delivered what seems to be a final no to the Shah last week-end. He pointed out *inter alia* that Iran's need was for budget balancing not foreign exchange; her foreign exchange reserves position was far better than that of, e.g., Pakistan, Sweden, Turkey or the United Kingdom. In the event His Majesty took the news without emotion and, Mr. Chapin alleges, without much understanding. My own impression is that the news was not unexpected in view of the correspondence described above.

8. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Treasury, Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, and to Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

ROGER STEVENS.

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APPENDIX
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EP 1012/1

No. 28

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN IRAN

Mr. John Russell to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 15)

(No. 9. Confidential) *Tehran,*
Sir, *January 12, 1957.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a revised report on leading personalities in Iran, which supersedes the one enclosed with Mr. D. A. H. Wright's despatch No. 88 of the 9th of August, 1955.

I have, &c.

JOHN RUSSELL.

[Generally speaking "e" represents the short "e" sound (met); "i" the long "e" (meet); "a" the short "a" (cat), and "ā" the long "a" (father).]

Enclosure

H.I.M. The Shah:
Muhammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavi.

The Pahlavi Royal Family

1. 'Adl. Ahmad Husain.
2. 'Adl. Engineer Majid.
3. Afshār. Rezā.
4. Alā. Husain. C.M.G., (Mu'in-ul-Vezareh).
5. 'Alam. Asadullāh.
6. Alavi. Dr. Hasan.
7. 'Ameri. Javād.
8. Amini. Dr. 'Alī.
9. Amir 'Alāi. Shams-ud-Din.
10. Amir-Taimur Kalali. Muhammad Ebrāhīm.
11. Ansāri. Abdul Husain Mas'ud.
12. Ansari. Vali. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
13. Arāmesh. Ahmad.
14. Ardalān. Dr. 'Alī Qulī.
15. Ardalān. Amānullāh (Hāji Ezz-ul-Mamālek).
16. Ardalān. Nāser Qulī.
17. Arfa'. Hasan. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
18. Asadi. Salmān.
19. Azudi. Yadullāh (Amir A'zam).
20. Bakhtiār. Āqā Khān.
21. Bakhtiār. Dr. Shāhpur.
22. Bakhtiār. Taimur Khān. General (*Sepahbud*).
23. Bakhtiāri. Jahānshāh Samsām.
24. Bakhtiāri. Murtezā Qulī Samsām.
25. Baqā'i. Dr. Muzaffar.
26. Bayāt. Murtezā Qulī (Shāh-us-Sulhān).
27. Behbahāni. Mirzā Sayyed Muhammad (*A'yatullāh*).
28. Behniā. 'Abdul Husain.
29. Burujerdi. Hāj Āqā Husain (*A'yatullāh*).
30. Bushehri-Dehdashti. Āqā Javad (Amir Humā'yun).

31. Dashti. 'Alī.
32. Divānbaigi. Āqā Rezā 'Alī.
33. Ebtehāj. Abul Hasan.
34. Ebtehāj. Ghulām Husain.
35. Emāmi. Jamāl-ud-Din.
36. Emāmi. Nezām-ud-Din.
37. Emāmi. Dr. Sayyed Hasan (*A'yatullāh*). (*Emām Jum'eh* of Tehran).
38. Entezām. 'Abdullāh.
39. Entezām. Nasrullāh.
40. Eqbāl. 'Alī.
41. Eqbāl. Dr. Manuchehr.
42. Estandiāri. Fathullāh Nuri.
43. Estandiāri. Musā Nuri (Muvaffaq-us-Saltaneh).
44. Eshraqi. Amir Qāsem. Engineer (*Muhandes*).
45. Eskandari. 'Abbās.
46. Fallāh. Dr. Rezā.
47. Farhudi. Dr. Husain.
48. Farmand. Hasan 'Alī (Ziā-ul-Mulk). *Farmānfarmāyān* (see Firuz. Muhammad Vali Mirza).
49. Farrukh. Mehdi (Mu'tasem-us-Saltaneh).
50. Fāteh. Mustafā.
51. Fātemi. Mehdi Mushir (Emād-us-Saltaneh).
52. Firuz. Muhammad Husain. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
53. Firuz. Muhammad Vali Mirzā (*Farmānfarmāyān*).
54. Furuhar. Abul-Qāsem.
55. Furuhar. Ghulām Husain.
56. Ganje'i. Reza. Engineer (*Muhandes*).
57. Garzan. 'Abbās. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
58. Gilānshāh. Hedāyat. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
59. Gulshā'i'yān. 'Abbās Qulī.
60. Hā'erizādeh. Sayyed Abul Hasan.
61. Hai'at. 'Alī.
62. Hākimi. Ebrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk).
63. Hasibi. Engineer Kazem.
64. Hedāyat. Abdullāh. General (*Sepahbud*).
65. Hedāyat. Ezzatullāh.
66. Hedāyat. Khusrau Bahman.
67. Hejāzi. Abdul Husain. Major-General (*Sarlashgar*).
68. Hekmat. 'Alī Asghar.
69. Hekmat. Rezā (Sardār Fākher).
70. Heshmati. 'Abbās.
71. Human. Dr. Ahmad.
72. Issayeff (or Issayan). Ramon.
73. Jahānbāni. Amānullāh. General (*Sepahbud*).
74. Jam. Mahmud (Mudir-ul-Mulk).
75. Jazayeri. Dr. Shams-ud-Din.
76. Kalhān. Mas'ud.
77. Kalvān. Amir.
78. Kāmbakhsh. 'Abd-us-Samad.
79. Kāshāni. Sayyed Abul-Qāsem.
80. Kashani. Ebrahim.
81. Kāzemi. Bāqer (Muhazzab-ud-Dauleh).
82. Keshāvarz. Faridun. Dr.
83. Khājah-Nuri. Ebrāhīm.
84. Kuras. 'Isa (Esau).
85. Lankarāni. Shaikh Husain.
86. Mekki. Husain.

87. Mansur (Rajab) 'Ali. C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk).
88. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sārem-ud-Dauleh).
89. Mas'udi. 'Abbās.
90. Matin-Daftari. Dr. Ahmad.
91. Mehrān. Dr. Mahmud.
92. Mesbah-Fatemi. 'Ali Naqi.
93. Meshāzadeh. Dr. Mustafā.
94. Mufakkhkham. Dr. Jamshid.
95. Muqbel. Dr. Ahmad.
96. Musaddeq. Dr. Muhammad (Musaddeq-us-Saltaneh).
97. Mu'amedī, 'Ali. Muvarrek-ud-Dauleh (see Sepehr. Ahmad 'AE).
98. Nabil. Fazlullāh.
99. Nafisi. Tabīb.
100. Nafisi. Hasan (Mushtraf-ud-Dauleh).
101. Nafisi. Sa'īd.
102. Naisāri. 'Abbās Quli.
103. Najm. Abul-Qāsem.
104. Nakha'i. Muhammad.
105. Namāzi. Hāj Muhammad.
106. Nāser. 'Ali Asghar.
107. Naseri. Mahmud.
108. Nasr. Muhsen.
109. Nasr. Taqi.
110. Navāb. Saifullāh.
111. Nikpay. E'zaz ('Azizullāh).
112. Nikpur. Abdul Husain.
113. Qanātābādī. Sayyed Shams-ud-Din.
114. Qaraguzlu. Muhsen.
115. Qashqā'i. Khusrāu.
116. Qashqā'i. Malek Mansur.
117. Qashqā'i. Muhammad Husain.
118. Qashqā'i. Muhammad Nāser.
119. Qavām. Ebrāhīm (Qavām-ul-Mulk).
120. Qezelbāsh. 'Aziz.
121. Qor's (Naki c'i). Husain.
122. Rādmānesh. Dr. Reza.
123. Rahmānā. Zain-ul-'Abidin.
124. Ra'is. Muhsen.
125. Rashidiān. Asadullāh (and brothers).
126. Rustā. Reza.
127. Sadiq. Dr. Isā (Sadiq-e-A'lam).
128. Sa'ed (Marāghch). Muhammad (Sā'ed-ul-Vezāreh).
129. Sajjādī. Dr. Muhammad.
130. Sāleh. Allāhyār.
131. Sāleh. Dr. Jahānshāh. Sardār Fākher (see Hekmat. Reza). Sārem-ud-Dauleh (see Mas'ud, Akbar).
132. Sayyāh. Hamid.
133. Sayyāh. Kāzem. Sayyed Zia [ul-Din] (see Tabātābā'i).
134. Sepahbudī. Anushirvān.
135. Sepehr. Ahmad 'Ali (Muvarrek-ud-Dauleh).
136. Shahbakhti. Muhammad. General (Sepahbud).
137. Shānruk. Bahram.
138. Shams-e-Mulkārā. Asadullāh (Shahāb-ud-Dauleh). K.C.V.O.
139. Sharif Emami. Ja'far. Engineer (Muhandes).
140. Shā'yegān. Dr. Sayyed 'Ali.
141. Siāsi. Dr. 'Ali Akbar.
142. Sohaili. 'Ali.
143. Sururi. Muhammad.
144. Tabā. Dr. 'Abdul Husain.
145. Tabātābā'i. Sayyed Muhammad Sādeq.
146. Tabātābā'i. Sayyed Zia-ud-Din.
147. Tāheri. Dr. Hādī.
148. Tāleqānī. Engineer Khāfī.
149. Taqizādeh. Sayyed Hasan.
150. Tehrani. Sayyed Jalal-ud-Din.
151. Vakilī. 'Ali.
152. Vālatābār. Abul-Fath. K.B.E. (Heshmat-ud-Dauleh).
153. Vūrasteh. Muhammad 'Ali.
154. Vusuq. Ahmad. Major-General (Sarlashgar).

155. Yazdān Panāh. Murtezā. General (Sepahbud).
156. Yazdī. Dr. Murtezā.
157. Zāhedī. Fazlullāh (Besir-e-Divān). General (Sepahbud).
158. Zand. Ebrāhīm.
159. Zanganeh. Dr. Ahmad Ebrāhīm.
160. Zargham. 'Ali Akbar. Brigadier-General (Sarāfp).
161. Zarin-Kafsh. 'Ali Asghar.
162. Zulfāqari. Muhammad.

Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza Shāh

The eldest son of Reza Shah by the daughter of Taimur Khan; this lady was the ex-Shah's chief consort and known as the *Malekeh* (Queen). Now known as the Queen Mother she is still active in Court intrigues.

Born on October 26, 1919, and proclaimed *Pahlavi*, or heir-apparent, on January 1, 1926. Educated in Tehran under tutors at first, and then in Switzerland at La Rosey, under the direction of Dr. Mu'adab Nafisi. Returned to Iran in the spring of 1936.

Betrothed in June 1938 and married Princess Fauzieh, sister of King Farouk of Egypt at Cairo on March 15, 1939. The marriage was preceded by a very pompous journey through Iraq, Syria and Egypt. The principal wedding festivities took place in Tehran in April, on the couple's arrival, and were attended by distinguished delegations from many countries. The only child is Princess Shahnāz, born 1940, who was educated in Europe, returned to Iran in 1956 and was betrothed to Ardeshtir Zāhedī, the son of General Zāhedī, in December, 1956. Queen Fauzieh left for Egypt in 1943 and never returned. Her divorce by mutual consent from the Shah was announced on November 19, 1948, and attributed to the fact that her health did not permit her to live in Iran.

On October 11, 1950, he was betrothed to Miss Suraya Esfandiari, the 18-year-old daughter of a minor Bakhtiari khan and a German mother. The marriage, postponed because of the bride's ill-health, took place on February 12, 1951. There has so far been no issue.

Muhammad Reza succeeded to the throne when his father, who was very fond of him but had kept him very much under his thumb, abdicated in September 1941. From the first he took a considerable part in public affairs and he showed an unmistakable sign of his intention to exert his influence in State matters when in 1946 he conceived a strong antipathy to Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Eventually it was due to his active intervention that Qavam fell from power at the end of 1947.

His private visit to Britain in July 1948 was a considerable success and he created a good impression.

On February 4 (15 Bahman), 1949, an attempt was made on the Shah's life. His escape was miraculous and created a profound impression. The Shah's bearing on this occasion greatly enhanced his prestige. He then decided to introduce the constitutional reforms, including the formation of the Senate, which he had been contemplating for over a year and in which he considered the primary remedy for the country's deplorable condition lay, and the Constituent Assembly, in May 1949 granted him the right to dissolve either Chamber.

In November 1949 the Shah left for a visit to the United States which lasted for six weeks. From March 1-16, 1950, he visited Pakistan.

An official visit to Jordan, planned for April 1951 returning King Abdullah's visit of July-August 1949 was postponed at the last minute because the Shah had an attack of appendicitis for which he was successfully operated on.

During the Musaddeq régime the Shah showed himself irresolute and timid, and allowed Musaddeq to build himself up at the Shah's expense. In July 1952, after Musaddeq had resigned and been replaced by Qavam-us-Saltaneh, it was primarily the Shah's refusal to agree to the latter's proposal to dissolve the Majles, and his withdrawal of the troops from Tehran, which led to Qavam's resignation after two days in office, and to Musaddeq's triumphal return. In late February 1953 the Shah was on the point of leaving the country but was dissuaded from doing so by a popular demonstration in his favour. From this time his position *vis-à-vis* Musaddeq became steadily weaker and he was increasingly attacked and ridiculed in the pro-Musaddeq press. However, in August 1953 he did nominate Zāhedī to replace Musaddeq, but when Zāhedī's *coup d'Etat* (Musaddeq having refused to resign) failed the Shah fled the country. A day or two later August 19 (28 Mordad), a popular uprising overthrew Musaddeq and the Shah returned soon afterwards to be greeted with great national enthusiasm.

After initial hesitation, the Shah put his full weight behind the oil agreement negotiated in the summer of 1954; this was decisive in getting it accepted.

On December 5, 1954, the Shah and Queen Suraya left for a two-months' visit and holiday in the United States, followed by visits to the United Kingdom and Germany, returning on March 12, 1955.

He then put considerable pressure on General Zāhedī (*q.v.*) to resign from the premiership, and eventually the latter agreed to ask for leave to go abroad for medical treatment which the Shah interpreted as resignation. On April 6, without consulting Parliament even informally, he appointed Mr. Husain Alā (*q.v.*) Prime Minister. Shortly thereafter he became engaged in a trial of strength with the mullas, who tried to reassert their authority by instigating a persecution of the Baha'i sect. In the early stages of this controversy the Shah showed lamentable weakness, and it was only with difficulty, and by means of various compromises, that he re-established his position.

In August and September 1955 he received King Saud of Arabia and President Bayar of Turkey respectively on State visits. In October 1955 he successfully brought Iran into the Baghdad Pact against the opposition of certain members of his Government, and without any real support from public opinion. This achievement, and the pliability of the Alā Government, encouraged the Shah to intensify his personal rule. In early 1956 he openly rigged the elections to the 19th Majles, thereby incurring considerable odium; and he intervened increasingly, though not always successfully, in matters of domestic and economic policy. Meanwhile he consolidated his position in the international field in the course of official visits to India (February, 1956), Turkey (May) and the U.S.S.R. (June) and visits to Iran by President Chamoun of the Lebanon (October) and President Mirza of Pakistan (November). During the last visit, the Shah presided at an improvised meeting of representatives of the four Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact, and made a considerable impression by his wide knowledge and sound sense.

The Shah is intelligent, well-informed, and hard-working. He is genuinely anxious for his country's progress and welfare and takes his duties seriously, but interferes too much himself, including meddling in business affairs. He is trying to operate a benevolent dictatorship within a rickety democratic framework, and without really having a dictator's temperament. He maintains a façade of complacent confidence and autocratic authority but suffers from a surfeit of advice, listens too easily to all comers, of whatever quality, but at the same time mistrusts many of his advisers and is reluctant, largely through jealousy, to

delegate power. In internal affairs, where policy decisions and personal directives have to be backed up by efficient administration and co-operation among subordinates, he has made little advance towards his proclaimed goals of social, economic, financial, agricultural and administrative reform. In foreign affairs he has shown sound sense and given a most valuable lead. He has a lively apprehension of Soviet designs, is convinced of the need for co-operation with the West—and for Western support—and is genuinely satisfied that neutrality is no safeguard for Iran. But a consistent and sensible foreign policy will not of itself make him more popular or do much to strengthen his hand at home, however much he may try to cover up the defects of domestic policy by showing that he has Western support.

Personally the Shah has great charm, with quiet manners and outward modesty. To understand his real thoughts it is often necessary to read between the lines of what he is saying. He is a keen all-round sportsman and a good amateur pilot. He speaks English and French excellently.

The Pahlavi Royal Family

The following are recognised members of the Pahlavi Royal Family:—

Princes

(i) Shāhpur (Prince) Ghulām Reza

Born April 13, 1923.

He was married in January 1948 to Huma A'lam, daughter of Dr. A'lam and granddaughter of Vusuq-ud-Dauleh, and divorced her in 1954. There is one son of this marriage. Made a second lieutenant in the army in 1947 after passing out from the Officers' Training College in Tehran. Went on a cavalry course in France, July-October 1949. Now holds the title of Inspector of the Army. Has, apparently, an amiable disposition but is generally regarded as stupid. November, 1956, attended Olympic Games at Melbourne.

(ii) Shāhpur 'Abdur Reza

Born August 19, 1924.

He returned to Tehran in January 1948 after several years at Harvard University. Went to United States again in 1948 for medical treatment but returned to Iran on the passage of the Bill relating to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation for which he was appointed honorary president, May 1949.

Began his military training at the Officers' School at Tehran, May 1950, and has since taken less interest in the Seven-Year Plan. Soon fell out with Abul Hasan Ebteha', on the latter's appointment as Director-General of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation in 1954.

Rather better educated than the Shah's other brothers but intellectually not in the same class as the Shah himself. Polite and sociable but likes money and is not averse to receiving it. He and the Shah dislike and distrust each other—Prince Abdur is constantly suspected of intriguing against the Shah. Compared with other members of the Royal Family his public activities are not mentioned much in the press. Married Pari Sima, daughter of Ebrahim Zand and divorced from previous husband, Engineer Hushang Afshar, October 12, 1950. Went on big-game shooting expedition to East Africa in 1956.

Son born in March 1952 and a daughter in January 1955.

(iii) Shāhpur Ahmad Reza

Born September 17, 1925.

Mentally not normal. Married to Simin Bahrani of Tehran, who bore him a daughter, March 10, 1949. Divorced his wife in 1954.

(iv) **Shāhpur Mahmūd Rezā**

Born October 3, 1926.

Educated in the United States at Michigan University where he is reported to have worked hard at a course in industrial economics. Returned to Tehran, November 1950. Pleasant and amiable.

(v) **Shāhpur Hamid Rezā**

Born July 4, 1932.

An unruly boy, who three times ran away from school in the United States. Finished his schooling in 1948 and is now in Tehran.

Married Minu Daulatshahi, March 15, 1951, and divorced her in 1954. There is one son and one daughter of this marriage.

Unreliable and too fond of money.

Princesses

(i) **Shāhdukht (Princess) Shams**

Born October 18, 1917.

Married first Ferāidun, son of Mahmūd Jam, and later divorced him; then Mehrdad Pahlbud, an amiable creature of cultivated tastes and artistic inclinations, by whom she has two sons and one daughter.

The Princess is president of the Red Lion and Sun Society (equivalent of the Red Cross). Has travelled in the United States and also in Europe, seeing hospital and welfare work.

Conveyed the Shah's proposal of marriage to Suraya and brought her back to Tehran from Paris, October 7, 1950, but is no longer on good terms with her.

With her husband, whose father was a musician, she makes a serious and creditable attempt to act as a patron of the arts and of charity. Shy and very taken up with her children and plays little part in Palace intrigues compared with her sister or brothers.

(ii) **Shāhdukht Ashraf**

Born October 24, 1919, a twin sister of the Shah and seems to have inherited more of her father's characteristics than her brother.

Married, first, 1937, Ali Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk, divorced 1942; one son, Shah-Ram; then Ahmad Shafiq, an energetic Egyptian of good family, who amongst other things has been Director of Civil Aviation. By him she has one son (born 1948) and a daughter (born 1950).

The Princess visited Moscow in 1946 and the United States and United Kingdom in 1947 to study social welfare organisations. Visited India and Pakistan in November 1948 and Europe November 1949-February 1950. When in Iran she plays an active part in social and charitable work.

Formerly much criticised for interference in political and administrative matters. The Shah was obliged by Musaddeq to send her away and she left for Switzerland in September 1951. Returned to Tehran July 1952 and left again with her family for Europe on August 2, 1952, after the short-lived Premiership of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Returned a few days before Musaddeq's overthrow in August 1953, but the Shah did not approve and she left again almost immediately. Came back for a few months in January 1954 and again in late October on Prince Ali Reza's death, but left for Europe pointedly on Queen Suraya's birthday, June 23, 1955.

She was violently anti-Musaddeq and a supporter of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. She is very critical of the Shah's weakness and with her mother tends to make Queen Suraya's life difficult.

(iii) **Shāhdukht Fātemeh**

Born October 30, 1929.

Went to school in the United States. Returned to Tehran 1948. Accompanied Princess Shams to the United States again May 1949 and there married an American student, Vincent Lee (now known as Ali) Hillyer, April 1950, without the Shah's permission. Deprived of Royal prerogatives, but on remarrying by Moslem rites was apparently forgiven. Both arrived in Persia in December 1950 but left again June 1951. Came back again for a few months in September 1953 and for short visits since. They live in California, where her husband is in business. She was reported in July 1955 to be suing for divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty.

The following, in addition to the Shah, are the offspring of Reza Shah's second wife, the present Mother:—

Princess Shams.
Princess Ashraf.

Reza Shah's third wife was Malekeh Turān Daulatshāhi, who was of Qajar stock on her father's side. She bore Ghulam Reza, but was divorced after three months. (In 1942 she married a Tehran merchant named Zabihullah Malekpor.)

Reza Shah's fourth wife was Esmat-ul-Mulk, a Qajar Princess of the Daulatshahi family. She bore him four sons and a daughter, viz.:—

Prince 'Abdur Reza.
Prince Ahmad Reza.
Prince Mahmūd Reza.
Prince Hamid Reza.
Princess Fātemeh.

There is also a daughter, Hamdam-us-Saltaneh, who appeared at Court during 1950 and who has been granted the title of Her Royal Highness. She is the offspring of the first wife of Reza Shah who was divorced before he married the Queen Mother. This daughter first married Colonel Atabā'i, Master of the Stables, and secondly Dr. Amir Aslani from whom she has also been divorced.

Prince 'Ali Reza, Reza Shah's second son who was killed in an air accident in October 1954, left a son, 'Ali, born in 1947. His mother is of Franco-Polish origin and her marriage to Prince 'Ali Reza was not officially recognised. It is still not clear whether the boy is in any way recognised as a member of the Royal Family.

1. **'Adl, Ahmad Husain**

Born in Tabriz c. 1895, son of the late 'Adl-ul-Mulk. Educated partly in France.

Minister of Agriculture from March 1942 until February 1943 showing himself friendly and helpful. He was then tried in the Officials' Court on charges of misappropriation of funds but was acquitted. Appointed to the Supreme Economic Council in April 1945. Became Minister of Agriculture in November that year and again under Qavam in June 1947. Chairman of the Provisional Organisation of the Seven-Year Plan in January 1949, until May 1949 when he was appointed a member of the Supreme Council of the Plan. He was successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949. Chairman of High Council of Seven-Year Plan, April 1950. Held this post throughout the Musaddeq régime, August 1953-April 1955. Minister of Agriculture under General Zāhedi. Also temporarily in charge of the Seven-Year Plan, July-September, 1954. Remains unemployed (1956).

Well versed in agricultural affairs but has a strong reputation for dishonesty in spite of his riches. Speaks French and a little English.

2. **'Adl, Engineer Majid**

Born c. 1911. Brother of Ahmad Husain 'Adl. Director of Karaj Agricultural College during Russian occupation (1943-45). Subsequently head of Animal Husbandry Department of Ministry of Agriculture. Then first Director of Animal Husbandry Institute (from early 1950), which he is organising on progressive lines. Keenly interested in his work and, although not really forceful, can be surprisingly determined; engaging personality.

Educated in France but speaks fair English and favours British methods. Very friendly and co-operated well with B.M.E.O. experts in pre-Musaddeq times.

3. **Abshār, Rezā**

Born at Urumieh (now Reza'iyeh) about 1888. Joined the Ministry of Finance as a young man, and during Mirza Kuchik Khan's rebellion in Gilan acted as financial agent to him. Served also under Sir P. Cox, who paid him well. Soon after the war he got away with certain funds from the Finance Office in Resht. With these he bought carpets and took them to America for sale. Returned to Iran in 1921, full of American ideas and education. Joined the staff of Dr. Millsbaugh, the American financial adviser. A staunch supporter of the Pahlavi régime; elected to the 5th, 6th and 7th Majles. Governor of Gilan in 1929. While at that post he organised the Gilan Import and Export Company, which was founded in opposition to Russian trade monopoly methods. As a result he incurred the hostility of the Russian interests there. Governor-General of Kermān in 1931. Minister of Roads in February 1932. Resigned in the following July, being unable to build the Chalus road fast enough for the Shah. Governor of Isfahan September 1932 to December 1933. Was put under surveillance in Tehran in 1935 owing to supposed inefficiency (perhaps complicity) in connexion with the Bakhtiari plots in 1934. Sentenced to six months' imprisonment and permanent exclusion from Government service in June 1936 for accepting a bribe when Minister of Roads.

Governor-General of Isfahan, May-June 1944, until Supreme Court of Appeal decided he was ineligible for office because of his conviction in 1936. Secretary to the Iranian Airways, December 1944, now managing director. Deputy for Reza'iyeh in 16th Majles but his credentials were queried and he was replaced by Mulsen Afshar. Deputy for Tabriz in 18th Majles, but lost his seat in the 19th Majles as he was an outspoken opponent of the 'Alā Government.

Speaks English fluently. Full of ideas and energy. An opportunist. Pro-American bias.

4. **'Alā, Husain, C.M.G. (Mu'in-ul-Yezareh)**

Born about 1884. Son of the late Prince Ala-us-Saltaneh, for many years Iranian Minister in London. Educated at Westminster School, where he seems to have received rough treatment which resulted in an anti-British bias, at any rate for the next few years. Created C.M.G. in 1902, when he accompanied his father on a special mission to London for the Coronation of King Edward VII. Appointed "chef de Cabinet" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1906, his father being then Minister. Minister of Public Works January-August 1918.

After accompanying the abortive Iranian mission to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 he became Minister at Madrid (1919) and then at Washington (1920). Returning to Iran in 1925 he alternated office at home with headship of missions abroad, being Minister in Paris 1929 to 1933 and in London 1934 to 1936. President of the National Bank in 1941 and Minister of Court 1942.

Ambassador to Washington August 1945. Was very active in giving publicity in the United States to the Iranian case over the Azarbaijan problem and showed ability presenting Iran's case to the Security Council in March and April 1946.

Minister for Foreign Affairs February-June 1950. Minister of Court, February 1951. Appointed Prime Minister following assassination of Razmara, March 1951, but resigned on April 27, 1951, because of preparation by the Majles Oil Commission of the Oil Nationalisation Bill without reference to him. Remained Minister of Court. Used his influence at Court in favour of retaining Musaddeq as Prime Minister until as late as March 1953. April 1955, appointed Prime Minister by the Shah to replace Zāhedi. An attempt was made on his life at the Shah mosque at the time of Iran joining the Baghdad Pact.

Married Fātemeh Khanum, the only daughter of the late Abul Qasem Khan Qaraguzlu (Naser-ul-Mulk), Regent of Iran, in July 1927. Mrs. Alā was one of the first of her generation to leave off the veil.

A hard worker and a patriot; intelligent and well-read, but in internal politics indecisive and chameleon-like; interested in the literature of many countries and once quite a good pianist. Has a perfect command of English and speaks good French. Whatever his feelings towards us, he seems to have a high regard for British education. His son went to Harrow and Edinburgh University.

5. **'Alam, Asadollāh**

Born c. 1920. Son of the late Shaukat-ul-Mulk, who was hereditary Khan of Birjand and the Qa'emat, he has inherited much of his father's influence over the Baluchi tribes of East Iran. In 1947 appointed Governor-General of Iranian Baluchistan, in which post he showed commendable energy and efficiency. Deputy for Birjand in the Constituent Assembly, 1949. Minister of the Interior under Sa'ed, January 1950, of Agriculture, February-June, 1950. Minister of Labour under Razmara until his assassination in March 1951. While Minister of Labour assisted in the formation of a central organisation to unify the rival non-Communist trade union federations and co-ordinate their activities. When the Shah decided to distribute the Pahlavi Foundation lands in January 1951 he became a member of the Commission supervising this work and was later put in charge of it, although his own estates in Birjand are a typical example of absentee landlordism. A close personal friend of the Shah. His position at Court was resented by Musaddeq who virtually forced the Shah to rusticate him to Birjand in November 1952. April 1955, appointed Minister of the Interior under Alā.

Friendly and fairly helpful, but rather a weak character; and his service at Court has not helped him to become any more robust. More of a Royal errand-boy than a politician and much disliked by those less in favour than himself, even though he is neither intelligent nor skilful. Married to a daughter of Qavam-ul-Mulk, who is a lady-in-waiting to Queen Suraya. Speaks good English and French.

6. **'Alavi, Dr. Hasan**

Born 1910 in Shiraz. Studied medicine in Bombay and London where he held post of ophthalmic surgeon at St. Thomas's and other English hospitals. He was recalled to Iran by Reza Shah in 1938 and appointed Court Physician and consulting specialist to the Iranian army. In March 1947 he was promoted to brigadier (honorary).

Hard-working and a patriot; intelligent and well-read with an almost perfect command of English. A sensitive and serious-minded Iranian Nationalist

who deprecates the failings, especially peculation, of his countrymen. A great admirer of British institutions, he helped to found the United Kingdom Universities' Society of the then Anglo-Persian Institute and the Iranian branch of the British Medical Association in the Middle East. He has been of great assistance to the British Council since it resumed activities in 1955. Has a considerable private practice and is commonly acknowledged to be one of the best ophthalmic surgeons in Iran.

A friend of the Shah, it was on his insistence, he says, that he stood for Bushire for which he was elected to the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Deputy for Bushire in 16th Majles. Prominent in the affairs of the Iran group in this Majles. A member of the Majles Oil Commission, he was very helpful in keeping us informed of developments there. He is an admirer of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din.

The abuse heaped on him by the National Front because he did not follow their line in the oil question was more than he could stand and after the passage of the oil nationalisation laws he became inactive politically. He is still disabused with politics but fairly well informed.

7. 'Ameri, Javād

Born in Tehran, 1895, from a Semnan family. Educated in Iran, and Paris where he studied law. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1914, and was for many years assistant to the French judicial adviser attached to the Ministry of Justice. Was a professor in the law school. Held various legal positions. Became Under-Secretary in Foreign Ministry, 1939.

In charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the invasion, 1941. Minister of the Interior in Suhaili's Cabinet, 1942, and later Minister of Justice. Elected to the 14th Majles from Semnan, December 1943. Accompanied Qavam-us-Saltaneh on his mission to Moscow in February 1946. Re-elected to 15th Majles, 1947. Deputy in Constituent Assembly, April 1949. Deputy for Semnan in 16th and 17th Majles. Member of the Majles Oil Commission, June 1950. June 1955, appointed a member of a three-man committee to examine all laws affecting judicial matters. 1956 became public prosecutor of Supreme Court, the second official position in the judicial body.

A man of some influence in his capacity as technical adviser on legislation. Having been trained by the French legal advisers here, his ideas of law are somewhat different from those held by British lawyers.

Conscientious and hard-working, with a lawyer's capacity for rapid assimilation of detail. Amiable but weak. Speaks French.

8. Amini, Dr. 'Ali

Fourth son of Muhsen Amini (Amin-ud-Dauleh). Born at Tehran in 1903. Educated in Iran and in France. Studied law at Paris. Married a daughter of Vusuq-ud-Dauleh. Served for some years in the Customs Administration; in 1936 appointed acting head and in 1939 head of the Customs.

Secretary to Qavam-us-Saltaneh (his wife's uncle) when Prime Minister in 1942. Sent by the Iranian Government to India in 1945 to study the possibilities for developing trade between India and Iran and to examine the foreign exchange control question. Chairman of the board of directors of the Industrial Bank, November 1946. Member of Democrat Party of Iran. Elected to 15th Majles for Tehran. President of Exchange Control Commission in 1949. Minister of National Economy under

Mansur, April 1950, but resigned when the Cabinet began to get into difficulties. Minister of National Economy under Musaddeq, December 1951-July 1952. Minister of Finance August 1953, and again under Alā to June 1955. Minister of Justice, June to December, 1955. Ambassador at Washington, 1956.

Until he became Minister of Finance he was generally regarded as brilliant, but somewhat irresponsible, lacking in courage and slightly corrupt. However, he proved himself determined, courageous and immensely hard-working. The skill, energy and flexibility which he showed in his conduct of the oil negotiations won him great esteem with his fellow negotiators. Though he is too quick-witted, glib and impatient to be popular in Parliament, he nevertheless ranked as one of the outstanding members of the Zahedi Government. Would like to be Prime Minister and is preparing the ground thoroughly. The Shah seems to mistrust him.

Speaks very good French. Is one of the richest landowners in Iran.

9. Amir 'Alī', Shams-ud-Din

Born about 1896. Senior official in the Ministry of Agriculture until appointed acting Minister and later Minister by Qavam-us-Saltaneh in 1946. In 1949 took *hast* with Dr. Musaddeq in the Royal Palace as a protest against the conduct of the 16th Majles elections.

In 1951 served successively as Governor-General, Gilan. Minister of Justice under Alā. Minister of National Economy under Musaddeq, and (in May) Acting Governor-General, Khuzistan, and the head of a Governmental mission to take over the A.I.O.C. of which he was a bitter critic. Made Minister of the Interior August 1951, Minister of Justice December 1951, and Minister without Portfolio specially responsible for Khuzistan February-May 1952. Ambassador to Belgium July 1952, until dismissed by Zahedi Government in August 1953. Returned to Persia, June 1954. May 1955, arrested and deported to the provinces by Alā Government as a counter to increased Musaddeqi activity.

Quiet man with few friends. Appears inoffensive and ineffectual but showed some determination and even fanaticism in his dealings with the Oil Company in the summer of 1951. A little unbalanced. Left-wing tendencies verging on fellow-travelling. Speaks French.

10. Amir-Taimur Kalāli, Muhammad Ebrāhīm

Born about 1895. Member of a well-known Khurasan tribe. Educated in Tehran. Elected to the Majles in the time of Reza Shah, and again for Meshed in the 14th Majles election, 1943. Vice-President of the Majles, 1944.

Was on Foundation Committee of Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society, March 1944. In 1945 he showed an inclination to turn to this Embassy for support against Russian pressure.

Arrested August 1946 under Military Law Ordinance. Elected Deputy for Meshed in 15th Majles, 1947. Represented Meshed in Constituent Assembly, April 1949. Unsuccessful candidate in 16th Majles elections at Meshed. Minister of Labour under Musaddeq, May to December 1951. Later Minister of Interior and Acting Chief of Police. Returned to public life March 1954 as Deputy in 18th Majles for Gunabad but not re-elected to the 19th Majles.

A rich landowner who smokes opium. A talkative demagogue, fond of working himself into passionate indignation about subjects which he does not understand. Opposed the Tripartite Treaty of

1942 and voted against the 1954 agreement with the oil consortium. Being vain, responds to flattery.

Speaks a little French. His daughter, Nahid, is married to Eskander Mirza, President of Pakistan.

11. Ansāri, Abdul Husain Mas'ud

The eldest son of the late Ali Quli Ansari (Mushaver-ul-Mamalek). Born 1899. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920. Served for a number of years in Iranian Embassy in Moscow as secretary, and his rapid promotion was largely due to his father's influence. Head of the Economics Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1933. Head of the Third Political Section (dealing with British affairs) 1936. Head of the Protocol Department November 1937. Consul-General, Delhi, May 1938. Minister to Sweden 1941. Returned to Tehran in 1944 and was appointed Head of the Tripartite Pact Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vice-President of Russo-Iranian Cultural Relations Society March 1945. In October 1947 appointed Governor-General of Isfahan. His smooth manner and lack of interest in local politics alienated some of the people among whom he worked.

Appointed Ambassador to Kabul March 1949. Governor-General of Fars December 1951. Minister at The Hague February 1953. Ambassador to Karachi, August, 1954, and Ambassador to Moscow, 1955.

Married a Russian in Moscow; the lady was suspected of being a spy but died in Berlin in 1936, leaving a son. Married an Iranian in 1937.

Agreeable and intelligent but rather ineffectual. Speaks excellent Russian and French. German and English.

12. Ansari, Vali, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1907. Engineer. Worked on the Transiranian Railway for some time; then became head of the Military Engineer Corps. Military Chef de Cabinet under General Zahedi. Returned to Army for a short time. Appointed head of the State Railways in 1954. Made Minister of Roads and Communications under Alā, April 1955. Has a good reputation for honesty, and seems reasonably efficient technically. Shrewd but lacking in courage or resolution. Has a schoolboy's love of trains, and less well qualified to deal with roads, as Mowlems have had occasion to discover.

Speaks French and some English.

13. Ārāmesh, Ahmad

Born about 1902. Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry June-September 1946. Set up the Labour Inspection administration in Khuzistan in June 1946 and became Secretary-General to the Democrat Party of Iran July 1946. Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister October 1946, when he resigned from his party post. Under-Secretary of State to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry late October 1946. Minister of Labour and Propaganda December 1946. In this post was strongly opposed by many of his Cabinet colleagues because of his efforts to collect party funds by irregular means, which he was suspected of turning to his own advantage. His Ministry's programme of social reform was also extremely unpopular with certain Right-wing members of his party.

Omitted when Qavam re-formed his Cabinet in June 1947. Successful in first stage Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949. Founded, February 1951, a new party, *Melli-yun-e-Demokrat*, restricting the powers of the monarchy, but this has made no

headway, January 1955, appointed to supervisory board of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation and in July publicly attacked A. H. Ebtehaj, Head of the Plan, who soon had him removed from the board.

Affable and energetic but garrulous, unreliable, immature and lacking political sense. Speaks fair English and French.

14. Ardalan, Dr. 'Ali Quli

Born about 1900; brother of Amanullah Ardalan. Served mostly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in various posts from 1922. Secretary at Washington 1932 where he had a dispute with Ghaflar Jalal, the Minister. Counsellor at Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Returned to Tehran 1942 and was in charge of the United Kingdom Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for more than a year, fulfilling his duties with efficiency. Counsellor at Ankara 1943. Under-Secretary for Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1948. Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on appointment of Alā February 1950. Head of Iranian delegation to U.N. August 1950-May 1955. Then appointed to the High Political Council of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 1955, and represented Iran at both the London conferences on the Suez Canal and on the intervening five-man committee led by Menzies to Egypt. During his tenure of office in 1956 Dr. Ardalan has grown considerably in stature. A competent administrator, he is now seen to possess convictions and sane courage and force of character. Though an official rather than a politician, he has done well with Parliament. A realist in his political views, he seems well-disposed to us. A Kurd from Sanandaj. Speaks English, French and German. Has a charming wife.

15. Ardalan, Amānollāh (Hāji Ezz-ul-Mamālek)

Born about 1888. Son of Haji Fakhr-ul-Mulk of Sanandaj and brother of 'Ali Quli. Deputy to the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Majles. Minister of Public Works in Sardar Sepah's Cabinet of October 1923. Resigned April 1924. Governor of Astarabad 1928; of Luristan, &c., in 1932; of Gilan in 1933 and again of Luristan in 1934, of Bushire and the Gulf Ports 1935; and Governor-General of Kerman in May 1936.

Governor-General of Azarbaijan (West) at the time of the invasion 1941; fled precipitately to Tehran when the Russians advanced, fearing that revenge would be taken on him for various anti-Russian measures which he had been ordered to take. Director-General of Ministry of Finance and Governor of Isfahan in 1942. Minister of Public Health February 1943. Minister of Finance December 1943. Minister of Commerce and Industry March-August 1944. Returned to Cabinet November 1944-April 1945. Minister of Justice November 1945-January 1946. Minister of Roads and Communications March 1948. Governor-General, Fars, June 1948. Deputy for Sanandaj (Kurdistan) in Constituent Assembly April 1949.

Minister of the Interior April-June 1950. Minister of Interior under Razmara, November 1950, until latter's assassination in March 1951. Deputy in 18th Majles for Sanandaj; Vice-President of Majles, April 1955. Iranian Amir-ul-Haj for Mecca in 1955. Re-elected to 19th Majles in 1956 and again a Vice-President.

Is the sort of professional politician who is always likely to turn up as a candidate for ministerial office. His reputation for honesty is not particularly good, but it is not as bad as some; not a very forceful personality, but knows the ropes. Old friend of Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Tabataba'i. Observes the fast in Ramadan. Speaks French and a little English.

16. Ardalan, Nāser Qulī

Born in Tehran 1896. Brother of Amanullah and Ali Quli Ardalan. Educated at Tehran and in Belgium. Returned to Iran 1915 and entered the service of the Ministry of the Interior, where he served for fifteen years, including several periods as Governor of different provinces. Subsequently employed in the National Bank.

Deputy for Sanandaj in the 14th, 15th and 16th Majles.

A member of Mixed Oil Commission May 1951, and of that body's three-man delegation to Khuzistan June 1951, where he joined the board of N.I.O.C. August 1952. April 1953 Government Inspector at the National Bank. Then Governor-General of Azarbaijan until Musaddeq's fall in August 1953. At present financial adviser to the Ministry of Finance and 1956 member of High Council of Agricultural Bank.

Intelligent and capable. More of an official than a politician. Speaks French.

17. Arfa', Hasan, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1890, the eldest son of the late Prince Reza Arfa' (Arfa'-ud-Dauleh). Educated in Russia and France. Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1907 as secretary to the Iranian Consulate at Tiflis. Secretary at the Iranian Legation at St. Petersburg in 1908. Joined the gendarmerie in 1911; and has been in the army since then. Commanded the crack cavalry *Pahlavi* Regiment in 1931. Iranian delegate to the Zahedan Conference in 1935, where, no doubt under strict orders, he took an extremely nationalistic and anti-British standpoint.

Officially attended Ataturk's funeral in 1938. Promoted brigadier-general April 1939. Inspector of Cavalry 1942. Commanded the 1st Division 1943.

Appointed Chief of the General Staff December 1945. Had some success in organising resistance to the Azerbaijan Democrats and their independent Government of Tabriz. When Qavam took office in February 1946, with the task of restoring good relations with Russia, Arfa' was at once relieved of his post. Arrested April 1946 by order of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Released October 1946. In 1947 started the "Asia Society," aiming at co-operation between Middle East States. Minister of Roads under Ala, April 4-27, 1951.

Speaks French, English, Turkish and Russian. Married to an Englishwoman, *née* Bewicke. Well read, particularly in history. Patriotic, honest, intelligent and outspoken but at times rather a firebrand. Despite his rather uncertain judgment and temper he might make a come-back as a political soldier. Ambitious to become Prime Minister.

18. Asadi, Salmān

Born about 1896. The eldest son of the late Muhammad Vali Asadi, mutawalli of the shrine at Meshed, who was shot for treason in 1935. Educated at the American College, Tehran; spent a few years also at Cambridge and in London; speaks English. Owing to his father's influence elected to the Majles as member for the 7th and 8th sessions.

Served for a short time in the News Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a translator. In charge of the Department of Propaganda 1941 to March 1942. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Food 1942 and worked hard to ensure the food supply of Tehran with Mr. Sheridan in the famine winter of 1942-43. Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Finance, and head of the Rice Monopoly April 1944. Member of Economic Section of

Qavam's Mission to Moscow February 1946. Appointed chairman of the Industrial Bank October 1946. Minister of Labour June to September 1947. Elected to 15th Majles for Meshed. April 1954 appointed to High Council of Seven-Year Plan.

Financially honest and often actuated by quite creditable motives; but an incorrigible liar and intriguer.

19. Azudi, Yadullāh (Amir A'zam)

Born in Tehran about 1890. The son of the late Nusratullah Mirza, and a descendant of Fath Ali Shah. Inherited large estates from his father in the neighbourhood of Damghan and Shahrud. Educated in Iran; has spent some years in Europe. Wife is a daughter of Vusuq-ud-Dauleh.

Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920. Secretary at Berlin in 1928; Counsellor at Washington in 1931 and Minister at Warsaw in 1933. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry, March 1937 until November 1937. Minister of Roads under Qavam-us-Saltaneh 1942, and did well in that post. Resigned early in 1943 partly owing to accusations of nepotism; appointed Minister to Brazil, and proceeded thither July 1943. Replaced March 1949. Minister to the Argentine August 1950-August 1952. December 1952 Master of Ceremonies at the Court until appointed Minister to Spain May 1954.

Speaks French and German, and usually very helpful and forthcoming. One of the old school with not much influence.

20. Bakhtiār, Āqā Khān

Born 1908, fifth son of Sardar Muhtashim. Educated in England.

No actual experience of tribal affairs in the tribe. Deputy for Shahr Kurd in 15th Majles. Made the Agricultural Bank his career and became Director of it in July 1951. Resigned March 1953. Appointed Director of the Mortgage Bank September 1953.

Conscientious and hard-working. Believes in need for reforms but not particularly active or influential in politics. Genuinely friendly towards us. Speaks very good English.

21. Bakhtiār, Dr. Shāhpur

Born 1909. Elder son of Sardar Fateh. Educated and obtained his doctorate in France where he lived for sixteen years and served with the French Resistance Forces during the war. On return to this country was appointed in 1946 as Director of Provincial Labour Office in Isfahan. Aroused opposition from factory owners by trying to implement labour legislation too enthusiastically. Factory owners succeeded in obtaining his transfer from Isfahan. Director of Provincial Labour Office in Abadan 1947-October 1949. Under-Secretary in Ministry of Labour April-August 1953. Remained faithful to Musaddeq. Arrested February 1954 for a few weeks for anti-Government activity and again in September 1954 on suspicion of collaborating with Tudeh military organisation; in June 1955 sentenced to three years' imprisonment but released in 1956 and now works as a contractor.

In Abadan worked hard to improve industrial relations and preserve industrial peace. Conscientious and apparently strictly honest. Relations with Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were on the whole good.

Speaks French and a little English. Is an intense Nationalist and professed anti-Communist.

22. Bakhtiār, Taimur Khān, (Sepahbud)

Born c. 1910; educated at Isfahan, Beirut and attended cavalry college in France. Joined the army in 1935 and gained good promotion. Was in command at Kermanshah in 1953. On Musaddeq's fall made Commander of the 2nd Armoured Division in Tehran and later Military Governor of Tehran and the Railways. 1956 attended course in the United States before becoming Head of the new National Security Agency and Under-Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office.

Bakhtiār is intelligent, active, ambitious and ruthless. His reputation has become tarnished during his Military Governorship (he has made enough to buy a number of villages) but he has done an outstanding job in maintaining internal security and rounding up Communist suspects. Ostensibly a faithful lieutenant of the Shah but may well see himself as Iran's coming "strong man." The Americans regard him as a likely candidate for high office. A lady-killer. Is related to Queen Suraya. Speaks French.

23. Bakhtiārī, Jahānshāh Samsām

Born 1910, the second son of Murteza Quli Samsam by his second wife, a sister of Saulat-ud-Dauleh Qashqa'i. Is more of a tribesman than his brothers. After his father he has probably more influence than any other of the Ilkhani Khans in the tribe and of all the Khans comes second to Abul Qasem.

In 1943 was awarded the Humayun medal, 1st class, for arranging a meeting between the Qashqa'i Khans and General Jahanbuni. Always friendly with British, he was presented with a silver tray at the end of 1945 in appreciation of the hospitality he had shown to British officials during the war.

Governor of Shahr Kurd and Deputy Governor of the Bakhtiari June 1944. Co-Governor of the Bakhtiari with Abul Qasem in July 1946. Arrested by Qavam who dismissed him in September 1946 for complicity in the plot by Bakhtiari and Qashqa'is to rise against the Central Government. Governor of Kurdistan, March 1949-January 1950, when promoted Governor-General, Kermanshah, where he did excellent work in making the administration more honest and more efficient. Obligated to resign by Musaddeq, May 1951. April 1955, appointed Governor-General, Kerman.

Active, patriotic and comparatively honest, but not very clever and of doubtful personal morals.

24. Bakhtiārī, Murteza Quli Samsām

Born about 1875. The son of the famous Samsam-us-Saltaneh. Took part in operations against Salur-ud-Dauleh in 1911. Represented the Bakhtiari tribe in the Majles in the same year, and appointed Ilbagi of the tribe in 1912. Governor of Yezd in 1914. Helped the Germans during the war 1914-18. Made his peace with the British Legation after the war. Has held the appointment of Ilbagi or Ilkhani of the tribe on several occasions. Was Ilkhani when most of the Bakhtiari Khans were arrested in December 1933. He escaped the fate of his fellow khans, and assisted the Government in their policy of inducing the Bakhtiari tribe to abandon their traditional nomadic habits. Appointed Governor of Bakhtiari early in 1943 and did well, suppressing various upstarts like Abul Qasem and establishing order in that tribal area, thereby serving British interests well during the war. By the end of 1945 he had, however, become unpopular with the other tribal khans and he was relieved of his appointment by Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Arrested in September 1946 for complicity in joint Bakhtiari-

Qashqa'i rising. Released December. Deputy for Shahr Kurd in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Since then largely in the tribal area.

Quick-tempered, jovial and obstinate. Served Reza Shah well. Very pleasant to meet, but not the sort of man one can trust very far.

25. Baqā'i, Dr. Muzaffar

Born about 1911. Son of Mirza Shahab Kermani, a schoolmaster of Kerman. Received a degree of philosophy from the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Saint Cloud, Paris, and afterwards spent some time in France. Entered the service of the Ministry of Education and became Director of Education in Kerman in August 1944.

Was a member of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Democrat Party in 1946 and became Deputy for Kerman to the 15th Majles. In September 1949 was the guiding force behind a new paper called *Shahed* and quickly got into trouble with the General Staff for attacks on the army. He was one of the founders of the National Front and, with other members of it, was elected Deputy for Tehran to the 16th Majles. Engaged with other members of the National Front in violent abuse against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and other British interests. In May 1951 he formed the Toilers' Party (*Hezb-e-Zahmatkashan*) in the hope of organising some labour support for Musaddeq's Government. Widely believed that he received financial support from the Americans to form the party. The party, which has never been much more than a gang of toughs, split in 1952 with the formation of the "Third Force" by Khalil Maleki. In October 1951 Baqā'i accompanied Musaddeq to America. Elected Deputy for Tehran in the 17th Majles. Broke with Musaddeq openly in March 1953 and gaoled for a few days before the latter's fall in August 1953. Went to Kerman for 18th Majles elections May 1954. Arrested in following June for opposing Government candidates and deported to Zahedan for a few months. Arrested in November 1956 for despatch of telegram to Nasser offering volunteers from his party, the framework of which still exists, to fight for Egypt; released after several weeks.

A clever and ambitious man with less of a reputation for dishonesty than many of his old colleagues such as Fatemi and Makki. It is widely held that the Shah keeps in touch with him. Has a strong following in Kerman and considerable support in Isfahan. Cold and unscrupulous, he is believed to have organised the torture and murder of Musaddeq's police chief, Afshartus. No friend of ours.

26. Bayāt, Murteza Quli (Sahām-us-Sultān)

A rich landowner from Sultanabad (Araq), born about 1882. Member of the Majles on several occasions, and Minister of Finance 1926-27. Deputy Speaker of the 10th Majles. Member of the 'Edalat Party 1942. Accused of hoarding wheat during the winter of 1942-43. Minister of Finance 1943, and performed the useful function of effacing himself completely in favour of Dr. Millspaugh.

Minister without Portfolio March-August 1944. Prime Minister November 1944-April 1945. He sought to improve relations with the Russians, but his efforts only resulted in the paralysis of the administration of the country. Sent as Governor-General to Tabriz in December 1945, but failed to do anything to check the Azarbaijan independence movement. Minister of Finance February to August 1946. Deputy for Araq in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator from Hamadan autumn 1949 and elected First Vice-President of the

Senate on its inauguration February 1950. Member of Mixed Oil Commission May 1951. Became managing director of N.I.O.C. December 1952, in which capacity he took part in the 1954 oil negotiations. In 1955 appointed chairman of the board of directors of the reconstituted N.I.O.C.

Has a young wife. Speaks good French. Has been sensible and adroit as chairman of N.I.O.C. and much quicker-witted than his rather uncomprehending demeanour betrays. Went to the United Kingdom at the end of November 1956 to undergo an operation for cancer, which is likely to mean the end of his active career and perhaps of his life.

27. Behbahāni, Mīrzā Sayyed Muhammad (A'yatullah)

Born in the early 1870s. Son of Aqa Sayyed Abdullah Behbahani, a leading Nationalist *mujtahed*, who was murdered in 1906 by a rival clique of fellow-revolutionaries.

A'yatullah Behbahani is a divine of a political rather than a religious bent and wields considerable influence in Tehran both in the bazaar and amongst politicians. Played an important part in stopping the Shah leaving the country in February 1953, and again in the events which led to Musaddeq's overthrow in August 1953. Directly concerned in the 1955 anti-Baha'i agitation.

Expects and usually receives payment for his services, in particular from the Shah, with whom he is believed to be closely connected. Regarded by some as pro-British.

His son, Sayyed Ja'far (born about 1911), became a Deputy for the first time in the 18th Majles, representing Tehran, made a number of Nationalist and anti-British speeches, and was re-elected to the 19th Majles.

28. Behniā 'Abdul Husain

Born about 1910. Educated in France. Most of his career as a civil servant has been passed in the Ministry of Finance, where he was senior Under-Secretary for several years until 1950. He then became President of the Exchange Control Commission. In August 1952 dismissed by Musaddeq to face charges of irregularities during his time in the Ministry of Finance. Cleared in April 1953. Then given sinecure as financial adviser to the Ministry of Finance. For some months in 1952 led Iranian delegation in financial negotiations with Russians. In 1954 went into private business. Member of the High Council of the Bank-e-Melli.

He has the reputation of being a realist and a sound administrator. He can take quick decisions and rapidly grasp the essentials of financial and economic problems. He mistrusts the Russians and seems prepared to be friendly and helpful towards the British rather than the Americans. He is reliably reported to be corrupt. Speaks French fluently. Is unmarried.

29. Burujerdi, Hāj Āqā Husain (A'yatullah)

Born c. 1875 in Burujerd of one of the old-established clerical families of that time. Completed his religious studies in Najaf (Iraq) and stayed there a number of years before returning to Burujerd. Gained a high reputation for his learning and for his proficiency in dealing with difficult points of theology but did not play a prominent public part in religious affairs until the leading Shi'a divine died in 1946. After a rival's short reign Burujerdi replaced him and moved to Qum, where he now lives.

During Musaddeq's time Burujerdi kept himself to himself although he was attacked by the Musaddeqi

and Tudeh press. He became more prominent politically during the anti-Baha'i agitation of 1955 when he brought pressure, including threats of leaving Qum for Najaf, upon the Alā Government and the Shah to more or less outlaw the Baha'is. Has become very critical of the Shah.

Old, deaf and going blind, he seems to be more of a tool in the hands of self-interested or fanatical *mullas* than to want to stir up trouble on his own initiative.

30. Bushehri-Dehdashti, Āqā Javad (Amir Humā'yun)

Born in Tehran 1898. Second son of the late Haji Muin-ut-Tujjar. Educated at Tehran and in the United Kingdom (1912-14). Claims that he joined an O.T.C. in the United Kingdom at outbreak of war but was forced by his father to resign. Speaks French and English. Married a daughter of the late Haji Amin-uz-Zarb. One of his sons, Jehangir, is an official of the International Bank. Elected a member of the 7th Majles.

In Germany from the outbreak of the war till 1942. Returned to Tehran March 1943. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad as a suspect in June 1943. Released May 1945. Appointed Governor-General of Fars October 1946 with approval of the Qashqa'is, but only held the appointment for a few months.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs under Qavam-us-Saltaneh September-December 1947 and Minister of Agriculture under Hahzr June 1948. Deputy for Bushire in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Bushire but elected a Senator from Tehran, October 1949. Minister of Roads under Musaddeq, May 1951. Member of Iranian negotiating team in oil talks with Harriman and Stokes, July-August 1951. Appointed Senator for Fars March 1954 and Vice-President of Senate, 1956.

A lightweight, but has entertained at times the ambition to become Prime Minister.

31. Dashti, 'Ali

Born about 1887. Educated in the schools of the holy places of Iraq. Returned to Iran about 1922 and edited a paper called *Shafaq-e-Sarkh*, which frequently abused things British and which he continued to publish until 1935, receiving subsidies now from Reza Shah and now from the Soviet Embassy. Deputy in the 6th, 7th and 8th Majles. Fell into disgrace with Reza Shah in 1935.

After the abdication of Reza Shah he returned to the foreground of Tehran politics. A severe critic of Furughi and Suhaili in 1942, he worked hard for the return of Qavam-us-Saltaneh as Prime Minister. When the latter came back to power and did not make Dashti a Minister he turned against him.

Elected to 14th Majles in 1943. In the oil crisis of 1944 he opposed the spread of Russian influence in Iran and strongly supported the "resistance" Cabinets preceding Qavam-us-Saltaneh's. Arrested May 1946. Released December 1946.

Ambassador in Cairo from December 1948. Minister without Portfolio under Ali March 1951. Shah's special ambassador to Jordan on the cancellation of his State visit April 1951. Appointed by the Shah Senator for Tehran April 1952, after a period of assiduous cultivation of the Imperial family. Elected Senator for Tehran March 1954.

He appears to have no scruples and no principles. Trusted little, even by his friends, who regard his excessive attachment to women (which he publicly displays) as not in keeping with high office.

A persuasive orator who once held the attention of the Majles as few others could.

32. Divānbaigi, Āqā, Rezā 'Ali

Born in Kurdistan about 1891. Related to the Qaraguzlu family. Educated in Iran. In the employ of the Ministry of the Interior for some years. Went to Turkey with the Nationalists during the first war. Chef de Cabinet to Governor-General of Kerman. A member of the 6th, 7th and 8th Majles. Governor of Gilan in 1931. Resigned in 1933, and appointed Governor of Mazandaran in October 1934; relieved early in 1936. Governor-General of Khuzistan July 1942, and showed some energy, but is reported to have lined his pockets pretty thoroughly in connexion with certain contracts. Recalled early 1943. Governor-General, Gilan, October 1947-February 1950, when appointed Senator for Kermanshah. Appointed again March 1954. One of the most violent opponents of the 1954 agreement with the Oil Consortium.

Speaks French. Agreeable to talk to, but unreliable. Tendency to demagoguery.

33. Ebtehāj, Abul Hasan

Second son of Ebtehāj-ul-Mulk and brother of Ghulam Hussain Ebtehāj. Born at Resht about 1900. Interpreter to the British forces in Gilan towards the end of the 1914-18 war. Entered the service of the British (at that time Imperial) Bank of Iran at Resht about 1920. Transferred to Tehran 1925. Assistant to the chief inspector from then till in 1936 he resigned of his own accord, because he did not think his talents were given enough scope.

Head of the Mortgage Bank, 1939. Became Governor of the National Bank of Iran in September 1942. In this capacity he achieved much and was also of considerable service to us in many ways. Was Iranian representative in the negotiations in London leading to the conclusion of a financial agreement between the National Bank and the Bank of England in August 1947, and to its renewal in November 1948. He maintained very cordial relations with the British Treasury and the Bank of England.

He proceeded unsuccessfully to litigation against the British Bank in 1936 and continued to harbour a grudge against it. In 1949 he did his best to make the bank's position untenable and his attitude was probably a contributory cause of the bank's later difficulties which led to its withdrawal from Iran in 1952.

Ambassador to France, August 1950. Recalled April 1952. Joined the staff of the International Bank in Washington as an economic adviser. Returned to Tehran July 1954. Managing Director of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation since September 1954, with the Shah's backing. His differences with Zahedi over development contracts and procedure contributed to the Shah's dismissal of the latter as Premier. Continually clashes with a number of Ministers and other important personalities but is still going strong. He has done much to introduce method into the operations of the Plan Organisation and to place it beyond the reach of pressure groups. In autumn 1956 negotiated a \$75 million loan for the Plan Organisation from the International Bank. The powerful opposition to the loan by both the Senate and Majles sprang largely from animosity towards Ebtehāj.

As an Iranian financier he is unusual, since he possesses vision, intelligence, intuition, energy and integrity, though little capacity for delegating authority. He is a sincere patriot and his financial theories and policy are largely dictated by his genuine desire to improve Iran's economic position. Apart from animosity towards the British Bank he has proved himself co-operative and friendly.

He is inordinately vain, sensitive and hot-tempered and has made many enemies among his own countrymen. He suffers from stomach-ulcers.

Married in 1926 Maryam, daughter of Taqi Nabavi. No children. Both he and his wife were much in the confidence of the Shah and Princess Ashraf. 1956 married the pretty wife of Abusar, his former assistant. For all his shortcomings there are few men of his calibre in Iran. He had done a remarkable job in the Plan Organisation, his only shortcoming being his unwillingness to make concession to political expediency.

34. Ebtehāj, Ghulam Husain

Born at Resht 1898. Brother of Abul Hasan Ebtehāj. Educated at Resht and completed his studies at Beirut, and for a short time in France. Interpreter to the British Expeditionary Force 1918-20.

His father was assassinated by the Jangalis, and he, together with his family, fled to Tehran when the Bolsheviks occupied Gilan in 1920. Clerk in the Prime Minister's Office 1920-21. Secretary to the Governor of Gilan 1921-22. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and assistant to the American adviser, Colonel Morris 1923-28. Dismissed from that post, apparently for dishonesty. Transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1931: First Secretary in London April 1932. First Secretary in Cairo March 1933. Suspended by the Ministry shortly after, apparently for conduct in London when the d'Arcy Concession was cancelled. In 1934 Chief of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior; and then director of the Tourist Department and chief of the Touring Club of Iran. Assistant to the Chief of the Tehran Municipality October 1937, but returned to the Ministry of Interior in 1938. Director of Administrative Services in the Ministry August 1938. Acting Chief of Tehran Municipality July 1939.

Incurved Reza Shah's displeasure and was relieved of his charge of the Municipality in September 1940. He then joined *Iranpour* and also served on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Administration. In 1942 divorced his Iranian wife and married a Polish refugee. Appointed Mayor of Tehran in 1944. A supporter of Sayyed Zia he was actively opposed to all Tudeh Party influence in the Municipality. He thus incurred the hostility of all Left-wing elements and in December 1945 Hakimi (then Prime Minister) dismissed him as a gesture of conciliation. In 1946 he became managing director of Iranian Airways. Deputy for Bandar Pahlavi in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Mayor of Tehran again November 1949, but resigned in February 1950 on taking up his duties as Deputy for Lahijan in 16th Majles. Strongly opposed to Musaddeq in summer and autumn of 1951. Mostly in Europe, 1952-54, when he was reappointed Mayor of Tehran. September 1954 also appointed Inspector of the Caviar Purchasing Company. Replaced as mayor on suspicion of corruption on Ali's becoming Premier, April 1955. Elected to the 19th Majles as a deputy for Resht.

Author of a guide book to Iran. Speaks fluent English, French and Russian. Clever and resourceful but not to be trusted. Active but acquisitive.

35. Emāmi, Jamāl-Ud-Dīn

Born about 1900, son of the Emam Jum'eh of Khauy. Educated in Belgium and speaks French. Deputy in the 14th Majles for Khauy. After at first supporting Ali Dashti, in 1946 he was encouraging the *Eduli* Party in Ahwaz and district. In May of that year he was arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh for intrigues against the State.

Minister without Portfolio, charged with looking after the affairs of Azarbaijan, June 1948 to October 1949. Elected to 16th Majles from Tehran.

One of the most influential members of the Majles Oil Commission, June 1950; it was he who drew up the oil nationalisation resolution of March 1951.

It was his proposal which led to the Majles vote of inclination for Musaddeq as successor to 'Alā at the end of April 1951. Emami subsequently became leader in the Majles of the Opposition to Musaddeq and spoke against him with great force and courage. His rather dubious reputation was, however, a distinct handicap to the Opposition. March 1952, accused of passing an uncovered cheque and for a time went into hiding to avoid arrest. April 1954, elected Senator for Tehran. An outspoken opponent of the Alā Government (1955).

Venial. His self-satisfaction makes him a difficult colleague. Fanatically anti-Communist. Courageous and forthright. Not above using "knifemen."

36. Emāmi, Nezām-Ud-Dīn

Brother of Jamāl-ud-Dīn Emāmi. Married to a daughter of Vusūq-ud-Dauleh. Speaks English. Served with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 1930-42.

Director-General, Transferred Lands Department, early 1943-September 1944. Head of Iranian Trade Delegation to India, October 1944. Iranian Government representative with the A.I.O.C., London, June 1947. A member of the Iranian Government Delegation in the negotiations leading to the Supplemental Agreement with the A.I.O.C., February-July 1949. Recalled after A.I.O.C. evacuation of the oil areas and returned December 1951. January 1952, attached to the Ministry of Finance as an Inspector of the National Bank. Elected to the 17th Majles.

Ambitious but a reputation for honesty. Patriotic, verging on nationalistic. Proud and rather pig-headed.

37. Emāmi, Dr. Sayyed Hasan (A'ṭullāhi), Emām Jum'eh of Tehran

Born c. 1903. His father and grandfather married daughters of the Qajar Royal House. His father was Emām Jum'eh (leading religious dignitary) of Tehran but because of his opposition to the Constitution was replaced by Dr. Emāmi's uncle after the abdication of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shah.

Educated at the Russian School in Tehran, Najaf (1922-28) and Lausanne. On his return in 1933 became a lay judge, later being promoted to the head of the Tehran court, with a reputation for a liberal outlook. In 1942 appointed a professor of law at Tehran University, where he still holds a senior professorship.

In 1944 became a judge of the Court of Appeal. In early 1945 Dr. Emāmi succeeded his uncle, who had died, as Emām Jum'eh of Tehran.

His political career seems to have started in late 1941 with membership of the 'Edalat' "party." Opposed Qavam-us-Saltaneh in 1946. Elected from Tehran to the Constituent Assembly in October 1949 and was successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in 1950. In August 1950 seriously wounded by a knife-man.

Thwarted by Musaddeq in the Tehran elections for the 17th Majles, he got in from Mahabad. Elected President of the Majles, 1st July, 1952. He and his supporters a few weeks later voted for Qavam-us-Saltaneh's abortive premiership; on Musaddeq's triumphal return Dr. Emāmi resigned from the presidency and left for Europe, later going to Iraq. Returned to Iran, January 1953. April 1954, elected Senator from Tehran, but has not attended Senate meetings. 1956, officiated at betrothal of Princess Shahnaz to Ardeshtir Zahedi.

Intelligent and enlightened although not without some tortuosity of mind or the characteristic Iranian belief in the existence of hidden political influences. Has a good reputation for honesty. Well-disposed towards us. Has an appreciable following of a more or less religious nature and has considerable influence amongst various political and social groups. A regular visitor of the Shah's and of the Queen Mother's.

His wife is a daughter of Zahir-ul-Islam (q.v.). A son and a daughter have been educated in the United Kingdom.

Speaks French, Russian and Arabic.

38. Entezām, 'Abdullāh

Born c. 1900. Brother of Nasrullah Entezām. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1919. In the early 1920s at Washington contracted an unhappy and short-lived marriage with an American. In the Press Department 1933-35. Consul at Prague 1936. Chargé d'Affaires at Berne 1938. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1941. Secretary at Berne 1942. Appointed in 1947 to investigate Iranian claims against Germany and sent to Stuttgart with the rank of Consul-General. Also accredited to The Hague as Minister, August 1949. Appointed first Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court and then Minister for Foreign Affairs by 'Alā, April 1951, but remained in Stuttgart, returning only in June 1953. August 1953, appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs under Zahedi, becoming one of the key men of his Government. April 1955, continued as Minister of Foreign Affairs under Alā and was acting Prime Minister during Alā's two months' absence. Represented Iran at the United Nations tenth anniversary at San Francisco, June 1955. 1956, appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister without Portfolio.

Pleasant and friendly. Interested in science. A man of principles, ideals and vision, with a constructive approach to his job, and a refreshing lack of personal ambition which, however, handicaps him in the tougher branches of politics. His integrity and modesty have earned him a very good reputation with his fellow-countrymen. More of a thinker than an operator.

Speaks excellent English, French and German.

39. Entezām, Nasrullāh

Born about 1899. Brother of Abdullah Entezām and nephew of Hasan 'Alī Ghaffari. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Joined Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1919. Secretary at Paris 1926. Secretary at Warsaw 1927-32. Secretary to the Iranian delegates to the League of Nations during the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Secretary at London May 1933. Transferred to Washington 1934. First Secretary at Berne 1936. *Délégué suppléant* at the League of Nations, May 1938. Head of the Third Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (dealing, *inter alia*, with the United Kingdom), July 1938.

Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs February 1943. Minister of Communications and subsequently for Foreign Affairs in Bayat's Cabinet of November 1944. Member of the Iranian delegation to San Francisco. Iranian delegate to Executive Commission of the United Nations in London with rank of Ambassador. Member of Iranian delegation to the United Nations January 1946 and again in September. Iranian representative on United Nations Palestine Commission June 1947. Ambassador in Washington 1950-51 as well as permanent Iranian delegate to

the United Nations from 1950 until February 1954, when he again became Ambassador in Washington. President of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1950. Again Iranian delegate to the United Nations in 1956.

Rather smooth but helpful and honest. Very intelligent. Speaks French and English.

40. Egbāl, 'Alī

Born in Meshed about 1895. Son of a well-known landowner of Khurasan, with property at Kashmar and elsewhere in the province. Deputy for Meshed in the 12th, 13th and 14th Majles. Never in Government service, but well acquainted with Khurasan politics. An enemy of Suhaili, he was a professing supporter of Sayyed Zia-ud-Din when the latter's fortunes were at their height.

Deputy for Kashmar in the 15th Majles and successful in first stage of Senate elections there, autumn 1949. Early in 1954 founded a contracting firm.

Murky personal morals. Energetic and dishonest.

41. Egbāl, Dr. Manuchehr

Younger brother of 'Alī Egbāl. Born at Meshed about 1905. Educated at Tehran Medical School, and in France. Returned to Iran in 1939 and was employed for some time in the Ministry of Public Health. Under-Secretary of the Ministry 1943. Minister for Health, August 1944. Minister for Health in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946. Minister for Education, June 1948. Minister for Health, November 1948. Minister for the Interior, March 1949. Minister of Roads, January-June 1950. August 1950, Governor-General, Azarbaijan, where he did a good job until recalled by Musaddeq, September 1951. In France for five months in 1952. Elected Senator for Tehran, April 1954. January 1955, with the Shah's support, became rector of Tehran University, where he has done well, and in May 1955 dean of the medical faculty. In addition, became Minister of Court, June 1956.

Married to a Frenchwoman. Ambitious, friendly, intelligent and not without courage, he has a forceful personality and is said to be a good doctor. Good reputation for honesty. Court physician and close Court connexions of some standing, particularly with the Queen Mother. His sights are set on becoming Prime Minister.

Speaks good French. A mason.

42. Esfandiāri, Fathullāh Nuri

Second son of Hasan Esfandiāri (Muhtashem-us-Saltaneh). Born about 1895. Educated in Switzerland and France. Entered Foreign Ministry and served in London from 1914-24. Washington 1926-29, as Counsellor in Paris from 1929-30 and Chargé d'Affaires in London 1930-31 and again in 1933. Head of Protocol 1936-37. In charge of the Government-controlled Iran Insurance Company, 1938. Appointed Iranian Government representative with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 1942, in London. Minister to Polish Government in London, January 1944. Returned to Iran, 1945. Minister in Washington May 1947. Appointed Iranian representative on International Bank, June 1947. Returned to Iran after his two years' appointment and made a member of the Seven-Year Plan Council, August 1949. Was head of the Iranian delegation to the Islamic Economic Conference at Karachi (1949). February-March 1954, Head of Supervisory Commission for 18th Majles elections in Tehran. Played a useful if not notably brilliant role in the 1954 oil negotiations. 1955 became a member of the High Council of the Seven-Year Plan Organisation.

Married to a Frenchwoman; speaks French and English. His son is A.D.C. to Prince Ghulam Reza.

Friendly and helpful but lacks drive: he has a reputation for integrity and seems to have been successful in avoiding charges or suspicions of corruption. Close friend of 'Alā.

43. Esfandiāri, Mas'ūd Nuri (Muvaffaq-us-Saltaneh)

Born in Tehran 1894. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916 and held various appointments, including Paris, Moscow and Ankara. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs December 1937. Minister, Bagdad, August 1938. Sent on a special mission to Berlin 1939. Left Berlin on rupture of relations in 1941 and returned to Bagdad as Minister until 1943. Though at first suspected of pro-German feelings, owing to his visit to Berlin, he behaved correctly in his second period of office in Bagdad. Minister of Agriculture in Suhaili's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Ambassador to Turkey 1945. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Qavam-us-Saltaneh September-December 1947 and again under Hakimi March 1948 and Hazhir June 1948. Ambassador to India January 1949-December 1951. September 1954, appointed Minister (later Ambassador) to Japan, and Ambassador at Rome in 1956.

Speaks French, Italian and English. Pleasant and well-educated, otherwise has no particular characteristics. Connected with Princess Ashraf.

44. Esbrāqi, Amir Qāsem, Engineer (Muhandes)

Born in Tehran c. 1900. After his schooling at the French College in Tehran he went in 1924 to the Berlin technical high school to study electricity. In 1927 continued his studies in Paris. In 1930 returned to Iran and made his career in the Ministry of P.T.T. In 1938 appointed Director-General in charge of telephonic and telegraphic communications throughout the country.

In 1950 became Under-Secretary to the Ministry of P.T.T. and then Minister, both under Razmara, until the latter's assassination in March 1951, when Esbrāqi again took a technical job in the Ministry. In 1952 appointed head of the Telephone Company.

In November 1954 appointed, on the Shah's recommendation, deputy to Abul-Hasan Ebtehaj in the Seven-Year Plan Organisation. In April 1955 became Minister of P.T.T. in the Alā Government.

A technician rather than a politician. Likes to show himself off in a good light but is undoubtedly serious and energetic and knows his job. Honest and firm in resisting special interests but well-liked in spite of this. A *protégé* of the Shah.

Speaks French and some English and German. Has a sensible French wife.

45. Eskandari, 'Abbās

Born c. 1889. 1920-25 and for a few months in 1941 owner-editor of newspaper *Siasat*. Uncle of Iraj Eskandari and a Qajar prince. One of the founders of the Tudeh Party, but soon broke away to lead a dissident section. In 1942 became a director of the Iran Insurance Company, in which he made money, and went to Egypt 1943-45. Appointed Governor of Tehran in June 1946 and Governor-General a month later, when Tehran was made an independent Ustan. Elected to the 15th Majles for Hamadan. In August 1947 made a violent attack in the Majles on Taqizadeh, the former Ambassador in London. Repeatedly attacked Hakimi's Government in the first part of 1948 and was foremost in demanding a revision of the A.I.O.C.'s concession and the return of Bahrain to Iran. In January 1949 attacked Taqizadeh for signing the revised A.I.O.C. concession of 1933 and thus set off the agitation which eventually led to nationalisation.

Left Iran for Europe very soon after the attempt on the Shah's life on February 4, 1949. Returned to Iran mid-1950. In July 1952 was Qavam-us-Saltaneh's right-hand man during latter's abortive few days' premiership. Now close to Asadullah Khan and, specially, to the Shah.

He is something of a mystery man. Can almost certainly be identified with Soviet agent No. 16 mentioned in Agabekov's revelations. His nephew Iraj Eskandari, who was formerly Secretary-General of the Tudeh Party and who fled abroad in 1947, is said to be leader of the Tudeh exiles who are concentrated in Prague. He is now rich, owning the greater part of Mehrabad aerodrome, having, according to general repute, cheated the original owner out of his title-deeds. Clever and untrustworthy.

46. Fallāh, Dr. Rezā

Born 1909 in Kashan. Secondary education in Tehran. Then at Birmingham University on an A.L.O.C.-financed Iran Government scholarship, after which he spent a year at the Sunbury Research Establishment. Took a Ph.D. 1937, joined A.L.O.C. and studied at their technical institutes in the United Kingdom. 1939-50, worked in the technical institute at Abadan, eventually becoming its director. 1951, adviser to the Temporary Oil Board after nationalisation. 1952-54, at first acting and later confirmed as refinery general manager for N.I.O.C. Took part in the 1954 oil negotiations. 1955, became a member of the boards of the reconstituted N.I.O.C. and of the consortium refining company.

His reputation for honesty is good. He is competent, intelligent and clever. (He rode the Musaddeq storm.) Ambitious and a subtle intriguer. His wife, a hypochondriac, is a bad influence. She is extremely ambitious and a greater, although less clever, intriguer than her husband. They have built up many influential connexions, including some at the Shah's court.

Dr. and Mrs. Fallah both speak excellent English. They have two daughters.

47. Farhudi, Dr. Husain

Born about 1899. Son-in-law of Vahid-ul-Mulk Shaibani. Educated in Tehran. Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Education, at Tehran and in the provinces. Has also done newspaper work. One of the Directors-General of the Ministry 1943. Successful candidate for Dasht-i-Mishan and Susangird in the 14th Majles 1943. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh December 1946. Released January 1947. Deputy Prime Minister in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947. Represented Dezful in Constituent Assembly 1949. Deputy for Dezful in 16th Majles. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran, autumn 1949. Cultural Attaché in Rome mid-1952 to August 1953, when recalled by Zahedi Government. Became Secretary-General of Tehran Chamber of Commerce January 1955 and accompanied Chamber delegation to Britain in 1956. Has done a good job in reviving the Chamber's moribund organisation and improving its public relations.

During various absences of Abbas Mas'udi in 1951 and 1952 exercised general supervision over *Entel'at*.

Speaks French. An intelligent man who is skilled at trimming his sails to the wind.

48. Farmand, Hasan 'Ali (Zil'ul-Mulk)

Born near Hamadan, 1886. Of the Qaraguzlu family. Educated partly in France; speaks French.

A large landowner, was Deputy for Hamadan in the 7th Majles (1928), three times between 1933 and 1943 and again in the 14th Majles (1943). Minister of Agriculture under Ali, March 1951, and retained

this post under Musaddeq, May 1951 to October 1951, when he resigned to stand, unsuccessfully, as Majles candidate for Hamadan.

Pleasant to meet but rather colourless and timid. Limited in outlook and not very practical. Reputation for honesty and generosity.

49. Farrukh, Mehdi (Mu'tasem-us-Saltaneh)

A Sayyed. Born about 1881. Was for some years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister at Kabul in 1927-28. Minister of Industry and Mines in 1938.

Governor-General of Fars 1940, and of Kerman in 1941. Minister of the Interior of Suhaili's Cabinet July 1942 and in spite of Majles opposition maintained his place in the Cabinet. Qavam-us-Saltaneh, in August, made him Minister of Food, in which post he displayed a sort of crazy activity which irritated many and did not achieve much. Having fallen out with the American adviser Sheridan, he left the Ministry of Food on the fall of the Qavam Cabinet in February 1943. Elected a Deputy for Zabul in the 14th Majles November 1943.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars December 1945 but was recalled in February 1946. Presented credentials as ambassador at Nanking November 1948. Arrived in Tehran, December 1949, after withdrawal of mission. Appointed Chief of Police at the end of May 1950; replaced on fall of Mansur Cabinet, June 1950. Nominated Senator for Azarbaijan, December 1950. Elected Senator for Khurasan, March 1954. 1955-56, Governor-General of Fars and later Khurasan. At present unemployed.

Was prominent in opposition to Musaddeq and displayed considerable courage. Intelligent and ambitious but excitable and hot-tempered and a speech he made attacking the 1954 oil agreement with the Consortium was neither intelligent nor responsible. Shows close interest in Sistan and Afghan frontier problems generally.

50. Fāteh, Mustafā

Born in Isfahan about 1897. Son of Fāteh-ul-Mulk, a servant of the Prince-Governor of Isfahan, Zell-us-Sultan. Educated at Tehran and at Columbia University, where he graduated in economics. Entered the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company about 1922. Appointed assistant general manager (Adm.) of A.L.O.C. at Abadan in February 1947, the most senior post held by an Iranian in which he enjoyed a good reputation as an efficient administrator. When the last of the British left in 1951 he was quickly retired by the N.I.O.C. Gaoled by Zahedi for a few days in October 1953. After release went to the United Kingdom and returned June 1954. Still lying low. His connection with A.L.O.C. is now completely severed though they still think highly of him.

Has a perfect command of English and is keenly interested in Persian politics. In 1943 founded the *Hamrohan* Party with a reform programme: the party had faded out by 1945. He also has an international outlook and a considerable knowledge of world politics, particularly those of the Left. Anti-American bias. Intelligent, friendly and approachable. Is a mine of information about the foibles of his own countrymen. When assistant general manager of A.L.O.C. he was a focus of mischief and pointless intrigue. Gave A.L.O.C. and thereby the British a bad name by intrigue and personal intervention in Iranian Government affairs. He supported the A.L.O.C. well, however, once the nationalisation issue was raised. Reputation for immorality and dishonesty. An inveterate intriguer.

Has a son in N.I.O.C. and a daughter formerly married to Asghar Mirza, the son of Sarem-ud-Dauleh. His wife was daughter of the Zell-us-Sultan's head secretary, Seraj-ul-Mulk.

51. Fātemi, Mehdi Mushir (Emād-us-Saltaneh)

Born about 1886. Added *Mushir* to his name to distinguish himself from the Fātemis of Na'in. Was an official in the Ministry of Finance and in 1918 was financial representative in his native city of Isfahan, where he is influential both through his own family and through that of his wife, who is a daughter of Zell-us-Sultan. Appointed Deputy-Governor of Fars in 1922-23. Elected a Deputy from Isfahan in the 5th and 6th terms of the Majles. Appointed Minister of Education in August 1925. Minister of Justice in December 1925 and Minister of the Interior February to May 1927.

As a Minister and a Deputy he was uniformly popular and successful. In 1928 he fell out with the Minister of Court and was not allowed to be elected to the 7th Majles. Elected a Deputy to the 8th Majles 1930. Governor of Gilan from December 1933 until October 1937.

Head of the Municipality of Tehran under Suhaili's Cabinet February 1943. Resigned 1943 and elected Deputy for Na'in 1943. One of the leaders of the *Ettehad-e-Melli* group in the 14th Majles which contained about twenty Right-wing members.

Appointed Governor-General of Fars in March 1946. Recalled during the Qashqa'i revolt in autumn, but reappointed February 1947. Recalled May 1947. Elected Senator for Isfahan October 1947 and again in November 1954. Remains a Senator. His son, Dr. Mushir Fātemi, was elected to the 19th Majles.

A heavy gambler with a reputation for dishonesty. In ill-health. Speaks a little French.

52. Firuz, Muhammad Husain, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1895. The fourth son of the late Farman Farma. Educated at the military college at Petrograd. Entered the Iranian Army during the 1914-18 war, and was regarded as one of the promising young officers of the army. Fell under suspicion for some reason about 1929 and resigned his commission. His Qajar origin was no doubt the cause of his collapse.

G.O.C. and Governor-General of Fars March 1942-43. He had succeeded in keeping a rather precarious order in Fars, but never succeeded in repressing Naser Qashqa'i's rebellious movement. Head of the Air Force 1943. Again appointed Governor-General of Fars in early summer of 1944, but did not get on with the influential Qavam-ul-Mulk or the Qashqa'i Khans. His enemies accused him of weakness and of truckling too much to the Tudeh, but His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, considered that his refusal to take unnecessarily repressive measures against the Tudeh was more sound. Minister of Communications in Hakimi's Cabinet November 1946. Resigned a month later. Returned to the same Ministry in Qavam's Cabinet in February 1946, but was left out when Qavam reformed his Cabinet in October 1946. Appointed Inspector-General, Persian Air Force, March 1947, and retired from military service in 1949. At one time a member of the Directing Council of the Iran-Soviet Cultural Relations Society and up to 1953 at least still actively connected with various international Communist front organisations.

Speaks very good French and Russian and some English; intelligent but irresponsible. Tudeh-sponsored candidate for Tehran in the elections for the 17th Majlis. Married a sister of Haj Muhammad Namazi, who was educated in Hong Kong, speaks English perfectly, and is one of Iran's leading feminists. Although his wife goes about socially he does not. He now leads a quiet private life and refuses all invitations, at any rate from members of the Diplomatic Corps. A man of great erudition and personal charm.

53. Firuz, Muhammad Vali Mirzā (Farmānfar-māyān)

Third son of the late Farman Farma. Born about 1893. Educated at Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as Head of the Finance Department 1915. Said to have taken many bribes while in that appointment. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected as Deputy to the 4th, 5th and 6th Majles for Tabriz. On the fall of his brother, Nusrat-ud-Dauleh, in 1931, he retired from public life and was seldom seen. Has been in Europe a good deal.

Elected to the 13th Majles for Sarab in 1941, and again to the 14th in 1943. His appearance, being that of an underfed bird of prey, seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence. Became Minister of Labour and Propaganda in October 1946 under Qavam, but resigned in December to stand, without success, as a candidate for the 15th Majles.

Founder member of Iranian Democratic Youth Organisation, a Tudeh Party cover organisation, July 1951.

Now inactive because of serious illness.

54. Furuhar, Abul-Qāsem

Born in Tehran about 1883. A grandson of Mirza Abbas Khan Qavam-ud-Dauleh, who was Minister of Finance for some years. Educated in Tehran and Switzerland; studied law. A judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1915-21. Chief of Construction at the Tehran Municipality 1921-24. President of the Tribunal 1926-27. Assistant Director of the Registration Department in the Ministry of the Interior 1927-28. Judge in the Appeal Court in 1929. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance October 1933. Minister to France June 1936-January 1937. Acting Minister of Interior July and Minister September 1937. Minister of Industry and Mines March 1938. Minister of Interior August 1938 to February 1939. A Deputy for Tehran in the 12th Majles October 1939, and in the 13th Majles 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs and later Minister of Finance in Sa'ed's Cabinet March-August 1944.

Delegate to U.N. Assembly, September 1947. Appointed minister to Switzerland 1948. Also accredited to Vienna August 1949. Recalled by Musaddeq, May 1951, because of his relationship with Ghulam Husain Furuhar of Supplement Oil Agreement fame. On Musaddeq's overthrow, August 1953, again appointed Minister to Switzerland, and additionally to Austria.

Well educated. Keeps himself to himself. Quite a good reputation for honesty. Married to a Bulgarian lady.

55. Furuhar, Ghulām Husain

Born in 1903. Brother of Abul-Qāsem Furuhar. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran, and at Berlin University where he studied economics and law. Entered the Ministry of Justice in 1928 and held various appointments in that Ministry until 1934 when he transferred to the Ministry of Finance. Director-General in the Ministry of Finance in 1940. In 1941 was appointed to Germany to investigate commercial relations between Iran and Germany. After relations with Germany were cut he acted as economic counsellor to the Iranian Legation in Switzerland. Returned to Iran early 1946 and was appointed Director-General of the Taxation Department of the Ministry of Finance. Minister of Roads and Communications in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinets December 1946 to December 1947. Head of Industrial Bank October 1948-August 1949, when appointed Minister of Labour by Sa'ed. Dropped January 1950. Ministry of Labour under Razmara, August 1950. Transferred to Ministry of Finance, October 1950, and undertook the defence of the

Supplemental Oil Agreement in the Majles, December 1950, a task which he performed with commendable courage. As a result of the outcry in the Majles, inspired against him by the National Front, he was forced to resign in January 1951. Appointed to the High Council of Seven-Year Plan March 1955. Became Minister of Finance 1956.

Gained much influence at one time by his wife's close association with Princess Ashraf. Intelligent and courageous but more of a showman than an administrator. Likes the good life but comparatively honest. Enjoys poor health.

Speaks fluent French and German.

56. Ganje'i, Reza, Engineer (*Muhandes*)

Born 1911. Educated in France and Germany. Editor of *Baba Shamel*, a satirical weekly, up to 1948. He served in various departments, such as the Mortgage Bank and the Seven-Year Plan Organisation. Was one of the editors invited to the United Kingdom by the M.O.I. in the autumn of 1945. Is a member of the Taqizadeh circle known as "Ammi'un" and is mainly supported by Taqizadeh, Hakim-ul-Mulk and Najm. Under-Secretary in Ministry of Industry and Mines, 1955. Minister of Industry and Mines under Alā, 1956. Member of Iran-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee.

More of a journalist than a politician. Has never done much work but is a decent, amiable person. German is the only foreign language in which he is really at home.

57. Garzan, 'Abbās, Major-General (*Sarlashgar*)

Born about 1902. In Cossack Brigade in early 1920s. Later commissioned in the Engineers. Studied in France 1925-27 at the *Ecole de Génie*.

In 1939 became head of the Railway Administration. In 1943 was appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In September 1944 appointed to command the 9th Division and became Deputy Chief of the General Staff again March 1946. Promoted brigadier in June 1946, and not long after became Director of Personnel in the Ministry of War. In 1947 assumed command of the 3rd Division at Tabriz and in 1948 of the 4th Division at Reza'ieyh. Promoted major-general March 1950. Relinquished command of the 4th Division in May 1950 to become Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and the next month, when Razmara became Prime Minister, he became Chief of the General Staff; kept his post until July 1952, when he was retired by Musaddeq. August 1953-April 1955 Minister of Roads and Communications under Zahedi. 1956, Chief Inspector of the General Staff.

He gained the esteem of the British officers working in the railway administration during the war, who considered that he co-operated well and loyally. He was highly thought of by His Majesty's Consul at Isfahan and has always appeared friendly. He is believed to be one of the more efficient and active officers in the Iranian Army. His reputation for honesty, which was once very good, seems to have declined somewhat in recent years. Not a very impressive Minister. He speaks fair French but no English.

58. Gilānshāh, Hedāyat, Major-General (*Sarlashgar*)

Born about 1908. Educated at the Tehran Military School. Commissioned 1929, first in the Cavalry and in 1931 transferred to the Air Force. Attended training courses in France in 1934 and 1936. In 1941 first commanded the Ahwaz Squadron and then the Tehran Air Group. Before 1941 associated a great deal with the German community. In October 1943 led a team of officers sent to the United Kingdom for air training, remaining there

for two years. 1947 became Deputy Chief of Air Staff and in late 1949 Commander of the Fighter Regiment.

Appointed Head of the Imperial Iranian Air Force in February 1952.

He is an intriguer, weak, conceited and fond of good living. Though actively employed in the Air Force for the whole of his service, he has little knowledge of modern Air Force affairs. Well in with the Shah, becoming an A.D.C. in 1945 and at present head of his military secretariat. Speaks French and English.

59. Gulshā'iyān, 'Abbās Quli

Born about 1898. Educated at School of Political Science, Tehran. In Ministry of Justice from 1918 to 1935, when he was transferred to Ministry of Finance of which he eventually became Director-General. Successively Minister of Finance, Commerce and Justice under Furughi, August 1941-March 1942. Appointed Governor-General, Tabriz, September 1943, but did not proceed. Head of Tehran Municipality January-August 1944. Minister of Commerce under Sadr, June 1945. Governor-General, Khorasan, April-September 1948, when he was appointed Minister of Justice under Hazhir. Minister of Finance in successive Sa'ed Governments from November 1948 to March 1950. Iranian Government plenipotentiary in negotiations with the A.I.O.C. which culminated in the signature of the Supplemental Agreement in July 1949. Governor-General of Pers, May 1950, where he did an excellent job. Dismissed in August 1951 because of National Front aversion to him as signatory of the Supplemental Oil Agreement. Appointed Governor-General Azarbaijan, December 1954 and Minister of Justice 1956.

Speaks French and has a limited knowledge of English. Affable and friendly with considerable character and determination. A capable and adaptable administrator.

60. Hā'erizādeh, Sayyed Abul Hasan

Born about 1894 of a spiritual family of Yezd. Deputy for Yezd in the 4th, 5th and 6th Majles. A follower of Mudarres, who strongly opposed Reza Shah. Has had a career in the Ministry of Justice which he joined in 1928. Deputy for Sabzavar in the 15th Majles. In 1945 was a member of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's party. Deputy for Tehran in the 16th, 17th and 18th Majles. For some time a member of the Committee of the Partisans of Peace. Although one of the original members of the National Front he broke with Musaddeq in spring 1953. Violently opposed the 1954 oil agreement, being one of the five Deputies who voted against it. Not elected to the 19th Majles in 1956 owing to his opposition to the Government.

Although in a long history of political opposition he has shown courage and spoken his mind and has integrity of a sort, he is a sufficiently clever politician to know when to dodge. Quarrelsome and falls out with his colleagues, but an effective member of the Majles, where he has often abused the British. Inclined to extreme "neutrality." Not particularly honest.

61. Hal'at, 'Alī

Born c. 1889 in Azarbaijan. Traditional religious education. Was opposed to Reza Khan before he became Shah but later became one of his friends. A Deputy on several occasions before becoming a magistrate in 1928. President of section of Supreme Court of Appeal when arrested at instance of Allied security authorities and interned at Arak, August 1943. Public Prosecutor at Supreme Court of Appeal when appointed Minister of Justice by

Mansur, April 1950; he appears to have owed his appointment to the fact that he was acceptable to such mutually incompatible elements as the Court and the National Front. Resigned with Mansur, June 1950. Minister of Justice under Musaddeq, May 1951. Resigned August 1951 on being appointed Senator for Azarbaijan. August 1953, appointed Head of Supreme Court; removed by Gulshā'iyān in 1956.

An experienced and influential lawyer. Ambitious and not particularly honest.

62. Hakimi, Ebrahim (Hakim-ul-Mulk)

Born in Azarbaijan, 1870; studied medicine in France for ten years; speaks French. Was Qajar Court Physician as was his father. Deputy in the 1st Majles, 1908. Minister of Finance, 1910. Minister of Education, 1910, 1911. Minister of Finance or Education several times up to 1920. Lived in retirement throughout Reza Shah's reign. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinets August 1942 and February 1943. Associated with Qavam-ul-Mulk in his pro-German intrigues before the Allied invasion. Member of the National Bank Advisory Council in 1943, 1944 and 1945; was considered an ancient nonentity, deaf and infirm, but in May 1945 was appointed Prime Minister because all other candidates were opposed by one or other faction in the Majles. His Cabinet failed to obtain a vote of confidence and resigned a month later. He again became Prime Minister in November 1945, and did his best to deal with the Russian-inspired independence movement in Azarbaijan and had courage enough to refer to the United Nations Security Council the situation created by the Russian refusal to allow the Iranian Government to send troops to Tabriz. Exhausted by his efforts and intimidated by the growing hostility of the Shah and the factions in the Majles, he resigned in January 1946.

Appointed Prime Minister, December 1947, after the fall of Qavam-us-Saltaneh. He survived in that office until June 1948, when his Government resigned on failing to obtain a vote of confidence. President of Senate April 1954-April 1955 and as such appointed member of Regency Council during Shah's absence in winter of 1954-55. Still a Senator, 1956.

Sensible, friendly and sincere. Although old, deaf, frail and lacking in grip, he is not yet quite in his dotage. Wealthy and honest. Very friendly with Taqizadeh.

63. Hasibi, Engineer Kazem

Born c. 1902 in Tehran. After graduating from Tehran Law Faculty he studied mining engineering in France. Speaks French and some English.

Assistant Head of Mines Department, October 1942. Reported to be a member of the Tudeh Party in 1943. Held senior appointments in Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1943-44. Joined Iran Party 1944 and National Front 1950. Chief theoretician of National Front on oil, was appointed additional Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Finance by Musaddeq, May 1951, with position of permanent deputy to the Minister of Finance on the Mixed Oil Commission. One of the Iranian delegates at the negotiations with the A.I.O.C. and Stokes mission in 1951, and International Bank in 1952. Deputy for Tehran in the 17th Majles. Always very close to Musaddeq, he remained with him right up to the latter's overthrow in August 1953. Then in hiding until he was arrested in March 1955. Released on parole in April and now teaches at the University.

Fanatically anti-British. He has a crazy look in his eye and his ideas on oil and politics are

completely impractical. Reputation for honesty. Left-wing views verging on fellow-travelling.

64. Hedāyat, Abdullāh, General (*Sepahbud*)

Born about 1902, the son of Mukhber-ud-Daulah (Ghulam Reza Kemal-Hedayat) and so member of a family that has usually been pro-British. Trained at the French *Ecole de Guerre*, and also at Fontainebleau. Head of the Third Bureau, General Staff, February 1941; at the Staff College November 1941; Deputy Chief of the General Staff May 1942; Commandant of the Officers' School November 1942. Under-Secretary, Ministry of War, April 1944. Acting Minister of War September 1944. Director of Artillery November 1954. Under-Secretary of War February 1946. While still retaining this post he left for the United States in March 1947 to negotiate purchases of military supplies. Returned in 1948 and continued in the same post until appointed Commandant of the Staff College in February 1950.

Appointed Minister of War by Razmara, June 1950, and held this post until the latter's assassination. Appointed Commandant of the Staff College May 1951. Retired by Musaddeq July 1952. September 1953, became Minister of War under Zahedi and continued under Alā April 1955. Appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, 1956. In this new appointment he holds Ministerial rank.

A well-qualified serious officer, more politician than a soldier. Intelligent and ambitious. Has a good reputation for honesty. When with the General Staff supported Yazdan-Panah in his opposition to a foreign military mission, but now appears friendly to the Americans. Fairly friendly to us but cautious and perhaps something of an intriguer. Speaks good French and fair English.

65. Hedā'yat, 'Ezzatellāh

Son of Sani'-ud-Daulah, who was murdered in Tehran during the Constitutional troubles about 1908. Born about 1895. Educated as a civil engineer in Germany. Member of the staff of the legation at Berlin 1920-23. On the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 1925. Appointed Chief of Railway Construction about that time. Interested in various engineering projects in Tehran and in a spinning factory. Director of the Port of Pahlavi 1930. Arrested and tried for complicity in irregularities in the Ministry of Roads and Communications, February 1936; sentenced to six months' imprisonment and a fine. Exonerated after the fall of Reza Shah. In 1943 engaged in contracting work. Appointed Inspector of Railways in August 1945 and Director-General January 1947. Relieved of this post January 1949. Was selected as independent chairman of a Workers' Congress held in February 1951, under auspices of Ministry of Labour, and for a few months in 1952 associated with the Iranian Trades Union Congress. Has an important interest in a sulphur mine at Semnan, December 1953-April 1955 Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Zahedi. 1956, in private business.

His mother was a daughter of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. He is married to a Russian and has a son being educated in England. He speaks Russian and French fluently and has a fair knowledge of English. Cousin of Khosrau Heda'yat. Professes friendship towards us but has a reputation for unreliability and dishonesty. A heavy gambler. Reported to have close connexions with French and German firms, whose interests he espouses assiduously to our disadvantage.

66. Hedāyat, Khusrau Bahman

Born c. 1908. Brother of General Abdullah Hedāyat. A qualified mechanical engineer. Assistant Head of the Iranian State Railways. May 1944, and appointed Director-General November 1944-early 1945. Reappointed for a few months in October 1946. One of the first members of Qavam's Democrat Party (September 1946) and was made responsible for organising a trade union section of the party to oppose the Tudeh movement. Obtained an appreciable following among workers, especially on the State Railway, presided at two congresses in Tehran in 1947 when the Federation of Trades Unions of the Workers of Iran (E.S.K.I.) was formed (this being the Democrat Party organisation in disguise), and in August 1947 became its first secretary. Elected to 15th Majles for Tehran in 1947. Deputy for Tehran in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Workers' delegate to the International Labour Conference, Geneva, June 1949. Elected president of Asian Federation of Labour January 1950. Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Roads in April 1955. Became Deputy Director of the Plan Organisation and Deputy Prime Minister in 1956.

At one time represented workers on High Labour Council and other joint negotiating bodies, and was for some time a member of the Executive Committee of the I.C.F.T.U. Has little in common with the working class, and only a slight knowledge of the principles of trade unionism. Used his position to improve his own status and settle personal scores, but no suggestion of dishonesty. In the Plan Organisation he has shown energy and considerable administrative ability, and has proved a good deputy to A. H. Eftehaji.

Has influence at Court, particularly with Princess Ashraf. His second wife is a daughter of Sarem-ud-Dauleh (q.v.).

Speaks French and some English.

67. Hejāzi, Abdul Husain, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born about 1905. At St. Cyr from 1924 and has spent in all about sixteen years in France. An instructor at the Military Academy in 1943, where he took strong measures against the Tudeh Party. In March 1945 went with a military mission to France. In July 1946 appointed Commander of the 10th Division. In September of the same year he was summoned to Tehran and arrested illegally by Muzaffar Firuz on a trumped-up charge (which was a Qavam-us-Saltaneh gambit) of plotting with the British and the tribes. His arrest quickly raised a storm in high army circles and he was released and took charge of the 3rd Bureau of the General Staff in October. Promoted *Sartip* (Brigadier) in March 1947 and commanded the 7th Division until appointed Commandant of the Military Academy in Tehran in September 1948. Accompanied the Shah on his visit to England in 1948, to the United States in 1949 and 1954, and to Pakistan in 1950.

In June 1950 made Deputy Chief of the General Staff while still remaining Commandant of the Military Academy. Chief of Police for a few months in 1951 but relieved in May and again became Commandant of the Military Academy until July 1952. Retired by Musaddeq in August 1952. Arrested for a few days after the events of February 1953.

Reinstated after Musaddeq fell in August 1953 and appointed G.O.C. III Corps in Kermanshah. Became head of the 3rd Department of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1956 and permanent Deputy to the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact.

Always appears reasonably friendly. A good general reputation and regarded as comparatively honest. In army circles he is considered a strong candidate for the post of Chief of the General Staff. Speaks French and English.

68. Hekmat, 'Ali Asghar

Born about 1894. A Shirazi and cousin to Sardar Fakher. At the Church Missionary Society School at Shiraz, 1908-09. Well-read in Arabic. Went to Tehran in 1914, where he entered the American College, graduating in 1917. Employed in the Ministry of Education until about 1930, when he went to Paris to study law. Returned to Tehran in September 1933 to take charge of the Ministry of Education as Acting Minister. Raised to the rank of Minister in February 1936. Dismissed July 1938, but restored to favour as Minister of the Interior, February 1939.

Minister of Industry and Commerce in Furughi's Cabinet in 1941, Minister of Health March 1942, Minister of Justice in Suhaili's Cabinet of February 1943. Headed cultural missions to India 1944 and again in 1947. Delegate to United Nations Education Conference 1945. Minister without Portfolio June and September 1947 under Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Delegate to UNESCO, November 1947. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs under Sa'ed, November 1948. Became Minister without Portfolio in same Cabinet, January to March 1950, August 1953. Minister without Portfolio under Zahedi. Since January 1954, Ambassador to India. In 1952 member of the Iranian Preparatory Committee for the Vienna Peace Conference and since about 1947 a member of the Directing Board of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Society.

The author of some literary works, he has been for many years a professor of Persian history and literature at Tehran University. Friendly and shrewder than he at first appears. He is eminently a professor and not a man of action, and although he is not generally popular he has considerable influence in his own particular circle. Rich, with a reputation for dishonesty.

Speaks both English and French, but neither well, although he has translated some of Shakespeare's works into Iranian.

69. Hekmat, Rezā (Sardār Fakher)

Born Shiraz about 1888. Cousin of 'Ali Asghar Hekmat. During the 1914-18 war was a determined enemy of Qavam-ul-Mulk and friendly with the Qashqa'is. After the war settled down in Tehran and was employed in various Government appointments. Governor-General of Kerman 1940-41 and in 1946. Was a member of Central Committee of Iran Democrat Party. Elected Deputy for Shiraz in the 14th (1944) and 15th (1946) Majles.

Elected President of Majles October 1947. On the fall of Qavam in December 1947 was a candidate for the Premiership. Leader of the dissident group of Qavam's Democrat Party. Re-elected President of the Majles 1948 and again in 1949. A member of the Regency Council during the Shah's visit to the United Kingdom July 1948. Elected to the Constituent Assembly from Shiraz April 1949. In July 1949 he founded the Socialist Party of Iran, which came to nothing. Deputy for Shiraz in 16th Majles and elected President of the Majles February 1950 and 1951. There were no elections held in Shiraz for the 17th Majles, largely because Musaddeq wanted to keep Sardar Fakher out of the Majles. March 1954, he was elected Deputy for Shiraz to 18th Majles, and elected its President April 1954, again in April 1955 and 1956.

More intelligent than he appears. Sensible and helpful. Is popular and has considerable influence in the Majles. His chief failing is a love of gambling, which does not encourage financial probity. An experienced politician.

70. Heshmati, 'Abbās

Born c. 1895, a Qajar prince, the son of Sardar Heshmat. Educated in France; speaks French.

Elected to the 14th Majles from Mahallat. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh at the time of the 15th Majles elections but released after promising to co-operate with Qavam and appointed Governor of Hamadan January 1947. In August of the same year was appointed Governor-General of Mazandaran where he remained until transferred to Kermanshah in February 1949. A Member of the Constituent Assembly for Mahallat April 1949. Relieved of Governor-Generalship January 1950.

Governor-General of Isfahan, August 1950-April 1951. Governor-General of Gilan October 1951-May 1953. March 1954, elected Deputy for Mahallat in 18th Majles. Member of Iranian parliamentary delegation which visited the United Kingdom in July 1955. Re-elected to the 19th Majles.

Very rich and fond of the good life. Well in with the Shah.

71. Human, Dr. Ahmad

Born in Tehran about 1906. Son of a prosperous fruiterer, Haji Reza Quli, who sent him to France for his education. He married one of the Sudavar family of Khurasan. On his return to Iran Human practised as a lawyer in Tehran. He entered politics with the now defunct *'Edalat* Party. In 1950 Cabinet Under-Secretary under Mansur and Director-General of Propaganda Department. Also a member of the Civil Service Purge Commission. Appointed assistant to the Minister of Court ('Ala) in March 1951, in which job he made no secret of his opposition to Musaddeq. August 1952 transferred to post as Supervisor of the Development Bank for Crown Lands until March 1953, when he resumed his private law practice. A professor of rural economy at Tehran University. A mason. Fairly close to General Arfa and to Eqbal.

He is friendly, intelligent and honest but rather indecisive. Politically ambitious. Regarded with disfavour by the Americans. Speaks French and English.

72. Issayeff (or Issayan), Ramon

A Caucasian Armenian born about 1895 and one of the biggest businessmen in Tehran. Has the reputation of being pro-Soviet although according to some people this is merely cover for his intense desire to realise an independent Armenia. He has close relatives in Soviet Armenia. He is, however, mistrusted by the majority of Armenians, who have defeated his recurring attempts to have himself elected as their Majles Deputy. He was a prime mover in the scheme for getting Armenian peasantry to return to Soviet Armenia in 1947 and in this connexion handled large sums of money subscribed by American Armenians. Attended Moscow Economic Conference in 1952. Is said to have made a great deal of money as a contractor to the Red Army occupation forces during the war. Is an able and resourceful financier. In his plans to increase his company holdings he has met with opposition because of his pro-Soviet reputation, but he has secured a large interest in several important industrial and commercial enterprises; he has of late over-extended himself in the field of agencies

as well as, it is believed, financially, and a number of principals have withdrawn their patronage from dissatisfaction with his services; but his resiliency is such that he will probably effect a comeback. He is a board member of the Caviar Purchasing Company and is a considerable shareholder in Iranian Airways. He entertains lavishly with funds which, it is reported—especially among the Armenian community—may well emanate from the Soviet Embassy. Whatever his sympathies, money is no doubt the main motive in his dealings.

Although uncouth in appearance he is well-educated and speaks excellent Russian. In spite of his reputation as a crook he is kind-hearted and generous. Drinks heavily.

73. Jahānbāni, Amānollāh, General (Sepahbud)

Born about 1890, son of the late Amanullah Mirza, Zia-ud-Dauleh (a descendant of Fath Ali Shah), who committed suicide in the British Consulate in Tabriz, where he had taken refuge from the Russians in 1917. Joined the Iranian Cossack Artillery School in 1907 and then graduated in Russia where he served two years with the Imperial Guard.

Was made a general, and became Chief of the General Staff in 1922. He visited France and England in 1923. Although a Qajar prince, he favoured the change of dynasty in 1925.

Held various military commands and ministerial appointments with periodical falls from and restorations to royal favour. Minister of War, March 1942.

General Officer Commanding, Fars, September 1943. Commandant, Cadet College, 1946.

First vice-president of Russo-Iranian Cultural Relations Society March 1945.

Retired from the army on being appointed Senator for Fars February 1950. March 1954, appointed Senator for Reza'iyeh. June 1955 appointed head of Iranian team for the delimitation of the northern frontiers under the Iranian Soviet frontier and financial agreement of December 1954. The delimitation was completed in autumn 1956. He remains a Senator.

Speaks Russian and French fluently; has a Russian, as well as at least one Iranian, wife. Has been very active for some years in encouraging sport, both in the army and in civilian clubs, and is an active member of the Animal Welfare Society. One of his sons, Husain, studied four years in the Soviet Union and was then forced to leave by the Russians before completing his studies.

74. Jam, Mahmud (Modir-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1880. Has had a long career in the customs and other Government departments, and was, for more than ten years, Iranian secretary to the French Legation in Tehran. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived Cabinet of Sayyed Zia-ud-Din 1921. Acting Minister of Finance January 1922 and Minister of Finance October 1923 to August 1924. Appointed as assistant to the Prime Minister, Reza Khan, until the latter became provisional head of the State on October 31, 1925, and then assistant to the two following Prime Ministers. Appointed Governor of Kerman Province in September 1927 and Governor-General of Khurasan in April 1928. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Furughi's Cabinet of 1933, and succeeded him as Prime Minister in December 1935. Headed the mission to Egypt on the Crown Prince's betrothal to Princess Fauzieh June-July 1938. Ambassador to Egypt 1941. Minister for War September-December 1947. Minister of Court January 1948. Accompanied the Shah to the United

Kingdom July 1948. Ambassador at Rome June 1949-July 1950. May-December 1954 Governor-General of Azarbaijan. Elected Senator for Kerman April 1955.

An amiable and easy-going man who speaks French fluently. Not averse to being bribed, if done tastefully and not with cash. More at home in ceremonial than in administration.

His Camberley Staff College Officer son was married to Princess Shams, since divorced.

75. Jazayeri, Dr. Shams-ud-Din

Born in Tehran, 1905, of a family of Khuzistan Sayyeds. Educated at Tehran University and Law School and in France.

Head of Tobacco Monopoly in 1941. Adviser on Millspaugh Price Stabilisation Committee 1943. *En disponibilité* August 1944. Legal Adviser, Ministry of Finance, and Labour, 1946-48. Member of board of directors of Iran Insurance Company 1948. Member of the Council of the Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Resigned August 1949.

Minister of Education under Razmara, June 1950. Resigned January 1951 after a public disagreement with G. H. Fumhar about the Supplemental Oil Agreement. In 17th Majles elections had Makki's promise of support, but elections were not held in his constituency. In private business until March 1954, when elected Deputy for Tehran in 18th Majles. Absented himself from vote on 1954 oil agreement. Not elected to 19th Majles in 1956 owing to his criticism of the Government.

Keenly interested in education. Also has considerable knowledge of labour and social developments and assisted in preparation of Persian Labour Code.

Rather a feeble character and an opportunist. Flirted with the National Front. Speaks French. Married in 1941 Mah Munir, daughter of Dr. Musaddab Natifi, a charming and intelligent woman.

76. Kaibān, Mas'ud

Born in Tehran 1886. Educated in Persia and in Saint-Cyr. Joined the gendarmerie in 1913 and rose to the rank of colonel. Minister of War under Sayyed Zia-ud-Din Tabataba'i after his *coup d'état* of 1921. After Reza Khan's *coup d'état* he joined the Ministry of Education and became a teacher in secondary schools and later at Tehran University. Was also professor of geography at the Military Academy. Minister of Education under Mansur April-June 1950. Head of Theological Faculty, March 1951.

Of simple tastes. Pleasant and quiet, a good teacher, and honest. Speaks French.

77. Kaivān, Amir

Born 1917. Has lived most of his life at Isfahan as an engineer. With Shams Sadri was active in the formation of the first Isfahan trade union in 1943-44. When the Tudeh movement attempted to absorb this union in 1945 Kaivān organised resistance as a result of which he lost the use of one eye. In 1945 went to Paris Conference of the I.L.O. as workers' delegate. Had to lie low until the Tudeh eclipse in the winter of 1946, when he revived his Isfahan union. In 1947 affiliated his union to the E.M.K.A. Federation, but later withdrew because of E.M.K.A.'s venture into politics.

Elected a member of the High Labour Council in 1951 and subsequently appointed vice-chairman. In 1951 attended I.L.O. Conference as Workers' Adviser and also the Congress of I.C.F.T.U. at Milan as representative of the new Iranian Trades Union Congress, which he had helped to form with Aziz Qozelbash, becoming its General-Secretary.

Afterwards visited the United Kingdom. In 1952, 1954 and 1955 attended I.L.O. Conference as workers' representative in Government delegation. Visited the United Kingdom and met Ministry of Labour and British T.U.C. officials in 1954 and 1955. Attended I.C.F.T.U. Congress at Vienna in 1955.

He is popular with his members and has considerable power over them. He dislikes the dependence of Persian trade unions on politics and does his best to keep himself politically independent. Violently anti-Russian and anti-Tudeh, for this reason has the friendship of certain religious leaders and Members of Parliament. Is thought quite well of in Persian Ministry of Labour, where he is recognised as an honest and earnest worker. Many Isfahan employers are strongly opposed to him because of his obstinacy in pursuing the cause of the workers and his refusal to be bribed. A likeable person, who seems to show more understanding of trade unionism than his collaborators.

78. Kāmbakhsh, 'Abd-us-Samad

Born 1905 at Qazvin; his father was 'Ain-ul-Mamalek, a Qajar prince and wealthy landowner at Qazvin. Entered Persian army about 1923; sent to Leningrad for training and became a pilot there; also imbibed the doctrines of communism with enthusiasm. On return was active Communist and was known as the Persian representative on the Comintern. Sentenced to death by Reza Shah, but was pardoned and then imprisoned with fifty-three other Communists. Exiled in 1940 to Bandar Abbas; released on the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941.

Elected to the 14th Majles for Qazvin with the help of the Soviet representative. Generally regarded as one of the more decent Tudeh members. At one time believed to be dissatisfied with the complete subservience of his party to Soviet interests. Put in charge of the publicity of the Tudeh Party in August 1944. Married to a Persian related to the Kia family who acts as a midwife in Tehran.

Believed to have taken refuge at Soviet Summer Embassy after the attempt on the Shah, February 1949. Sentenced to death *in absentia*, May 1949, for acting against the Constitutional Monarchy. His wife was arrested and sentenced to three years imprisonment. His present whereabouts is unknown.

Reputation for honesty. Intelligent, active, and a good orator.

79. Kāshāni, Sayyed Abdul-Qāsem

Born about 1888. Educated at Korbala and lived there for many years as a *muftahed*. Expelled by the Iraq Government in 1922 for non-co-operation with our policy in that country, and came back to Persia. He kept in the background during Reza Shah's reign, but on the latter's abdication in 1941 came back into prominence and achieved a certain popularity partly owing to his reputation as an opponent of Reza Shah. His anti-British bias, a legacy from 1922, led him into intrigues with German agents and in August 1943 he fled from Tehran to avoid arrest. He was arrested by British security authorities in June 1944 and confessed to having helped German agents. Released in August 1945. He nurses a bitter enmity towards the British. Arrested by Qavam-us-Saltaneh July 1946 and released in November.

In June 1948 he instigated demonstrations against Hazhir after the latter had been elected Prime Minister. Arrested by military authorities after attempt on Shah's life, February 4, 1949, and banished to Khurramabad, but later allowed to leave the country for the holy places of Syria and spent some time in Beirut.

Elected to the 16th Majles from Tehran as a protégé of the National Front. Returned to Tehran June 1950 and immediately became active in anti-A.I.O.C. agitation. Was associated with the Fedaiyan-e-Islam at the time of the assassination of Razmara, March 1951, but they later broke away from him. Although re-elected for Tehran to the 17th Majles and its president for a time during this term, he never attended.

Musaddeq owed much to the politico-religious support which Kashani provided. Began falling out with Musaddeq November 1952 and broke with him in March 1953. After latter's overthrow in August 1953 Kashani was at first on fairly good terms with Zahedi, but a few months later began to oppose him. Since 1954 has been fairly quiet except in November 1956 when he attempted to agitate against the British action on the Suez Canal and was placed under restraint by Military Government.

Kashani is venal and an opportunist of the worst kind. His pretensions to being a religious leader are weak.

80. Kashani, Ebrahim

Born c. 1908. Educated in Tehran. Started his career in the Bank Melli where he gained steady promotion. Proposed Deputy Governor of the Bank by Zahedi. Became Acting Minister of National Economy in the Ala Cabinet of April 1955 and Minister of Commerce later that year.

He speaks English, French and Russian. Likeable and friendly, takes a keen interest in music. Honest and capable but not forceful, he was more successful in the bank than as a Minister.

81. Kāzemi, Bāqer (Muhazzab-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1887. Educated in the School of Political Science in Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appointed counsellor to Washington in 1925. Appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Roads and Communications in 1930 and Acting Minister in 1931-32. Subsequently appointed Iranian Minister in Bagdad, towards the end of 1932. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1933.

Went on official visits to Afghanistan and India November-December 1935. Resigned March 1936 and unemployed until appointed Governor-General of Eastern Azarbaijan April 1937. Ambassador, Kabul, 1938, and Ankara, 1939.

Minister of Public Health, December 1941 to March 1942. Minister of Finance in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942. Minister of Education in Sa'ed's reshuffled Cabinet of August 1944. Delegate to the United Nations, January 1946. Minister to Denmark, Norway and Sweden, April 1946.

Nominated Senator for Tehran February 1950, but did not return to Iran until September 1950, when he allied himself with the National Front and bitterly opposed Razmara. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Musaddeq, May 1951, as was said as nominee of Kashani, with whom he is very friendly. July 1952, became Minister of Finance in Musaddeq's new Cabinet. Ambassador in Paris March 1953 until dismissed August 1953. In bad odour with the Shah. Returned to Iran December 1954. May 1955 arrested and deported to the provinces by the Ala Government as a counter to increased Musaddeqi activity. Now unemployed and lives in Tehran.

Disagreeable, stupid and obstructive. Hypocritical and self-important.

82. Keshāvarz, Faridun, Dr.

Born in 1906. Partly educated in France as a doctor of medicine and formerly practised at Pahlavi. Then ran a large and prosperous children's clinic in Tehran. In 1944 became one of the leading members of the Tudeh Party, of which he is a member of the Central Committee, and since then has been responsible in large measure for the organisation of the party. Editor of the Tudeh newspaper *Razm*. Tudeh Deputy for Pahlavi in the 14th Majles. In December 1945 was invited by the Soviet Government to attend ceremonies held in Tashkent on the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the Central Asian Middle East College. Minister for Education under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August 1946, but was dropped in the Cabinet reshuffle of October of the same year. During his tenure of office he succeeded in filling many important posts in the Ministry with Tudeh members and sympathisers.

After the attempt on the Shah's life of February 4, 1949, he was reported to have taken refuge in the Russian Embassy. Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949 for actions hostile to the constitutional monarchy. In early 1955 believed to be in Vienna.

Immoral, completely unscrupulous and reported to be a perfect tool for the Russians. Not without money. An accomplished public speaker.

83. Khājah-Nuri, Ebrāhīm

Born about 1905. Educated in Belgium, where he studied law and psychology and also Posts, Telegraph and Telephone administration. In 1932 head of the P.T.T. Training School, Tehran, 1933-35 collaborated with General Faslullah Zahedi in the Ford agency. In 1936 began practising as a barrister. 1937-39 worked in various State trading organisations. Founder member and Secretary of the *Edalat* Party from 1942. Unsuccessful candidate for the Tehran elections in 1944. Director-General of the Publications and Propaganda Department in 1944 under Suhaili and Sa'ed and again in 1947 under Qavam-us-Saltaneh, when he also held the office of Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949 and again in March 1954. Legal Adviser to the Tehran Chamber of Commerce since 1944. Member of the Persian parliamentary delegation to the United Kingdom, July 1955.

A well-known and popular writer, his best-known work being "Bāzigarān-e-'Asr-e-Talā'i," a series of twelve biographies of outstanding personalities in Reza Shah's reign. For some years he has produced a well-known fortnightly newsletter on political affairs. As a historian he is most readable but not very accurate. In politics he is an idealist of marked pro-British tendencies. Has shown political courage. Constructive and a reformer. Less personal ambition than many Tehran politicians. Tends to be over-subtle.

A not uncritical friend of Zahedi. Although friendly with a number of its members, opposed the Ala Government.

Speaks French and some English.

84. Kurus, 'Isā (Esau)

Born about 1896. A commissioned officer in the South Persian Rifles during the 1914-18 war. For many years a leading and reputable merchant of Tehran, representative of Imperial Chemical Industries, Metropolitan Vickers and many other important British firms. Has a branch in London, where he lived for long periods, and one in the United States. His brother and partner, Hasan, who has also lived in London, has a more forceful personality and is the acknowledged leader of the

family. The third brother, Kazem, manages the textile factory at Rey, which has come to absorb more and more of the family's energy. 'Isa fell into disgrace under Reza Shah through no fault of his own. Stood for the Majles for Tehran, 1943, without success, and now no longer believes in mixing politics with business. Vice-President of Tehran Chamber of Commerce, 1942-43. Member of Tehran Municipal Council, 1943. Member of board of directors of Iranian Airways, 1946.

Speaks excellent English and is well disposed towards us. Patriotic and honest. A man of rare integrity.

85. Lankarāni, Shaikh Husain

Born about 1890 in Russian Azarbaijan. Religious education in Tehran. During and after first world war collaborated with Sulaiman Mirza and his Socialists. Opposed Reza Shah and was deported to provinces for two years. After that lay fairly low until end of latter's reign.

Elected Deputy for Ardebil in the 14th Majles. Owed election to Soviet intervention. Although believed to be opposed to the Pahlavi Dynasty, in 1943-44 he was employed by the Shah to stir up trouble against Sayyed Zia-ud-Din. Collaborated with Qavam-us-Saltaneh, who in turn arrested him July 1946, but released him in December.

Arrested in March 1948, together with his three brothers, in connexion with the murder of the journalist Muhammad Mas'ud. Subsequently released. Again arrested with his brothers after the attempted assassination of the Shah, February 4, 1949, but again later released. Later collaborated with Musaddeq until July 1952. For some months after coming to power in August 1953, Zahedi used Lankarāni and his brothers to keep in hand the Azarbaijan mobs in South Tehran, over whom they have considerable influence.

Noted Tehran intriguer, mob orator and trouble-maker. Venal and double-faced, but probably not quite so bad as his brothers. The latter, Ahmad, Murteza and Mustafa, have been associated with various Tudeh cover-organisations. In December 1954 Mustafa was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment by a military tribunal ostensibly for insults to the Shah some years previously.

86. Makki, Husain

Born c. 1915. Basic education in Tehran. Did his military service in the air force and rose to rank of sergeant but was discharged on charges of stealing technical equipment.

Dogsbody to Malek-ush-Shuara in his researches into Persian political history, 1941. Subsequently edited a few books on this subject himself. Deputy Mayor of Tehran, 1946. Director-General of Developments and Improvements, Ministry of Labour, 1947. Elected to the 15th Majles from Arak and to the 16th from Tehran. Secretary-General of the National Front and special protégé of Dr. Musaddeq. Talked out the Supplemental Oil Agreement in a four-day speech mostly written by Engineer Hasibi, July 1949. Rapporteur of the Majles Oil Commission, June 1950, and of the Mixed Oil Commission, May 1951. One of the three-man delegation from the Mixed Commission to supervise take-over of A.I.O.C. in Khuzistan, June 1951, and made money in the process. Deputy for Tehran in the 17th Majles, heading the poll. In September 1952 began, with Kashani, to turn against Musaddeq and openly opposed him from March 1953. Gaoled by Musaddeq a few days before the latter's fall in August 1953. After his release lay fairly low and now confines himself to business and literary activity.

A loud-mouthed man with no ideas of his own; extremist and irresponsible. An unprincipled adventurer. Now comfortably off.

87. Mansur (Rajab) 'Ali, C.B.E. (Mansur-ul-Mulk)

Born about 1888. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and appointed Under-Secretary in 1919. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1920. Created C.B.E. 1920. Appointed Governor-General of Azarbaijan in 1927, and held that post until 1931, when he was made Minister of the Interior. Minister of Roads 1933. Arrested in 1936 on charges of misappropriation and incompetence. Rehabilitated as Minister of Industry and Mines August 1938. Selected by Reza Shah for the post of Prime Minister June 1940, it was to him that the joint Russo-British ultimatum was delivered on August 25, 1941. As the result of the subsequent events he resigned in September 1941. Governor-General of Khurasan February 1942. Governor-General, Azarbaijan, 1946-48. Elected to the Constituent Assembly from Tehran April 1949. President of the Council of the Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Prime Minister March-June 1950. Ambassador at Rome July 1950-December 1951. Ambassador to Turkey November 1953.

A clever but dishonest man, addicted to money. An effective diplomat. Speaks French.

88. Mas'ud, Akbar (Sārem-ud-Dauleh)

Born 1885. A son of Mas'ud Mirza Zell-us-Sultan, son of Nāser-ud-Din Shah. Succeeded to the major part of his father's inheritance. Governor of Isfahan in 1917. Minister of Finance in Vusūq-ud-Dauleh's Cabinet of 1919, one of the triumvirate who arranged the abortive Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1920; Governor of Kermanshah and Hamadan in November 1920. Governor-General of Fars 1922-23, and again in 1929. Arrested in 1929, and lived quietly in Tehran till 1932, when he was allowed to return to his vast properties in and around Isfahan.

Killed his own mother at his father's instigation on a point of honour in 1906. He seems to have lived down the odium of this deed. The two-fold stigma of being pro-British and a Qajar prevented him holding office during the time of Reza Shah. However, he became the unofficial controller of almost everything in Isfahan, displaying commendable initiative in supporting such improvement projects as the Kuhrang tunnel and the thermal power station in Isfahan. He takes a great pride in his model village at Asgharabad, near Isfahan.

Headed the poll from Isfahan in the elections to the Constituent Assembly, April 1949.

Has one surviving son and two daughters. A famous hunter. Is on good terms with the present Royal Family and accommodates members of it when they visit Isfahan. Tries to keep in with everybody. Speaks English and French fluently and is pleasant-mannered, clever and intelligent. Regarded as a British stooge. Not popular with the mass of Isfahanis. Now an old and sick man.

89. Mas'udi, 'Abbās

Born in 1895 in Tehran. Educated in Tehran, and for a year in France. A journalist by profession. Proprietor with his brother, Javad Mas'udi, of one of the two principal vernacular daily papers in Tehran (the *Ettela'at*) and of the French and English daily papers *Journal de Téhéran* and *Tehran Journal* and of weekly and monthly *Ettela'at*. Owns an up-to-date press which does much work for the Government publicity services. He accompanied the present Shah, when Crown

Prince, to Iraq, Syria and Egypt on his wedding tour as press representative, and kept the Tehran press supplied with a stream of accounts of the Prince's doings, in that quasi-religious style that alone was permitted to Iranians when speaking of their monarchy. A Deputy in the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Majles.

In the 13th Majles came out strongly in opposition to Qavam-us-Saltaneh, and was severely beaten by some of his opponents in the riots of the 8th December, 1942. Visited Palestine and Egypt in May-June 1943. Appointed Director of Iranian Airways December 1944. Visited United States in April 1945, as one of several representatives of the Tehran press invited by the American Government. Covered the U.N. meetings in London in early 1946 as unofficial representative of the Persian press. Returned from America August 1947 and took over direction of *Ettela'at*. Elected to 15th Majles for Tehran which he also represented in Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator for Tehran October 1949. Attended the Moscow Economic Conference in April 1952. Elected Senator for Tehran March 1954. Member of Iranian Press delegation to Turkey, May-June 1955. Accompanied the Shah to India, February 1956. In October 1956 visited Formosa (on official invitation) and Hong Kong, and, in November, represented Iran at the Bangkok meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Elected chairman of the Iran-America Society, November 1956.

Can be relied on to keep in with whatever Government is in power.

Speaks French and has an attractive wife. Is believed to keep most of his considerable fortune in Switzerland, where he owns one or more factories.

90. Matin-Daftari, Dr. Ahmad

Born in Tehran 1898. A nephew of Dr. Musaddeq, whose daughter he has married. Educated in Tehran, partly at the American College. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1918. Persian secretary to the German Legation in Tehran 1920-23. Returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1923-27. Joined the Ministry of Justice in 1927, and sent to Europe in 1929 to study in Germany. Returned to Iran 1931. Director-General of the Ministry of Justice 1932. Acting Minister of Justice for a short time in 1933. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1934. Minister of Justice 1936. Prime Minister October 1939.

Appeared pro-German in various negotiations while Prime Minister and was forced by Reza Shah to resign in June 1940, perhaps as a scapegoat. Arrested by the Allied forces as a suspect June 1943, but soon released. Minister without Portfolio in Qavam's Cabinet, February 1946.

Elected Senator for Tehran October 1949.

President of the Iranian United Nations Association since 1948. He is very active in this capacity and uses it as a sounding-board for neutralist ideas. Member of the Mixed Oil Commission May 1951, and of three-man delegation to supervise the take-over of the A.I.O.C. June 1951. Attended the Moscow Economic Conference in April 1952. In 1955 was on the Preparatory Committee for the Warsaw Youth Festival.

Speaks French, German and English; he has travelled in England, where his son is at Cambridge and his daughter at school.

Would undoubtedly like to be Prime Minister again. His ideas on foreign policy are distinctly "neutralist." More cultivated, widely read and travelled than many Iranians, possessed of a good intellect and with considerable conversational gifts. Dr. Matin-Daftari is sly and unreliable, and has a reputation for corruption. Active and ambitious, he has a considerable following among university

students and the younger middle class, and is active in various international fields, particularly United Nations.

91. Mebrān, Dr. Mahmud

Born c. 1911. Schooling in Tehran followed by university education in France, where he graduated as a Doctor of Literature. About 1938 returned to Tehran to work in the Ministry of Education. 1944 became a Director-General in the Ministry and 1947 went to the Iranian Embassy in Paris for two years to supervise Iranian students in Europe. In June 1950 became Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Education in Razmara's Government. April 1951, after latter's assassination, Mebrān returned to his Paris job until early 1954. Whilst in Paris did his best to counteract Communist influence amongst Iranian students.

Refused Zahedi's offer to become Minister of Education, but in July 1954 accepted post of Head of the State Social Insurance Organisation. In December made Head of the Iran Insurance Co., another State concern. In April 1955 Minister of Education under Ali.

Honest, serious and hard-working. Intelligent, constructive and a reformer. Well liked but has not got a very strong personality and is not the type for the rougher sides of politics. Well disposed towards us.

Speaks French and Italian. Italian wife.

92. Mesbāhzādeh, Dr. Mustafā

Born c. 1904 in Bandar Abbas. His father was a senior servant of Qavam-ul-Mulk. Accompanied Qavam's son, Ali, to France for education, where Mesbāhzādeh obtained a doctorate in law. Returned to Tehran in 1929 and was employed in the Ministry of Justice. Developed connexions with the Shah's Court through Ali Qavam, who was Princess Ashraf's first husband.

Owner of the newspaper *Kaihan* since late 1941. Head of Press and Propaganda Department, June 1943. He was the Shah's candidate for Bandar Abbas in the 14th Majles elections but was not successful. He was, however, elected from that constituency to the 15th Majles and also represented it in the Constituent Assembly, April 1949. Went to the United States in November 1949, to cover the Shah's visit for *Kaihan*. Deputy for Bandar Abbas in the 16th and, being pro-Musaddeq, the 17th Majles. As a Deputy made a lot of money. Member of an Iranian Press delegation to Germany May 1955. Visited the United States (on invitation) March-May 1956.

Speaks English and French. Socially pleasant and has a charming wife. Since the return of the Embassy has shown himself cautiously friendly towards us. Has a reputation for slipperiness and dishonesty and is certainly an accomplished trimmer. His newspaper office is the most efficient in Tehran.

93. Mesbah-Fātemi, 'Ali Naqi

Born about 1898. Has had a career under the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties. Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925. Governor-General of Khuzistan in 1940 and again in 1943. Replaced August 1949.

Speaks English and French. Got on well with the authorities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with whom he co-operated satisfactorily during the labour troubles of the summer of 1946; but regarded as an A.I.O.C. and, therefore, British stooge. Dishonest and of generally bad reputation. Lives quietly at Shemran.

94. Mofakkhham, Dr. Jamshid

Born c. 1910. Educated in Switzerland from an early age and only returned to Iran in 1942.

Head of the School of Arts and Crafts, autumn 1943. Director-General of Ministry of Commerce and Industry (later known as Ministry of National Economy), December 1946. Under-Secretary and Acting Minister of National Economy under Ala, March-April 1951. Appointed High Inspector when Musaddeq put in Zarakzadeh as Under-Secretary, May 1951. From early 1952 acted as Under-Secretary and for some time during his Minister's absence deputised for the latter. July 1952, appointed a board member of the Foreign Trade Department and in August 1953 made chairman. December 1954, Under-Secretary for Commercial Affairs in the Ministry of National Economy, continuing in this post under Ala Government until he resigned in June 1955. Now adviser to Japanese business firms.

An intelligent man, honest and conscientious; friendly and helpful towards us, but a rather confused personality. More recently has had his fingers in too many pies.

95. Muqbel, Dr. Ahmad

Born 1900 in Tehran. Son of late Muqbel Lashgar. Educated in Tehran and began his career as a barrister in 1922. Visited Europe in the early 1920s, graduated as Doctor of Law at Paris in 1925, and remained there. Acted as honorary legal counsellor to the Iranian Legation in Paris from 1935 to 1939. After fifteen years in France returned to Iran in 1940 and was appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance. In Sa'ed's second Cabinet was Minister of Agriculture. Joined the Seven-Year Plan Organisation in 1948. In 1950 Razmara, then Prime Minister, sent Muqbel to Washington to negotiate a loan from the American Import-Export Bank or from the International Bank. But the negotiations were halted as a result of the murder of Razmara. Muqbel therefore spent some time in France, Germany and America and only came back to Iran in 1954. He became Secretary-General to the High Economic Council in December, 1955. He is at present Minister without Portfolio in the Ala Cabinet.

Friendly, sensible and helpful but of no great weight. French wife.

96. Musaddeq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddeq-us-Saltaneh)

Born about 1885; a nephew of Farman Farma. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authority from Parliament to purge and reform that Ministry. However, at the end the organisation was worse than before, as he proved himself entirely incapable of making reforms. Appointed Governor-General of Azarbaijan in 1922, and in 1923 became Minister for Foreign Affairs for a period of four months. Elected Deputy to the 4th, 5th and 6th Majles from Tehran. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the 6th, steps were taken to prevent his election to the 7th Majles.

Imprisoned and otherwise ill-treated by Reza Shah, he spent the last few years of Reza's reign in his village near Tehran. Headed the poll in the Tehran Majles elections in 1944. Tried unsuccessfully to unseat Sayyed Zia.

Sponsored the Oil Law of December 1944 prohibiting the grant of any oil concession until after the departure of all foreign troops from Iran.

Headed the poll in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran October 1949, but was not elected in the second stage. Led a deputation of twenty

National Front supporters, who took *bast* in the Shah's Palace for five days in October 1949 as a protest against the conduct of the 16th Majles elections. Headed the poll in both the initial Tehran 16th Majles elections and the re-held ones in February 1950; with him were elected seven other members of his National Front.

Chairman of Majles Oil Commission, June 1950. Submitted proposal for nationalisation of oil industry, February 1951. Forced the Oil Commission to approve a general resolution in favour of oil nationalisation the day after Razmara's assassination, March 8, 1951. A demoralised and intimidated Majles and Senate approved the resolution unanimously and, when Ala refused to accept the nine-article Bill drawn up by the Oil Commission, voted in favour of Musaddeq becoming Prime Minister, which he agreed to do on condition that they first approved the nine-article Bill. He presented his Cabinet to the Shah on May 2, 1951, the same day as the Shah promulgated the nine-article Law.

From the summer of 1951 onwards his control of the 16th Majles gradually weakened as did his hold on public opinion. Yet he contrived to maintain himself in power until the opening of the 17th Majles, the elections to which were to a large extent rigged by his supporters.

Presented the Iranian oil case to the United Nations Security Council, October-November 1951; also in the same connexion attended The Hague Court from May 28 to June 24, 1952. Obtained vote of inclination from the 17th Majles on July 6, 1952. Resigned July 17 after a dispute with the Shah over Musaddeq's wish to become Minister of Defence and replaced by Qavam-us-Saltaneh, who in turn resigned on July 19 after serious National Front and Tudeh riots in Tehran. Musaddeq again became Prime Minister with increased popularity and power. October 1952 closed down the Senate and broke off diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom. By this time some of his old colleagues were beginning to desert him. February 1953, almost succeeded in forcing the Shah to leave the country. August 1953, closed down the Majles after the so-called referendum. Began gaoling even more of his opponents, including some of his former colleagues. Dismissed by the Shah but did not obey until forced out by a popular uprising on August 19, 1953, which followed General Zahedi's more or less abortive *coup d'Etat*. Tried for treason and sentenced, December 1953, to three years' detention as from August 1953. The light sentence was due to the Shah's intervention. Released in August 1956 and now lives under surveillance at his village of Ahmedabad on the road to Qazvin. Has aged a lot and become very deaf.

A clever political manipulator and demagogue with considerable histrionic talent. He worked on Persian xenophobia and popular discontent to make himself a national hero and by skilful use of intimidation secured the mastery of the 16th Majles and later the country. He had no positive programme for the betterment of his country and no understanding of practical problems, but kept going by creating one excitement after another. Opposed to any interference by the Shah in the conduct of Government business and eventually tried to force the latter off the Throne altogether. His reputation for honesty stood him in good stead with the Iranian people. Still a name to conjure with in spite of all that has happened.

97. Mu'tamed, 'Ali

Born about 1897. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 1919. Served abroad as secretary at various posts; *chargé d'affaires* at Rome in 1933. When the Minister of Justice

(Matin-Daftari) was made Prime Minister in October 1939, he took Mu'tamed with him as Private Secretary.

Married the sister of Ghulam Ali Khajeh-Nuri. Private Secretary to the Prime Minister in Sahaili's Cabinet of 1942, and became Minister of Posts and Telegraphs for a few days at the end of Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet February 1943. Was also in charge of the Road Transport Board in 1942 and 1943. Appointed Consul-General at Delhi July 1943. Member of Advisory Council of Anglo-Iranian Institute 1943.

Became first Iranian Ambassador to India 1947. Refused offers of Cabinet portfolios from first Hakimi and then Hazhir in 1948. Resigned his ambassadorship in November 1948 as a protest against conditions in Iran. After that lived in retirement at a village near Tehran until July 1952, when the Shah made him manager of the Imperial Land Bank. March 1953 appointed Head of the Shrine at Meshed, but refused a consecutive appointment as Governor-General of Khurasan because of his continued objections to being paid from public funds. April 1955 became Minister without Portfolio under Ala. 1956 appointed Minister in Ottawa.

Honest and conscientious. Well-liked but not a strong character. Speaks French, Italian and a little English.

98. Nabil, Fazlullah

Born 1895.

Chargé d'affaires in London, end of 1937 to early 1941. Head of Confidential Office of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 1943. Head of Third Political Department, February 1944. Administrative member of delegation to San Francisco, April 1945, and to the United Nations, December 1945. Delegate to the United Nations, September 1947. Minister at Warsaw, 1948. Transferred to Stockholm, September 1950. Returned to Iran and appointed Under-Secretary at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1951 until August 1952, when Fatemi became Foreign Minister, in which post Nabil did his best to be helpful in adverse circumstances. Reappointed to Stockholm, December 1953.

One of the better members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Speaks French and some English.

99. Nafisi, Habib

Born about 1909. Son of Dr. Mu'adeb-ud-Dauleh. Educated Toulouse University and Paris, qualifying as an engineer. Completed practical training in the United States (three years), Czechoslovakia and Germany. On return to Iran was employed successively as a technical expert in the administration and management of State factories and Director of the Tehran Small Arms Factory. Director-General in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, where he became increasingly interested in social problems and employment conditions. He drafted the first Iranian Labour Law (May 1946). Was appointed Under-Secretary of the newly-formed Ministry of Labour and Propaganda, to which labour functions previously performed by Ministry of Industry and Commerce were transferred in May 1946. In 1947 succeeded in separating propaganda functions from Ministry of Labour. It was almost entirely due to his enthusiastic and insistent efforts that the Labour Law was finally approved by the 15th Majles in June 1949. Replaced during Razmara régime, but was reappointed Under-Secretary and Acting Minister of Labour under 'Ala, March 1951. Remained Under-Secretary under Musaddeq until February 1952. November 1953, Head of the Industrial Organisation. June 1954, Under-Secretary for Industry to Zahedi's Cabinet

and December 1954, also Under-Secretary for Industrial Affairs in the Ministry of National Economy. Continued in latter post under Ala Government until 1956, when he was dropped and became technical adviser to the Transhahr company.

He shows a wide interest in social services whether or not within his official duties; in 1948 he established an experimental trade training centre in Tehran, he has worked hard for the Imperial Organisation for Social Services, and he has inspired an embryonic co-operative movement in Iran.

An admirer of British achievements in social and labour spheres, and pro-British in so far as this does not conflict with his nationalism. Extremely hard-working, conscientious and apparently honest, but with a reputation for intrigue.

His first wife was drowned at Geneva in 1947. In 1948 he married the niece of Mustafa Adl (Mansur-us-Saltaneh).

Speaks fluent French and English.

100. Nafisi, Hasan (Musharraf-ud-Dauleh)

Third son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atebba. Born in Tehran 1896. Educated in France where he obtained a law degree and diploma of political science. Served in the Ministry of Finance. Joined the staff of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as legal adviser in 1928. Visited London 1929. Set up private practice as an advocate in 1930, but remained the company's lawyer. Visited London again in 1933 and 1935.

Minister of Finance in Furughi's Cabinet 1941, and did good work in the difficult task of reconstructing the country's finances on a new basis. Resigned with that Cabinet early in 1942. Iranian Government representative to International Bank in 1946. Appointed Financial Adviser to the Prime Minister under Qavam-us-Saltaneh, autumn 1947, and charged with preparation of preliminary report on Seven-Year Plan. Within one month produced report which was basis of subsequent legislation. Post as Financial Adviser abolished January 1948, but he remained chairman of Provisional Planning Authority until the end of the year, when he resigned after disagreeing with Sa'ed's Cabinet over the staffing of the Planning Authority. Was appointed member of the Council of the Seven-Year Plan May 1949, and Managing Director of the Plan August 1949-July 1950. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran, October 1949. Since 1950 has lived mainly in Europe. Has business interests and connection with the Crédit Lyonnais Bank.

Married the daughter of Amin-ud-Dauleh in 1931. Speaks English and French. A very sensible and capable man, with a sound knowledge of local and French law.

101. Nafisi, Sa'id

Second son of the late Dr. Nazem-ul-Atebba. Born in Tehran 1893. Educated in Persia and later in France. Returned to Iran in 1911, and was employed in the Ministry of the Interior. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works in 1916, where he held different posts till 1927. Since then has been professor of the Persian language and literature in various schools. Has also done a good deal of journalism for the *Ettela'at*, the *Journal de Téhéran* and other newspapers. Was also active in promoting the first Iranian cinema film. Has a great reputation as a prose writer. Author of a life of the poet Rudaki, and of a French-Persian dictionary. Published some violently anti-British articles in the local press when the D'Arcy Concession was cancelled. Has a certain knowledge of the Pahlavi language. A member of the Iranian Academy (Farhangestan).

A scholar of sorts and an active propagandist of pro-Russian views. Visited Moscow in autumn of 1945. In the latter part of 1949 and early 1950 was in India in connexion with the "Peace through Education" movement. Prominent in the Soviet-Iranian Cultural Society. In 1955 was on the Preparatory Committee for the Warsaw Youth Festival. Now in India.

Generally regarded as untruthful and avoided by many of his fellow-countrymen. Outwardly friendly.

102. Naisāri, 'Abbas Quli

Born c. 1910, son of Amir Heshmat Naisāri, a well-known Azarbaijani figure. Graduate of Birmingham University. Employed many years in the Bank Melli, but his progress was hindered as he did not get on with the governor, Abul Hasan Eftehaji. In August 1950, after the latter left the bank, Naisāri became deputy governor until May 1953, when he went to New York as the Bank Melli's representative. November 1953, appointed manager of the Agricultural Bank.

He is solid and outspoken. Until recently regarded as honest, but there have since been suggestions of backsliding. He is openly pro-British and co-operative (embarrassingly so) at all times. He plays bridge, tennis and squash. He speaks English and Turkish fluently.

103. Najm, Abul-Qāsem (Najm-ul-Mulk)

Born in Tehran 1893. Son of the late Najm-ul-Mulk, a noted astronomer.

Educated at the School for Political Science at Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1911. Chief accountant at the Ministry 1920-24, and again from 1926-28. Transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and appointed Director-General there in 1930. Under-Secretary to that Ministry in 1933. In November of that year appointed minister to Germany. Minister in Tokyo early 1940; recalled on rupture of relations 1942. Ambassador at Kabul 1943-45.

Minister for Foreign Affairs in Hakimi's Cabinet of November 1945. He did his best to deal with the Azarbaijan crisis but the difficulties were too great for him.

Minister of Finance in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948. Member of the Council of the Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Elected from Tehran October 1949 and resigned from Seven-Year Plan on opening of Parliament February 1950. Member of Mixed Oil Commission May 1951-June 1952. Appointed Governor-General of Khuzistan by Ali Government, June 1955, but soon resigned owing to differences with the Government. Still mentioned occasionally as a potential premier.

Reputation for honesty but a very negative person. Still connected with Hakim-ul-Mulk and Tagizadeh.

104. Nakha'i, Muhammad

Born about 1902. Educated in Iran, speaks French.

Secretary of the Iranian Legation in Brussels from 1928 for some years, and then remained in Belgium teaching Persian. Also studied law, and eventually returned to Iran to join the National Bank as head of its legal department. Later transferred to the Ministry of Finance as private secretary to the Minister. 1941 became president of the Exchange Commission. At the end of 1943 private secretary to the Prime Minister (Suhaili).

In autumn 1943 helped to organise Government Employees' and Tenants' Association. President of Association of Iranian graduates of Belgian Universities.

Minister of Commerce in Sa'ed's reconstituted Cabinet of August 1944. Minister of Agriculture in Sa'ed's Government in 1945. Minister without Portfolio November 1949 and then Minister of Agriculture January 1950 and of Labour February-August 1950, when he was appointed managing director of the Seven-Year Plan, in which capacity he was not very successful. Replaced May 1951, since when he has been mostly in Europe in business.

Capable, intelligent and well-disposed towards us. Brother of Dr. Husain Quds. Brother-in-law of Najm. Married a Belgian while in Brussels for medical treatment 1949-50.

105. Namūzi, Hāj Muhammad

Born c. 1895 in Shiraz. His father, Hāj Muhammad Hasan, had a lucrative business with China in which opium is believed to have played an important part.

Represented his father in India and after the latter's death in 1932 set up on his own in India and Hong Kong (where he still owns a house). Later returned to Iran for a few years until 1942, when he went to the United States to do business. 1946-51 held the post of honorary commercial attaché to the Iranian Embassy in Washington, which he is said to have used to avoid United States income tax. Wrote fairly realistic letters to Musaddeq about the oil dispute, which were published and which the latter did not like.

Returned to Iran December 1953 and played a part in the 1954 oil negotiations. Appointed Minister without Portfolio November 1954 by Zahedi and continued in this post under 'Alā, until 1956. He provided directly, and later through the Iran Foundation, a trust which he set up, the finance for a piped water supply and a modern hospital in Shiraz. A close friend of Husain 'Alā, to whom he is related by marriage and who has taken part in some of his commercial transactions.

Quite a good reputation, but he is above all a clever businessman, some of whose deals have not been above suspicion. Shrewd and sensible, he has not hit the headlines as a Minister but has done useful work in economic affairs. Now lives in the United States.

A bachelor until 1950, when he married the daughter of Ata-ul-Mulk Dehesh of Isfahan, who had nursed him in an American hospital.

106. Nāser, 'Alī Asghar

Born c. 1903. Manager of Bank Melli bazaar branch for many years until August 1950, when he was appointed vice-governor of the bank, on the recommendation of Abul Hasan Eftehaji, to act as mentor to the new governor. He went to London with the latter soon afterwards for discussions with the Treasury and Bank of England and created a very favourable impression. Acting governor of the bank, September 1951-August 1952. Continued as vice-governor until November 1952, when he went to the United States as Iranian representative on the International Monetary Fund. Returned August 1953 and appointed governor of the Bank Melli, September 1953.

He is essentially a banker and avoids politics as much as he can, does his best to follow sound, if conservative, banking principles and to protect the position of the Bank Melli. He resists Government pressure well for an Iranian, but is apt to give way in the end. He is honest, frank, friendly and has a pleasant but not a strong personality, and as a consequence policy at the bank is more often decided by his juniors than by himself.

He speaks English fairly well and French fluently. He plays an excellent game of bridge.

107. Naseri, Mahmud, Musaddeq-ud-Dauleh

Born c. 1890 in Kashan. Related to well-known local family of Saleh of which Dr. Jahanshah Saleh is Minister of Health and, Allahyar, Saleh was Ambassador in America in the time of Musaddeq. Spent some early years in England and France. Worked with Dr. Millspaugh, the American financial adviser, during the latter's first mission in the 1920s. Later he assisted Colonel MacCormack, another American, who was in charge of cereal distribution. During Reza Shah's time Naseri was elected to the Majles from Ahwaz. He continued as Deputy for seven elections up to the 14th Majles in 1940 when he gave up politics, started farming in Khuzistan and prospered greatly. He was appointed Senator for Khuzistan in February 1954, and became Minister of Agriculture in June 1956. Has retained various business interests.

A relatively little-known political figure who belongs to the Tagizadeh and Hakim-ul-Mulk circle. Speaks good English and French. Friendly and Western in outlook. Although businesslike and well-informed has made no great mark as a Minister.

108. Nasr, Muhsen

Born c. 1907. Educated in France. Returned to Iran, 1930, and employed in Trade Department. Transferred to Ministry of the Interior as head of a department and promoted to Director-General. Appointed Governor-General of Mazandaran in the Sa'ed Cabinet, 1943-44; condoned Tudeh activities there. Then unemployed until General Razmara became Prime Minister when Nasr was appointed Under-Secretary to the Minister of the Interior; did badly and lost his post. Again unemployed for some time until Musaddeq made him Mayor of Tehran. Remained mayor until August 1943, when Musaddeq was overthrown. Again unemployed until Alā appointed him as Minister of Labour in April 1955, a post he still holds. Made a favourable impression as I.L.O. Chairman in May-June 1956.

Not a capable man but nevertheless manages to hang on to office under succeeding régimes.

109. Nasr, Taqi

Born c. 1909.

Was chief of the economic section of Ministry of Finance and later head of the Agricultural Bank. In 1941 went to United States as Ministry of Finance delegate on a permanent Iranian trade and finance mission in Washington. Was deputy Iranian representative first on the International Monetary Fund and later at the International Bank. Later worked in the United States with an Iranian-American trading group. Since 1941 he has spent little time in Iran. Appointed executive director of Seven-Year Plan May 1949. Resigned August 1949 and went to United States. Returned to become Minister of National Economy under Sa'ed January-March 1950. Minister of Finance under Razmara June 1950; dropped October 1950. Now works for the International Bank in the United States.

He is a close friend of Prince Abdur Reza whom he assisted in his studies in the United States. Pro-American. He is keen, intelligent and adaptable, but showed deplorable lack of courage and staying power in deserting from the Razmara Government while abroad on an official mission for it. Since this episode he has not, apart from a short visit in November 1953, returned to Iran.

51075

110. Navāb, Saifullāh

Born about 1893. Educated in France.

Member of Economic Advisory Committee, 1945. Governor-General of Mazandaran, 1945, 1949 and 1950; Director-General of Census and Civil Registration Department twice, the last time in 1950-51. Supported Musaddeq and is now unemployed.

Speaks fluent French. Fanatic Muslim. Honest, but neither capable nor firm.

111. Nikpa'y, E'zāz ('Azizullāh)

Born in 1896. Educated by the Church Missionary Society at Isfahan and at the American College in Tehran. Speaks English and French. Director of a large and important mill in Isfahan. Governor of Kermanshah in 1940-41. Represented employers at International Labour Conference in Paris, October 1945. Governor-General of Kermanshah, May 1946, where he proved a resolute and active opponent of the Tudeh Party. Political Under-Secretary and Assistant to the Prime Minister, Qavam-us-Saltaneh, in July 1946; granted ministerial rank September 1946; Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in October 1946. Dropped from the Cabinet in June 1947. Since then has lived mostly in Isfahan, where he also had interests in the Kuhrang tunnel and the turbine power-station.

A zealous administrator and apparently pro-British but not very reliable. Intelligent and not without charm. An intriguer and dishonest, but thrifty and capable.

Appears to be relatively enlightened on matters regarding relations of employer and employee.

112. Nikpur, Abdul Husain

Born c. 1896. A rich Tehran business-man who first made his way when Taimurtash was Minister of Court. Amongst many other things he owns most of the shares in the Tehran glass factory. Although not an importer has been president of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce since the early 1930s and has considerable influence in the bazaar. He was Deputy for Tehran in the 13th and 15th Majles and was elected Senator for Tehran in October 1949. In opposition to Musaddeq from the summer of 1951. Elected Senator for Tehran March 1954. A strong supporter of freedom of trade and of private as against State enterprise. Led Chamber of Commerce delegation to United Kingdom in 1956.

A crafty man who prefers to work for his political aims by indirect means. Dishonest and untrustworthy with an eye always to the main chance. A man of ability and some vision, he is at the same time prone to vendettas and generally against the Government.

113. Qanātābādi, Sayyed Shams-ud-dīn

Born c. 1912, son of a minor *mutla* of Qanatabad, a district of Tehran. Educated in Tehran in religious schools.

He worked closely with his brother-in-law, Sayyed Abul-Qasem Kashani (*q.v.*), and was banished to Kermanshah for eight months after the latter was deported in 1949. Joined the National Front on its foundation in 1950 and as a reward was returned to the 17th Majles from Shahrud in the Musaddeq-rigged elections of 1952. Founded an ephemeral pro-Kashani Party in 1951, which was supported by Dr. Baqa'i. Like Kashani, broke with Musaddeq in early 1953 and made up to General Zahedi, thus assuring his re-election to the 18th Majles from Shahrud in March 1954. Then opposed Zahedi and was one of the five Deputies to vote against the

1954 oil agreement, but afterwards returned to the Zahedi fold for financial reasons. Strong opponent of the 1955 Alā Government. Re-elected to the 19th Majles in 1956.

Although politically opportunistic and venal he has a reputation for loyalty to his personal friends and can generally be expected to take a broadly "nationalist opposition" line. Intelligent, clever and an effective orator with a sense of humour and a sense of occasion. Not without courage, and is influential inside the Majles and outside, particularly amongst the lower classes and the half-educated youth.

114. Qaragazlu, Muhsen

Born c. 1900. Elder son of the late Naser-ul-Mulk. Brother of Husain Ali and of Fatemeh, wife of Husain Ali. Brought into the Court by his brother-in-law; Comptroller of the Household to Queen Suraya, 1951. Later Assistant Master of Ceremonies of the Imperial Court and in 1954 Master of Ceremonies. Vaguely acting as Minister of Court from April 1955 till June 1956.

An unimpressive person. Rather a busybody. Has a decorative and enterprising Egyptian wife who spends a lot of her time abroad.

Speaks French and English.

115. Qashqā'i, Khusrau

Born 1921. Youngest son of the late Esmā'il Qashqā'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Was appointed Governor of Firuzabad in November 1943, but preferred making frequent trips to Tehran to living at his post. Made large sums of money by selling monopoly goods destined for the tribes at an enormous profit in the open market. Elected to 15th, 16th and 17th Majles from Firuzabad. Member of the Majles Oil Commission, June 1950, and was to all practical purposes a supporter of the National Front. Returned to the tribe not long before Musaddeq's fall in August 1953, and stayed there, threatening trouble for the Zahedi Government, until December 1954, when he followed Naser Khan abroad and, amongst other things, made propaganda for himself and the tribe in London. Now lives in California.

The reprobate of the family, he has great personal bravery and recklessness. Considered a hothead by his elder brothers and not altogether trusted by them. Inherits his father's cruelty and sadism, and is credited with a number of reckless killings. Has personal charm, considerable powers of persuasion and a boundless capacity for making mischief. A spoilt child with a nasty nature.

Khusrau is intelligent but has an unfortunate propensity for intrigue and an unguarded tongue, which continually gets him into trouble. Changes what he considers to be allegiance whenever circumstances seem to demand it.

116. Qashqā'i, Malek Mansur

Born 1905. Second son of the late Esmā'il Qashqā'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Studied at Brasenose College, Oxford. Of hawk-like appearance and attractive personality, he talks much but slowly and tends to repeat himself. Speaks good English and German, a little French and Turkish and Turki. Reported to be loved by the tribespeople where Naser is feared, since he is very interested in agriculture and the general well-being of the tribespeople. Devoted to tribal pursuits of hunting and riding. Says that he will do his utmost to oppose any Government interference with the tribe and that he is prepared to fight the army. The least untrustworthy of the Qashqā'i khans, but politically works closely with his three brothers. The only Qashqā'i brother in Iran (1956).

Has great influence amongst the Boir Ahmadi tribes with whom he spent many years of his youth. He is very popular among the whole Qashqā'i confederation. Married the daughter of Jahangir Khan (Qashquli Kuchek family) by whom he has a daughter.

117. Qashqā'i, Muhammad Husain

Born about 1907. Third son of the late Esmā'il Qashqā'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Studied at Reading University, but left because of chronic asthma. Studied economics at Berlin University. Deputy in 14th, 15th and 17th Majles for Abadeh. Elected to Constituent Assembly from Firuzabad April 1949. Has lived mainly abroad since 1949.

A voluble speaker. Excitable and untrustworthy. He is known as the "merchant" brother. Not very popular in the tribe—he married a rich Tehrani girl, another cause for tribal criticism.

118. Qashqā'i, Muhammad Nāser

Born 1904. The eldest son of the late Esmā'il Qashqā'i (Saulat-ud-Dauleh). Elected to the 8th Majles as a member of the Qashqā'i. Ilkani and the most influential chieftain of his tribe for a short time during 1930. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested for conspiracy in 1932.

Fled from Tehran during the general disorder in September 1941 and recovered his old position in Fars.

He rebelled in 1943 and was attacked by troops under General Shahbakhsh, but the operations were very half-hearted and soon fizzled out. In April 1944 he handed over the Germans who had taken refuge with him and undertook to co-operate with the Allies. Was a leader of tribal revolt in Fars in summer of 1946 in which his brothers also took part. After some fighting the Qashqā'is came to an understanding with the Government and peace was restored. Deputy for Shiraz in the Constituent Assembly, April 1949. Senator for Fars February 1950. In 1951 was at some pains to show that he was not anti-British and to act as a mediator with Musaddeq over the oil dispute; but he was a member of the National Front and supported Musaddeq to the end. In November 1954 went to Europe and the United States after reaching some sort of *modus vivendi* with the Zahedi Government.

Muhammad Naser Qashqā'i has made himself unpopular in the tribe by permitting the greed of his wife (Bibi Rudabeh) who wishes to seize all she can for Naser's children (three sons, Amanullah Khan (born c. 1922), Abdullah and Changiz, and several daughters).

Physically fit, a good leader of men. Not very intelligent and, like his brothers, not very trustworthy. Does not smoke or drink and is a model family man. Tall, broadly built, staring eyes, slight smallpox marks on face, of commanding presence. A fast and smooth talker and a good raconteur. Fond of town society and when living in civilised surroundings is very reasonable and amenable. When living with the tribes he seems to lose his balance (where matters outside the parochial affairs of the tribes are concerned) and to be easily misled. This instability probably results from his varied earlier experiences, including imprisonment in Tehran with his father, who died in captivity. Basically opposed to the Pahlavi dynasty.

119. Qavām, Ebrāhīm (Qavām-ul-Mulk)

Born 1888. The son of Mirza Habibullah Khan Qavām-ul-Mulk, who was killed accidentally in May 1916. During the war of 1914-18 was very friendly to us, and carried on his father's traditional policy of opposition to the powerful Qashqā'i group

of tribes. Having inherited vast properties in Fars from his father, as well as the titular headship of the "Arab" tribes of that province, he wielded immense authority in the south of Iran at the time of the *coup d'Etat* of 1921. Reza Shah expressed a wish that he should reside at Tehran; he therefore became elected to the Majles as member for the Khamseh (Arab) tribes and thereafter resided a good deal in Tehran. In 1929 Qavam was given crown lands in Nishapur, in the neighbourhood of Tehran and elsewhere in the centre of Iran in exchange for his Fars properties. He is one of the wealthiest landowners of Iran at present. Enjoyed some confidence from Reza Shah but, nevertheless, was arrested in 1933.

Played his part in the "events of 1941," he and his family at one time taking *hast* in the British Legation at Gulhek; and when Reza Shah abdicated and went to Isfahan it was Qavam who was sent by the Government to obtain Reza's signature to documents handing over his properties and private fortune to the State and to his son respectively.

Sent back to Fars in summer 1943, to help contain the Qashqā'is and appointed Governor-General, but fell out with the military and returned to Tehran in the autumn.

Deputy for Shiraz in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Elected Senator from Fars, April 1949. He returned to Fars for a time in 1952 in an unsuccessful attempt to re-establish his influence.

Qavam's name in the Fars of to-day still commands respect, although the Khamseh tribes no longer look to him as their feudal chief. The general tendency among his own family, whose obedience but not conscience he commands, is to regard him with the utmost respect as the survivor of a day that has gone. He himself does not seem to be conscious of, or will not admit, this passage of time. Now rather timid. Has a pro-British label.

His son, Ali Muhammad, married Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1937, but the marriage was dissolved. He subsequently married a girl of the Shaibani family, daughter of Muhaseb-ul-Mamalek. He had previously been an undergraduate at Bristol, where he did badly, and is now in business. The other son, Reza, was educated at Christ Church, Oxford, married a daughter of General Muqaddam and until 1956 was employed in the Ministry of Labour. One daughter is married to Asadullah 'Alam and the other to Dr. Abul Qasem Nafisi.

120. Qezelbash, 'Aziz

Born about 1900. A Kurd by birth, from Kermanshah. His father and mother were killed during the constitution riots (1905-10). Spent six or seven years in India working on the railway and then lived in Ahwaz, where he was friendly with His Majesty's Consul at Khorramshahr, for whom he acted as interpreter with the tribes and with whom he was under fire on several occasions. This Consul (Mr. Soane) later left him a legacy. Qezelbash has worked on the Iranian State Railway since soon after its inception and is now in the Inspection Department. Anti-Communist, he joined the Democrat Party and the E.S.K.I. trade union immediately on their inauguration in December 1946. Became second secretary of the trade union and attended the I.L.O. Conference, Geneva, in 1947, as a workers' representative. Led E.S.K.I.'s more militant anti-Communist activities, touring the railway system, identifying Tudeh members and insisting upon their removal from employment with the State Railway. In winter 1948, owing to personal differences with Khusrau Hedayat (the first secretary of E.S.K.I.), Qezelbash was dismissed from the E.S.K.I. After that he operated independently, using his personal influence among railway workers

and in the bazaars to draw support away from E.S.K.I. to his own newly-formed "Central Council of the Federation of Workers, Peasants and Tradesmen of Iran." Eventually agreed to the setting up of a joint committee under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour to co-ordinate trade union activities of E.S.K.I., E.M.K.A. and his own Central Council. In February 1951 was elected to the General Council of the newly-formed Trades Union Congress and has since been its president. In 1955 unsuccessfully sought nomination as workers' delegate to International Labour Conference by "back-door" methods, thereby incurring displeasure of his T.U.C. colleagues.

Friendly. Seems to be genuinely interested in his trade union work, but more of a politician and a "fixer" than a practical trades unionist.

Speaks Turki and Urdu.

121. Quds (Nakha'i), Husain

Born about 1892. Graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Has held various posts under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, Washington and Izmir. Returned to Persia in 1947. Appointed Head of Third Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1948. Director-General (Personnel) later 1948. Under-Secretary, September 1950. Ambassador in Bagdad, April 1951 until November 1952, when he was removed by Husain Fatemi. Then in Europe, mostly the United Kingdom, until he returned to Iran after Musaddeq's overthrow. 1953, reappointed Ambassador in Bagdad; and Ambassador at Tokyo in 1956.

Speaks good English and French. A quiet and level-headed official. Pleasant and well-liked by his fellow-countrymen and colleagues. Good reputation for honesty. Genuinely friendly towards the British. Has a wife who speaks fluent Cockney.

122. Rādmānesh, Dr. Rezā

Born about 1900. In 1938 he was arrested by Reza Shah for making Communist propaganda. Elected Deputy for Lahijan in the 14th Majles. A prominent member of the Tudeh Party from its foundation and was a dominating member of the Tudeh Party General Party Conference in 1944. Edited Tudeh paper *Maridun*. One of six editors invited by the Ministry of Information to visit the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1945, but did not accept. A genuine Communist who was at one time believed to be not best pleased with the complete subservience of the Tudeh Party to the Russians but unable to help himself. Rather naive.

Believed to have taken refuge in Soviet Embassy after attempted assassination of Shah February 4, 1949. Sentenced to death *in absentia* May 1949 for activities against the constitutional monarchy. In 1955 believed to be in Vienna.

Generally regarded as the most likely candidate for the Presidency of the "People's Republic" for which the Tudeh Party were planning in Musaddeq's time.

123. Rahnamā, Zain-ul-'Abidin

Born about 1888, one of the sons of the late Shaikh-ul-'Araqain, an Iranian subject and minor *mutahed* of Kerbela.

Rahnama was educated in Iraq and came to Iran about 1910. He was a member of the Democratic Party and edited first the newspaper *Rahnama* and subsequently the semi-official paper *Iran*. Was appointed Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Public Works at the end of 1926 and Under-Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior in April 1927.

With the object of making headway in politics, he discarded his turban and gave up his title of shahk. This brought him three different under-secretaryships in succession.

In the summer of 1935 was exiled and took up his residence in Beirut; the Shah was said to have suspected him of plotting against the régime.

Returned to Iran after the fall of Reza Shah in 1941. Plunged into political intrigue in 1942 and became a sort of secretary and spy in Suhaili's Administration in 1943, but soon resigned. Minister in Paris, 1944. Appointed Minister in Beirut, February 1947. First Minister to Amman, July 1949. Returned to Tehran on conclusion of duty, October 1949, and is now retired.

Clever and dishonest. Politically very ambitious and opportunist. Apparently a supporter of General Arfa.

Speaks French, English and Arabic.

124. Ra'is, Muhsen

Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Iran and France. The eldest son of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1919. Served at the League of Nations, Counsellor at Paris, 1930, Minister at Berlin, 1933, and Bucharest, 1938; representative at Vichy in 1941 and Minister, Baghdad, 1943. Ambassador to London June 1947. Returned to Tehran to become Minister for Foreign Affairs under Razmara, August 1950. Held post until assassination of Razmara, March 1951. October 1953, appointed Ambassador to Paris.

A very agreeable man, but with little force of character. Speaks good French. Married one of the many daughters of Farman Farma in 1935.

125. Rashidiān, Asadullāh (and brothers)

Born c. 1919. He and his two brothers, Qudratullah and Saifullah, are sons of Habibullah Rashidi, an Azarbaijani of modest origin and means who, because of his liaison work for the British Legation in Reza Shah's reign, was imprisoned in 1932 for ten years. He was again imprisoned for a few months by Qavam-us-Saltaneh in 1946.

The brothers started as small retail merchants but went quickly from strength to strength. They form an effective team, a rare phenomenon in Iran even amongst close relatives. Broadly speaking, Asadullah, a man of strong personality and political ambitions, provides the directing brains. Saifullah is responsible for much of the commercial work and liaison with British firms, and Qudratullah has more routine business attributes. They are very energetic and, contact-men by nature, they have a wide range of connections of all degrees of respectability. They are close with Princess Ashraf, Suhaili, General Bakhtiar, police chief Alavi Muqaddasi, G. H. Furuhan, Sayyed Zia-ud-Din Tabataba'i and with the Majles faction grouped round Sarrafzadeh, Sanandaji and Farudi. They are strongly pro-British. Although there seems to be no doubt of their loyalty, they undoubtedly have an eye to the main chance in their business dealings. They trade almost exclusively with British firms for whom they have secured very valuable business. They have now established themselves amongst the leading intermediaries in Tehran with all the notoriety that this implies. Politicians by nature, their efficiency in routine, commercial matters leaves much to be desired.

The brothers have been active partisans of Sayyed Zia from the time of the latter's return to Iran; they participated in the Qashqa'i revolt of 1946 against Qavam-us-Saltaneh; were imprisoned for a short time in 1953 by Musaddeq; and played a part

in the events of August 1953 leading to Musaddeq's downfall and the Shah's return. They were originally responsible for bringing Mowlems to Iran.

Opinions about the Rashidian brothers among the British who have known them during the past ten years vary greatly. The "old Persia hands" have nothing but praise for their ability and devotion to the British cause in times of crisis. Since 1953 the Embassy has not resumed political contacts with them owing to their reputation as fixers and calculated indiscretions. The commercial connection has however remained friendly and useful.

126. Rustā, Rezā

Born about 1900. Imprisoned by Reza Shah for espionage—map stealing from the military office at Kerman. In 1944 was in close touch with the Soviet Trade Delegation and was the channel through which Soviet help, in the form of cash, paper or transport facilities, reached the Tudeh Party. In the same year became a member of the Tudeh Inspection Committee and was strongly opposed to the moderate policy then pursued by the Tudeh Central Committee. Appointed secretary of the Central United Council of the Iranian Federation of Trade Unions (Tudeh) and, following Louis Saillant's visit to Iran in 1946, was officially recognised by the World Federation of Trade Unions as representative of Iranian workers.

In December 1946 complained to W.F.T.U. and British Trades Union Congress of oppression of Iranian workers, arrests and victimisation. He appealed for a W.F.T.U. delegation to visit the country to investigate. On arrival of this delegation in February 1947 Rustā was closely associated with the President, El Aris, and the Russian member, Borisov. His reputation with the Iranian workers was strengthened by this delegation. Arrested April 1947 on charges of high treason in connexion with the Azarbaijan secessionist movement. Released on bail of 1 million rials in November 1947. After his release from prison he avoided the public eye, but worked energetically and quietly consolidating the Tudeh trade union movement and organising a purge of waverers. Is believed to have left for Moscow shortly before the attempted assassination of the Shah and was sentenced to death *in absentia* with other Tudeh leaders in May 1949. Since then believed to have spent a lot of his time at the W.F.T.U. headquarters in Vienna.

127. Sadiq, Dr. 'Isā (Sadiq-e-A'lam)

Born about 1892. Educated partly in England (where he was for a time secretary to Professor E. G. Browne) and partly in America, where he took a doctor's degree. Began his career in a very lowly station in the Ministry of Education, rose to be Director of Education in Gilan. Attended an international congress on education in England about 1929, where he lectured on modern educational methods in Iran. Principal of the Teachers' College (*École normale*) 1932.

Minister of Public Instruction, September 1941, 1942. Dean of the University of Tehran. Again Minister of Education, December 1943 and November 1944. As chairman of Tehran Telephone Company went to the United Kingdom to buy equipment for the company in 1947. Minister of Education, June–December 1947. Deputy for Tehran in the Constituent Assembly April 1949. Represented Iran at the "Peace through Education" conference at Calcutta September 1949. Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949 and again in March 1954. Has been a professor of Iranian literature at Tehran University for many years. November 1954–January 1955 visited the United States under sponsorship of United States Government.

An intelligent and go-ahead man speaking English and French. Has a good reputation as a scholar but politically is neither very important nor very active. Well disposed towards Anglo-Saxon methods of education. The author of several works on education.

128. Sā'ed (Marāgheh), Muhammad (Sā'ed-ul-Vezāreh)

Born about 1885. Educated in the Caucasus. Served in various capacities in the Iranian Consular posts at Baku, Tiflis and Batum. Acting Consul-General at Baku in 1927. Head of the Russian Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1933. Appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow in February 1934. Minister at Rome, June 1936. Accredited also to Hungary, 1938. Ambassador at Moscow, April 1938.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1942–February 1943.

Prime Minister, March–November 1944. After Kāvtaradze's arrival to discuss a Soviet oil concession he was persistently opposed by the Tudeh and the Russians and was thus able to do little during his tenure of office. His Government's rejection in October 1944 of the demand for an oil concession brought about a crisis which resulted in Sā'ed's resignation.

Elected to 15th Majles for Reza'iyyeh. Member of Regency Council during Shah's visit to the United Kingdom, July 1948, and again during his visit to the United States, November–December 1949. Became Prime Minister again November 1948. Resigned March 1950. Nominated Senator for Reza'iyyeh, April 1950. Ambassador to Turkey, June 1950–51. Elected Senator for Reza'iyyeh, March 1954. Leader of the Iranian parliamentary delegation to the United Kingdom July 1955.

An agreeable person, whose Russian is better than his Persian. Speaks good French. More intelligent than he appears. Always willing to help. Good reputation for honesty. Appears to have no delusions about Russia. As Prime Minister from November 1948–March 1950 he showed himself as well-intentioned rather than effective. He has a Latvian wife and two daughters, one married to John Wallis, the British journalist, the other to Aslan Afshar, a young Deputy.

129. Sajjādi, Dr. Muhammad

Born in 1899 in Tehran. Son of a Tehran Mullah. Employed in the Ministry of Justice, the Customs, the Tobacco Monopoly and the Ministry of Communications.

Minister of Roads in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941 and then head of the Tehran Municipality in 1942. Arrested and sent to Sultanabad by the Allied security authorities, September 1943. Released at end of war.

Director of the Exchange Control Department in the Ministry of Finance in Hakimi's Government of November 1945. Resigned November 1945.

Minister of National Economy, September–June 1948. Minister of Roads, November 1948, Justice, March 1949. Lost office with Sā'ed March 1950, and became Head of the Civil Service Purge Commission, in which job his own reputation did not always inspire confidence in the Commission's recommendations. Managing Director of Seven-Year Plan, July–August 1950. Governor-General, Isfahan, April–June 1951. Governor-General of Azarbaijan October 1951–August 1952. Head of Military Tribunal until Musaddeq's overthrow in August 1953. Appointed Senator for Tehran March 1954.

Spent several years in France and speaks French. A talkative and clever man. Ambitious and has not a good reputation for honesty. Not very reliable.

if only because of his ability in trimming his sails to most winds. Married his brother's wife after she had been divorced as a result of a liaison with himself. A candidate for the premiership.

130. Sāleh, Allāhyār

Born about 1900. Graduate of the American College at Tehran. For some years employed as a secretary in the American Legation (now Embassy) at Tehran, where his brother, Pasha Khan Sāleh, has for some years been the senior Persian employee on the political side. He later entered the Ministry of Justice, where he held various appointments. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and appointed director of the opium monopoly, and afterwards director of the tobacco monopoly. Head of the Customs for a short time. Then Accountant-General.

Not a successful Minister of Finance under Suhaili 1942–43. Minister of the Interior in Hakimi's Cabinet, November 1945 to January 1946, when he dismissed Ghulam Husain Ebtehaj, the pro-Sayyed Zia Mayor of Tehran, and replaced him by Nariman, as being more acceptable to the Russians.

In Hakimi's Cabinet he was regarded as the leader of the appeasement group. Minister of Justice, August 1945; resigned October 1946. Member of the Majles Oil Commission, June 1950, and chairman of the Mixed Oil Commission, May 1951. A member of the National Front. Minister of Interior, February 1952.

Resigned from Ministry of the Interior, March 1952, because he would not carry out certain acts of interference in the elections called for by other members of the Government. He thus confirmed the impression that, although often wrong-headed, he is a man of some integrity. Elected to 17th Majles for Kashan, but in October 1952 went to Washington as Ambassador. Resigned after Musaddeq's overthrow in August 1953. Returned to Iran, April 1954, and renewed contact with his old National Front colleagues.

An intelligent, honest and able but embittered man. Left-wing views. Speaks French and English.

131. Sāleh, Dr. Jahānshāh

Born 1904, brother of Allāhyār Sāleh. Educated at the American College, Tehran, and in America, where he qualified as a doctor in 1933. After post-graduate work in America he returned to Iran and obtained the headship of various hospitals. He was for some years Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Tehran University, where he holds the professorship of anatomy and gynaecology; and is also Head of the Imperial Social Services Organisation. Served in the Finance Department before taking up medicine. Minister of Health under Razmara, June 1950–March 1951. Appointed Minister of Health under Zahedi, August 1953 and again under Alā in April 1955.

Not a very impressive Minister. Well-off and has an eye to the main chance. Energetic and slick but untrustworthy and disliked in many Tehran medical circles for promising much and doing little. Completely Iranian under a thick American veneer. Married to a rather unpleasant American. Speaks English and French.

132. Sayyāh, Hamid

Born in Isfahan 1886. Educated at Moscow. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1916. For some time a judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry. Commercial secretary at Moscow, 1922–26. A director of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Board, 1927–31. Chief of the

Russian Section at the Ministry in 1932. In charge of the Eastern Department, 1933. Consul-General at Beirut, March 1934. Minister at Warsaw, June 1936.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Furughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and was most helpful to us. Again Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam-us-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 until January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs again, December 1943. Minister of Communications in Sa'ed's Cabinet, March-August 1944. Accompanied Qavam to Moscow in February 1946. Appointed Minister to Moscow, March 1946. Returned October 1946 and became Minister of Commerce and Industry until June 1947. Recalled April 1949 and appointed Minister of Roads under Sa'ed, May 1949. Dropped, January 1950. Leader of the Iranian side in the negotiations with the Soviets which led to the agreement on financial and frontier questions of December 1954.

Speaks French and Russian. An agreeable but not a brilliant personality. He knows too much about Russian methods to incline towards bolshevism, but he maintains fairly close contact with the Soviet Ambassador and his ambition is to become Ambassador to Moscow again. A good bridge player.

133. Sayyāh, Kāzēm

Born about 1892 of a family of Turkish descent, not related to Hamid Sayyāh. Served in the Turkish army in the 1914-18 war, and taken prisoner by the British troops 1917. A strong supporter of Sayyid Zia in the latter's *coup d'État* of 1921, and when the Sayyid fell he fled with him to Switzerland. Returned to Iran about 1923 and was imprisoned by Reza Shah for some time. Then employed under the Ministry of Industry in supervising the factories at Isfahan. Was also in charge of the Fine Arts Department at that place, 1940 to 1942. Fell under suspicion as pro-German owing to his relations with the factory engineers, most of whom were Germans. Transferred to Tehran, 1942, and put in charge of the glycerine factory. In 1943 employed by the Americans in the price stabilisation section of the Ministry of Finance. Appointed Head of the Organisation Section of the Ministry of Interior, 1944. As he was well known as a strong supporter of Sayyid Zia this appointment raised an outcry by all Left-wing elements and by those who favoured a policy of appeasement towards the Russians. Appointed a director of the Tehran Electricity Company, 1945. Director-General in Ministry of Labour and Propaganda, April 1947. 1949, employed in the Factories and Industries Department of the Seven-Year Plan. Head of the Cotton Company of the Seven-Year Plan, February 1951. Governor-General of Mazandaran, April 1951. Dismissed by Musaddeq in August 1951. September 1953, attached to the Seven-Year Plan Organisation and later appointed to the High Council of the Organisation.

A man of the world, capable of good work, and claims to be well-disposed towards us. Married to a Greek.

134. Sepābhūdī, Anušīrvān

Born in Tehran about 1890. Educated in Tehran. Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1907. At consular posts in the Caucasus, 1910-18; Minister at Berne, 1929-33; Minister at Rome, 1934; Ambassador at Moscow, 1936-38; Minister at Paris, 1939, and Ambassador at Ankara, 1940. Minister for Foreign Affairs June-October 1945. Minister for Justice in Qavam's Cabinet February 1946. Ambassador in Paris August 1946.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs by Qavam in June 1947, but did not take up his post. Recalled to Iran February 1948. Nominated Senator for Tehran and also appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Court February 1950. Accompanied the Shah to Pakistan March 1950. Resigned his post as Master of Ceremonies after the marriage of the Shah, February 1951. October 1953, appointed Ambassador to Egypt.

A man of no particular family, he made his way to the top while still young. Speaks French and Russian. Is quite well supplied with brains, but is often too lazy to use them. Rather timorous. On friendly terms with Shah. Hates Russians.

135. Sepelir, Ahmad 'Alī (Muvarekkeh-ud-Dauleh)

Born c. 1890. Educated in Tehran. In 1911 joined the Customs Department, 1914-18 employed in the German Legation. Then in the Ministry of Finance. In June 1942 he was mixed up in a German plot involving Qavam-us-Saltaneh and others. Was Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry at the beginning of 1944. In February 1944 became Acting Minister of Commerce and Industry. He was removed from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the summer of 1944 and remained without an appointment until August 1945, when he was appointed head of the Caspian Fisheries, a post which brought him into close touch with the Russians. Closely associated with Qavam-us-Saltaneh and joined the Cabinet as Minister of Commerce and Industry March-July 1946.

Successful in the first stage of the Senate elections in Tehran in October 1949. Chairman of the Board of the Caspian Fisheries 1950-52. Now holds no official position.

Has a bad name for intrigue and lying. Well-informed politically and active in cultivating the younger generation. A friend of General Arfa's.

136. Shābbakhtī, Muhammad, General (Sepābhūd)

Born about 1882, the son of a peasant. He enlisted in the Cossack Brigade about 1901, distinguished himself by bravery in the field, and received a commission. In 1914 he was a captain. He attached himself to Reza Khan, whose influence secured him promotion to the rank of colonel in 1919. After the *coup d'État* of 1921 appointed to various commands.

Appointed to command the troops in Azarbaijan in 1932 and Khuzistan in 1939.

Appointed Commander of the Western Forces October 1941, with the rank of general (*Sepābhūd*). Controlled the Kermanshah area pretty thoroughly, ignoring completely the civil Governor, till he was transferred to Fars to quell the Qashqa'is in February 1943. He was not very successful in that campaign and after the defeat of the garrison at Semirum in July 1943 came to Tehran to report. Suspected of taking large bribes when at Kermanshah and again from the Qashqa'is.

Placed on the retired list, October 1943. Recalled to active list, 1947. Appointed Inspector of Troops in Azarbaijan, and early in 1949 Commander-in-Chief of Forces in Azarbaijan.

In April 1951 was sent to Ahwaz as Governor-General of Khuzistan and Commander of the Forces of the South in order to restore order after the riots in Abadan, but did not go to Abadan for two weeks. Recalled end May 1951, when he was appointed General Officer Commanding, Azarbaijan, staying most of the time in Tehran. February 1953, gaoled by Musaddeq and placed on retired list. September 1953-May 1954, Governor-General of Azarbaijan under Zahedi. Now retired.

Though somewhat arrogant, he is a very charming old man and has a great reputation in Azarbaijan, where his activities and strength of character made it impossible for any strong Governor-General to co-exist with him. Dishonest and rich.

An almost entirely uneducated survival from the Cossack Brigade, resembling in appearance the more famous product of that corps, Reza Shah.

137. Shāhrūkh, Bahrām

Born c. 1911. One of the six sons of Arbab Jamshid Shahrūkh, formerly Zoroastrian Deputy in the Majles and murdered by order of Reza Shah in 1940. He has studied in Manchester and Germany and has visited England several times.

Married to a German, by whom he has three children. During the war he was in Berlin and constituted himself leader of the Iranian colony there, displaying strong pro-German sympathies. For a considerable time he broadcast in Persian from Berlin radio, his talks being listened to eagerly in Iran on account of their eloquence and vitriolic invective against the British. In the latter days of the war he saw which way the wind was blowing, left Germany for Turkey and completely abandoned his German friends. After returning to Germany for several months he decided to settle in Iran. Was agent for various German firms.

In addition to his commercial activities Shahrūkh has always taken a keen interest in politics, having managed to gain the confidence of many prominent politicians, and, on occasion at least, of the Shah. Appointed Director-General of Press and Propaganda by Sa'ed September 1949, and despite much opposition from the press and other circles held on to the post, in which he showed commendable energy and zeal until June 1950, when he was appointed a director of the Irrigation Board. Again Director-General of Press and Propaganda November 1950-January 1951. Shortly after Musaddeq came into power he was obliged to leave the country as a warrant was out for his arrest. He went to Germany whence he imprudently returned in December 1951, being arrested on a charge of malversation of official funds. Sentenced and remained in gaol until Musaddeq's overthrow in August 1953. Used by the Shah in an attempt to build up a private contact with this Embassy very soon after the resumption of relations but, when this was not successful, was dropped by the Shah and rusticated. Returned to Tehran in the spring of 1955, and bought a half-share in the newspaper *Post-e-Tehran*, which he now edits.

He is clever, confident and his chequered career shows him to possess courage and an unlimited capacity for intrigue. In spite of his European upbringing he is very much an Iranian at heart. Of unlimited vanity. His political ambitions are much hampered by his being a Zoroastrian, although he is not trusted by many of his fellow-Zoroastrians. Now claims to be strongly pro-British and pro-American. An irrepressible but well-informed opportunist.

Speaks excellent German, English and French.

138. Shams-e-Mulkārā, Asadullāh (Shahāb-ud-Dauleh), K.C.V.O.

A Qajar prince. Born about 1880. Educated in Iran. For many years employed in the Telegraph Department. Governor of Yazd in 1911. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, 1914-15. Minister of Public Works, 1915. Master of Ceremonies at the Court, 1922-25. Governor of Kermanshah, 1929. Recalled 1933 and Governor of Kurdistan, October 1934-April 1936.

Governor-General of Fars early 1942. Governor-General of Kermanshah late 1946-early 1948. Appointed Senator for Tabriz March 1954. Received K.C.V.O. when in attendance on Ahmad Shah during his visit to London in 1919.

A rather pompous man, said to be a great intriguer; he is not averse to the society of foreigners, and probably regrets the good old days. Was a member of the Advisory Council of the Anglo-Iranian Institute before the break in diplomatic relations.

Speaks English and French fluently.

139. Sharif Emami, Ja'far, Engineer (Muhandes)

Born 1910. Married a sister of Dr. Mu'azzami. Was assistant Director-General of the Iranian State Railway. Served on Irrigation Board. Appointed Under-Secretary and acting Minister of Roads in the Razmaru Cabinet, 1950 to March 1951. Nominated member of High Council of Seven-Year Plan Organisation, April 1951. Managing-Director of Seven-Year Plan Organisation for a short time in 1953 under Zahedi. Elected Senator for Tehran, March 1954. One of the Senators who voted against the 1954 Oil Agreement.

Intelligent in his own way. Ambitious and opportunistic, but has a fairly good reputation. Speaks English.

140. Shā'yegan, Dr. Sayyed 'Alī

Born in Shiraz in 1904, son of Haji Sayyed Hashem. Doctor of Law. Educated in Tehran and Paris. In 1940 appointed Professor of Civil Law, Judicial Counsellor and Barrister. Dean of the Faculty of Law, Tehran University. In May 1946 appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Education. In October 1946, Minister of Education under Qavam-us-Saltaneh, June 1947. Deputy for Tehran in the 16th and 17th Majles. Member of the Mixed Oil Commission. Member of delegation formed to negotiate with the A.I.O.C., June 1951. Member of delegation to The Hague, June 1951; accompanied Dr. Musaddeq to the United Nations Security Council in October 1951; was again a member of the delegation to The Hague in June 1952. Elected to the 17th Majles for Tehran. Resigned with Musaddeq's other supporters after the "referendum," July 1953. Arrested August 1953, after Musaddeq's overthrow. Tried October 1954 and finally sentenced to ten years' hard labour. Deprived of his professorship. Released and now lives quietly in Tehran.

One of the most fervent supporters of the National Front, he seems to suffer from bad nerves; his unbalanced fanaticism is to some extent due to his state of health. He has views tending strongly to fellow-travelling. Although generally regarded as dishonest he has the reputation of being a good teacher and still commands considerable respect amongst many University students.

141. Sīāsī, Dr. 'Alī Akbar

Born 1893. Educated in France 1911 and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in pedagogy. Employed as dragoman and Iranian secretary at the French Legation from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was instructor in psychology and law at the University of Tehran; later professor. Went to Europe 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Iranian Club" in 1921.

Minister of Education August 1942. Resigned from Suhaili's Cabinet in August 1943. Minister without Portfolio in Bayat's Government 1944.

Member of Iranian delegation to San Francisco Conference March 1945. Visited United Kingdom after the conference.

Minister of Education in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947. Minister for Foreign Affairs under Sa'ed, January-February 1950. Leader of Iranian delegations to various cultural conferences, including UNESCO, June 1951. Rector of Tehran University from early 1943 until early 1955. Remains dean of the faculty of literature.

An intelligent man with a perfect command of French. Always polite and agreeable to talk to, but a "trimmer." His attitude undoubtedly gave the Tudeh Party an excellent opportunity to infiltrate the University.

142. Suhaili, 'Ali

Born about 1890. Educated partly in Russia and talks Russian well, also French and a little English. In January 1931 was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Kazemi. In September 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary. Minister in London, March 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs, May-July 1938. Governor-General of Kerman, February 1939. Ambassador, Kabul, October 1939.

Became Prime Minister, rather unexpectedly, in March 1942, after having been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Furughi's Cabinet from September 1941. His Cabinet fell in July 1942, partly owing to lack of support from the Court and the army. Again Prime Minister on the fall of Qavam-us-Saltaneh in February 1943. Proved himself a hard worker, but carried little weight in the country and had to maintain himself by various "combinations" and political deals with Majles Deputies.

Was tried in February 1948 for illegal interference in the elections for the 14th Majles and on other political charges, but was acquitted. Minister without Portfolio in Hakimi's Cabinet, March 1948. Appointed Ambassador to Paris, June 1948. Transferred as Ambassador to London, August 1950. Dismissed, December 1951, by Musaddeq. Remained in the United Kingdom and Europe until September 1953. Again Ambassador to London, April 1954. Underwent a serious operation in the London Clinic in 1956. There are still a few people who would support him as a candidate for the premiership.

Hard-working and approachable. Well-disposed towards us but an inveterate intriguer. A gambler and discreetly dishonest. Not held in much respect by his compatriots. Connected with Taqizadeh and Hakim-ul-Mulk.

His Caucasian wife (there is an Iranian one from whom he is separated) has to be seen to be believed. She enters into his intrigues as well as apparently running some of her own.

143. Sururi, Muhammad

Born about 1895. Educated at the Tehran School of Political Science. Served in various Government Departments. Has been judge in the Tehran courts, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice, Director of the Agricultural Bank, 1942-June 1943. Acting Minister of the Interior, January 1944. Minister of Interior in Sa'ed's Cabinet of August 1944 and again in Bayat's Cabinet in November 1944-June 1945. He did well, but incurred the displeasure of the Tudeh Party when he arrested the worst of the professional toughs of Tehran and imprisoned them in Bandar Abbas.

Minister of Justice under Hakimi, December 1947-June 1948. Elected Senator from Tehran, October 1949. Chairman of Administrative Purge

Commission, July 1949, but resigned on grounds of ill-health, November 1949. Member of Mixed Oil Commission, May 1951. Musaddeq, after dissolving the Senate in August 1952, offered Sururi the Ministry of Interior. He declined but accepted post of Head of Supreme Court which he retained until Musaddeq fell in August 1953. Re-appointed head of the Supreme Court in 1956.

Business-like and said to be honest. Lacking in real initiative, but has a strong reputation for doing his duty firmly and without regard to any private considerations.

Speaks French.

144. Tabā, Dr. 'Abdul Husain

Born in Tehran about 1911 of a Na'in family. Educated in medicine in England and qualified in medicine and surgery after eight years in Birmingham and at Guy's Hospital. Real name is Tabataba'i but not related to Sayyid Zia. Employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a doctor, 1940-42, and since practising in Tehran. Elected to the 15th Majles for Na'in, which he also represented in the Constituent Assembly, April 1949, and in the 16th Majles. Later became Head of the Health Department of the State Railways. With the World Health Organisation in Geneva since 1953.

A go-ahead man who seems keen on his profession, but as a Deputy acquired a reputation for being highly irresponsible. Honest and well liked. Married the youngest daughter of Vusuq-ud-Daulah.

145. Tabātabā'i, Sayyid Muhammad Sādeq

Second son of the late Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i who was a prominent figure in the Nationalist movement of 1906 to 1910. No relation of Sayyid Zia. Born in Tehran about 1880. Elected to the 3rd and 4th Majles. In close touch with pro-Germans during the war of 1914-18. Emigrated to Turkey in 1916. Returned in 1918 and co-operated with Sulaiman Mirza in forming the Socialist Party. During this phase he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy. Ambassador to Turkey 1924-27.

Was more or less under arrest for about ten years in Tehran until the fall of Reza Shah 1941. Gradually entered political life after that and initiated and fostered the *Mellat* (Nation) Party.

Head of the Election Committee for Tehran 1943-44, and himself elected Deputy.

Elected President of the 14th Majles. An opium addict for thirty years, he frequently found it difficult to keep awake when he was presiding.

Unsuccessful candidate for Tehran in elections for 15th Majles, but elected from Tehran to the Constituent Assembly, of which he was elected President April 1949. Member of the Regency Council during Shah's journey to Europe July 1948. March 1954, elected Senator for Tehran.

An incorrigible intriguer. His "liberal" ideas are not to be taken seriously. He and his friends pride themselves on their patriotism and the pursuit of the middle way between Britain and the U.S.S.R. For some reason he is generally regarded as a "national" figure. Reputation for honesty and influential in the bazaar. In his dotage and in ill-health.

Speaks French.

146. Tabātabā'i, Sayyid Zia-ud-Din

Born about 1893. Son of the late Sayyid Ali Yazdi Tabataba'i. Edited the newspaper *R'ad* (Thunder) in Tehran in 1915-16. Played a considerable political rôle in 1917-18. Sent to Baku

by Vusuq-ud-Daulah in 1919 as Iranian representative to Caucasian Azerbaijan. While in Baku he issued a long statement entitled "A New Epoch in the History of Iran," a spirited defence of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 which, although it had not been ratified by the Majles, he endeavoured to bring into force when he became Prime Minister. Returned to Tehran in May 1920. Carried out *coup d'Etat* with the help of Reza Khan and the Cossack Brigade in February 1921, and seized power. Appointed Prime Minister with full powers by Ahmad Shah on March 1, 1921, and effected numerous arrests, particularly amongst the ruling classes. His reforms were too radical for the country and the time, and he fell from power in June, fleeing the country.

In 1942, having by that time developed a very prosperous farm near Gaza in Palestine, he began to think of returning to Iran. Muzaffir Firuz began with great energy and indiscretion to run a newspaper campaign in his favour in Tehran, and quite a number of Deputies in the 13th Majles seem to have favoured his return. The Russians and the Shah, however, were steadfastly opposed to it, the latter through fear that the Sayyid might become a dictator. However, he returned to Tehran in September 1943, and was elected to the 14th Majles from Yazd. Caused annoyance by insisting on wearing a woollen hat of Caucasian style, and alienated some of his friends by an appearance of stubbornness and obstinacy.

Founded a political party which in the summer of 1945 was officially launched under the name of *Eradeh-e-Melli* (National Will). Was the particular bugbear of the Tudeh and the Russians, who never tired of vilifying him as the arch-enemy of his country and the principal tool in Iran of imperialists and reactionaries. (Some of this propaganda has stuck.) During the near-panic which prevailed in Tehran in November-December 1945, as a result of the approach of the Azarbaijan Democrats towards Qazvin, many leading politicians and Deputies began seriously to consider that Sayyid Zia should be exiled from Iran as a sop to the Russians.

His continued opposition to Qavam-us-Saltaneh's pro-Soviet gambits in the beginning of 1946 resulted in his arrest and imprisonment, but later he was released. Early in 1948 the Shah tried without success to enlist his support for his project of constitutional reform. Thereafter Court and Government circles evinced great hostility towards him and he was widely accused of disloyalty and even of pro-Soviet sympathies. There was, however, no concrete evidence to support these charges. On the other hand, Sayyid Zia was known to have criticised the Shah's "unconstitutional" behaviour. But he remained firmly opposed to communism and the Russians in general.

After the attempt on the Shah's life in February 1949 he made his peace with His Majesty and has seen him regularly since. On the resignation of 'Alā, April 1951, the Shah agreed to his appointment but the Majles unexpectedly gave a "vote of inclination" to Musaddeq. Was one of the first to take up opposition to Musaddeq in summer of 1951 and for a time seemed a likely successor to him. But, in view of the Shah's discouraging attitude Sayyid Zia felt obliged to withdraw into semi-retirement on his farm north of Tehran, where he has kept himself very well informed through his many loyal friends in various walks of life. Visited Saudi Arabia at the invitation of King Saud in 1956.

Scrupulously honest, religious, widely read and travelled, of active habits and practical outlook. Sayyid Zia-ud-Din is an unusual Iranian and an impressive man. Patriotic, courageous and a genuine reformer. Originally a journalist by profession he has become a successful and progressive

farmer. His main faults are obstinacy and impatience of criticism, which seem to have mellowed somewhat; and he has not always made a wise choice of collaborators. He speaks English, French, Arabic, Turkish and Turki.

Confident that he could make a good start at putting Iran on its feet, but neither a supplicant nor a candidate in the ordinary sense for the premiership. He is aware that the Shah would have to be in difficult straits before letting him be Prime Minister on the terms which the Sayyid would consider necessary. The Americans do not favour him as a candidate for the premiership.

147. Tāheri, Dr. Hādī

Born at Yazd about 1888. Son of a mullah. Formerly a landowner and proprietor of various concerns at Yazd. A great rival of the Navvab family of Yazd. Elected to the Majles on various occasions. Served on the Committee of the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, 1943, and was helpful in providing local knowledge. Was largely responsible for the success of Sayyid Zia-ud-Din in the Yazd elections of 1943, thereby incurring the dislike and distrust of the Shah.

Arrested November 1946 for political activities against Qavam-us-Saltaneh. Released February 1947. Appointed Minister without Portfolio under Sa'ed November 1948. Resigned September 1949, to stand for the 16th Majles, to which he was elected from Yazd. Supported Musaddeq in 16th Majles in order to ensure his own re-election in 17th. In July 1953, after many other Deputies had resigned in support of Musaddeq's dissolution of the Majles following the so-called referendum, he also resigned. Did not stand for 18th Majles, but stood unsuccessfully for the Senate at Yazd in March 1954. Now an old man. His son, an American-trained doctor, was elected to the 19th Majles in 1956 for Yazd.

Though very slow in speech and manner he is extremely astute and has a profound knowledge of his colleagues and particularly of their weak points. Though patriotic he would not allow his patriotism to interfere unduly with his personal interests in Yazd. He has a congenital aversion to the obvious course and delights to achieve his objectives by devious means through the agency of others. Was regarded as a mouthpiece of the British Embassy.

148. Tāleqāni, Khalīl, Engineer (Muhandes)

Born in Tehran, 1913, son of a Government official. At American schools in Tehran and Tabriz and later at the American College, Tehran. In 1933 won an A.I.O.C. scholarship to Birmingham University, where he graduated in civil engineering in 1937. Further engineering experience in the United Kingdom, including construction work on the Waterloo Bridge.

Early 1939 returned to Tehran and did his military service as an engineer. Then worked for various construction enterprises, until 1948, when he became technical director of the Irrigation Company of Gulpayegan, a State concern. December 1951 appointed Minister of Agriculture by Musaddeq and again in July 1952 in Musaddeq's new Government. Resigned in March 1953.

In October 1953 given a senior post in the United States Point Four, and in February 1954 appointed by Zahedi managing director of the Karaj Dam Authority. October-December 1954 in Washington negotiating a United States Eximbank loan. Made a "special adviser" to Zahedi in early 1955. April 1955 appointed Minister of Agriculture under 'Alā, and Minister without Portfolio and with special responsibility for the Karaj scheme in 1956.

A good reputation for honesty, and a reformer. Capable and balanced. Patriotic with some tendency to nationalism. Well-liked. Although regarded by some as pro-American he makes a point of being on good terms with us as well.

A keen sportsman. Speaks very good English. Has an attractive Iranian wife.

149. Taqizadeh, Sayyed Hasan

Born in Tabriz about 1880, the son of a small preacher. He was educated in his native town, where he showed great eagerness to acquire knowledge. Connected with the Nationalist movement in Persia from early youth. He was elected to the 1st term of the Majles and was one of its most prominent members.

In the *coup d'Etat* of 1908 Taqizadeh took refuge in His Majesty's Legation and as a condition of his amnesty went to the United Kingdom. Returned late 1908 and played prominent part in 2nd Majles. Elected to 3rd and 4th Majles *in absentia*. He stayed in Europe and America during the whole period from 1914 to 1923 and was for years in Berlin, where he edited a paper called *Kaveh*. He negotiated the Irano-Soviet Commercial Treaty in Moscow in February 1921, and finally returned to Persia in 1924. Member of 5th and 6th Majles. Appointed Governor-General of Khurasan in January 1928; he was recalled in May and became Iranian Minister in London until April 1930, when he returned to Iran and became Minister of Roads and Communications. In August 1930 he was appointed Minister of Finance in addition.

Taqizadeh fell from grace in September 1933, for reasons which are obscure. The Shah is said to have suspected him of intrigue with Majles members in connexion with the purchase of gold. He was, however, soon re-employed as minister in Paris.

In 1936 became lecturer in Persian at London University. First Minister (1941-44) and then Ambassador (1944-49) in London. Headed Iranian Delegation to the United Nations in London in January 1946 and ably presented the Iranian case when the Security Council considered the Irano-Russian dispute about Azarbaijan.

Elected Deputy for Tabriz in 15th Majles.

In a speech in the Majles in January 1949 he said that he signed the 1933 A.I.O.C. Concession under emphatic orders from Reza Shah and against his better judgment. This helped to provoke the demand for its revision.

Elected Senator from Tehran October 1949 and President of the Senate on its inauguration in February 1950. Re-elected President, April 1951 and April 1952. June 1954, elected Senator for Tabriz. Absented himself from the vote on the 1954 oil agreement. April 1955 elected President of the Senate with many abstentions.

He is married to a German and talks German fluently. He speaks English and French reasonably well.

There are now few traces of the fire-eater of the early 1900's and Taqizadeh is now noted for his extreme caution. Has a scholarly bent and much charm. His political "group" *Am'iyun* includes Hakim-ul-Mulk and Dr. Taheri.

150. Tehrani, Sayyed Jalal-ud-Din

Born c. 1896. Higher education in Belgium followed by practise of astronomy. A famous astronomer and astrologer who first appeared on the political scene when he became Minister without Portfolio under Qavam-us-Saltaneh just before the latter's fall November-December, 1947. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Tehran October

1949. Minister without Portfolio under Sa'ed November 1949. Transferred to Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones January 1950 and retained under Mansur, April-June 1950. Appointed guardian of Meshed Shrine, June 1951. Governor-General of Khurasan, October 1951-February 1952. September 1953, appointed minister to Belgium.

Intelligent even if a little unbalanced. Close to the Shah. Reputation for honesty. Apparently a firm believer in the myth of British omnipotence and omniscience in Iranian affairs. Belgian wife.

151. Vakil, 'Ali

Born in Tehran about 1894. A prosperous Tehran business man. He has held seats on Tehran Municipal Council and in Tehran Chamber of Commerce. He was Deputy for Tehran in the 10th and in the 15th Majles. Attended Moscow Economic Conference in April 1952. Elected Senator for Tehran in March 1954.

Until he suffered a heart attack in 1956, he was an active, resourceful and enterprising man with a finger in many pies. He is shrewd and tends to work behind the scenes. Most of his business is with United Kingdom manufacturers and he has supported British interests fairly well. Friendly. His reputation is not as bad as that of some other merchants, such as Nikpur. Close friend of General Zahedi's. Speaks good French and some English.

152. Valatabar, Abul-Fath, K.B.E. (Heshmat-ud-Dauleh)

Born about 1885. A member of the Tabataba'i family of Tabriz and a step-brother of Dr. Musaddeq's. A chamberlain of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. Private Secretary to Muhammad Ali Shah before he came to the throne, and until 1909. An open enemy of the Nationalists. Governor of Resht in 1915. Minister of War 1916-17. Governor of Kerman 1918-19. His help to the British in 1914-18 war earned him a K.B.E. Minister of the Interior 1920. Imprisoned by Sayyed Zia. Governor-General of Khurasan May 1924; resigned the next year owing to differences with the military authorities.

Attained an appointment as a kind of chamberlain at the court in 1943. Appointed Governor-General, Azarbaijan, April 1949. Represented Tabriz in Constituent Assembly 1949. Senator for West Azarbaijan February 1950, and for Tabriz March 1954.

Has owned large properties near Tabriz, but has spent most of his substance. He is a heavy gambler. An old-timer, not much respected and with a reputation for dishonesty, who hangs around the Shah's Court. Speaks French.

153. Varasteh, Muhammad, 'Ali

Born c. 1890. An official of the Ministry of Finance for many years. Later Under-Secretary to the Ministry of the Interior and in 1942 was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 1944-46 Governor-General of Isfahan. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948. Joined Hazhir's Cabinet as Minister of Finance September-November 1948. Governor-General, Kerman, August 1949-February 1950. Minister of Health under Mansur April 1950, but transferred to the Ministry of Finance later the same month. Resigned shortly before fall of Cabinet June 1950.

Minister of Finance under Ala, March 1951, and continued in same office under Musaddeq May 1951. Led the Iranian delegation to the A.I.O.C. negotiations June 1951 and to the Stokes negotiations in August 1951. Resigned from Ministry of Finance end of 1951, but returned March 1952 until September 1952. November 1952-March 1953, Governor-General of Fars. Appointed Senator for Tehran, March 1954. Absented himself from the vote on the 1954 oil agreement.

A man of weak character and little influence. Unimaginative and obstinate.

154. Vusuq, Ahmad, Major-General (Sarlashgar)

Born 1899 and had military training at St. Cyr. Joined the army in 1925; in command at Meshed in 1945; Deputy Minister of War in 1951, and again in 1952 (when Musaddeq held the portfolio). Head of the Gendarmerie in 1951 and Commander of the Military College in 1952. Led military mission to United States in late 1953; made Minister of War in 1956.

Quiet, conscientious and fairly efficient. Believed to be strongly anti-Russian and certainly suppressed subversive activity while at Meshed with firmness. Is well liked and particularly highly regarded by the Americans. He is, however, overshadowed in his appointment by General Abdullah Hedayat, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his senior officer, who also enjoys the privileges of ministerial rank.

Speaks French and English.

155. Yazdan Panah, Murtezā, General (Sepahbud)

Born about 1891; son of Mirza Ali Akbar, a small shopkeeper in the village of Saradasht. In 1907 he entered the Cossack Cadet School. Received his commission in 1912, showed strong pro-Russian sympathies, and consequently gained rapid promotion. Made lieutenant-colonel in 1919 and colonel in 1920. During the whole of his service he was intimate with Reza Khan, and accompanied him on the march to Tehran in February 1921, which culminated in the *coup d'Etat*. Was promoted general and given command of the Central Division. Inspector of Infantry in 1932. Commandant of Tehran Cadet College, 1933.

On the fall of Reza Shah he became Chief of the General Staff and worked as a loyal supporter of the young Shah.

Appointed adjutant-general to the Shah autumn 1943, a post he still retains. Member of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.

Leader of military contingent chosen to represent Iran at Victory Parade in London, June 1946. Minister of War in Hakimi's Cabinet December 1947-June 1948; Minister of Roads under Sa'ed, September 1949; accompanied the Shah to the United States November-December 1949; transferred to Ministry of War January 1950, and retained this post under Mansur April-June 1950. Then Head of the Shah's military secretariat and latter's Adjutant-General until May 1951, when he became Minister of War under Musaddeq. Dropped in July 1952, when Musaddeq re-formed his Cabinet. Then returned to his job at the Court. October 1953, relinquished the military secretariat post to General Gilanshah. Remains Adjutant-General to the Shah.

He is active, relatively honest, genial and staunchly patriotic, but rather stupid, supporting Musaddeq at Court for well over a year. Full of his own importance. Believed to be an opium-smoker.

Speaks French and Russian and has a Russian wife.

156. Yazdi, Dr. Murtezā

Born about 1900, son of an influential political Mulla of Tehran. Educated first in Tehran and then studied medicine in Germany, where he is reported to have joined the Communist Party. Often represented Tudeh workers in negotiations between them and their employers. In early 1946 made a tour of the south and south-east in an effort to whip up Tudeh support and was responsible in large measure for the troubles in Isfahan in April of that year. A member of the Directing Committee of the Russo-Iranian Cultural Relations Society, 1946. Minister of Health under Qavam-us-Saltaneh in August-October 1946, when he used his position to fill important posts in the Ministry with Tudeh members and sympathisers.

After the attempt on the Shah's life he was tried with other Tudeh leaders and sentenced to five years' solitary confinement April 1949. Escaped with other Tudeh leaders December 1950. Member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party. Arrested in 1955 and sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment apparently as the result of Sayyed Zia's intercession with the Shah.

Considered a good doctor and has a reputation for honesty and firmness of character.

157. Zahedi, Fazlullah (Basir-e-Divān), General (Sepahbud)

Born in Hamadan about 1890. His father was for many years in charge of the late Naser-ul-Mulk's property at Hamadan. Joined the Constitutional movement and was wounded. Joined the Cossacks and thus came into contact with Reza Khan, under whom he served. Commanded the troops at Shiraz in 1922. In 1924 commanded the troops sent to Khuzistan, and helped to arrest the Sheikh of Muhammerah in 1925. Transferred to Resht in 1926, where he commanded the Northern Independent Brigade. Recalled to Tehran December 1928. Commanded the Road Guards 1929. Arrested and degraded for neglect of duty in 1929. Soon after he was pardoned and reinstated. Chief of Police 1931. Relieved of this post after a few months owing to the escape of some prisoners from prison. Dismissed from the army in 1931. Turned his attention to business and became a partner in the "Kazadema" Ford agency. Reinstated in the rank of general 1932 and made *aide-de-camp* to the Shah.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942, and gradually took charge of all local departments of Government; proof was found that he was working with the Germans, and he was arrested by British troops and taken out of Iran in the autumn of 1942. Released in 1945. Appointed Inspector of the Forces of the South, July 1946. Placed on the retired list June 1949. Successful in first stage of Senate elections in Hamadan autumn 1949. Appointed Chief of Police November 1949. Appointed Senator for Hamadan February 1950 while remaining Chief of Police. Forced to resign from this post May 1950, largely owing to the activities of Razmura, Chief of the General Staff.

Minister of the Interior April-August 1951. In August 1952, strongly criticised Musaddeq in the Senate. Zahedi then took *bast* in the Majles and again in July 1953. In August 1953, appointed Prime Minister by the Shah. His first attempt to depose Musaddeq failed, but a few days later (28th Mordad) he was swept into power by a popular uprising in favour of the Shah.

By March 1955 it was clear that the Shah wanted to remove Zahedi from the premiership. Serious differences with Abul Hasan Ebtehaj, Head of the

Seven-Year Plan; a heavy swell of corruption around Zahedi; and the latter's indifferent health provided strong grounds. After considerable persuasion Zahedi left the country in April 1955 for medical treatment and, although he had not in so many words offered his resignation, was replaced by Alā. Returned in autumn 1956 for the betrothal of Princess Shahnāz with his son Ardeshtir.

More of a politician than a soldier, but not sufficiently sensitive to political feeling. Not particularly intelligent and rather stubborn. Has a long record of dishonesty. Being capable of generosity he was not unpopular with the troops under his command. As Chief of Police showed himself active and enterprising and gained a certain popularity. Pleasure-loving and a womaniser. Courageous, and loyal to his friends and supporters to a point where his loyalty seriously complicated his problems as Prime Minister, particularly because of the corruption practised by a number of them.

In spite of his faults he succeeded, as few other Persians probably would, in restoring order and stability in the chaos left by Musaddeq, re-establishing friendly relations with the Western Powers (including resumption of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom) and in carrying the 1954 negotiations with the oil consortium through to a reasonable conclusion. Firmness and prestige were his strong points. He also had the good sense to pick men of the calibre of Abdullah Entezam and Ali Amini for the key posts of Foreign Affairs and Finance respectively, and to let them get on with their jobs.

158. Zand, Ebrāhīm

Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg and studied law in France. Towards the end of the 1914-18 war became an active member of the *Musavat* Party in Azarbaijan, and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azarbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, being later employed in the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Finance. In 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Ebtehaj as governor he left the bank and was employed at Court as Comptroller of the Royal Accounts. Minister of War in Suhaili's third Cabinet, December 1943. Minister of War in Sa'ed's Cabinets March and April 1944, in Bayat's Cabinet November 1944, Hakimi's Cabinet May 1945, and Sadr's Cabinet June 1945. Governor-General, Isfahan, January 1949-February 1950. Minister of the Interior till appointed Governor-General of Azarbaijan in April 1950. Replaced Ebtehaj as governor of the National Bank July 1950. Ambassador to Turkey August 1951 until his appointment in October 1953 as Ambassador to Italy. 1956 became Governor-General of Azarbaijan.

Suffers from ill-health and has made frequent trips to Palestine for treatment. A patriotic man with a background of military training of the Russia of Tsarist days. Had sound ideas about eliminating corruption in the army but lacked courage to enforce his will. This bore out his general reputation for being honest but not a very capable administrator.

Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahrami. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian. One of his daughters is married to Prince Abdur Reza.

159. Zanganeh, Dr. Ahmad Ebrāhīm

Born c. 1909. Director of Industrial and Mining Bank and for a time managing director of this Bank. A member of the Iran Party. He had been

connected with the Planning Organisation of the Seven-Year Plan for some time before being appointed a member of the Council of the Plan on its creation in May 1949. Resigned to become Minister of P.T.T. under 'Ala, April 1951. Managing-Director of Plan Organisation under Musaddeq, May 1951, until latter's overthrow in August, 1953, when Zanganeh was gaoled by Zahedi. Released in November 1953, when he joined a commercial firm.

Has shown keen interest in economic development schemes but apparently has not very much drive. Well-educated but more theoretical than practical. Left-wing tendencies like other members of the Iran Party. A bit slippery.

160. Zarin-Kafsh, 'Alī Asghar

Born about 1885, of a Tehran family of Kurdish descent. Educated at the Political School in Tehran. Served in the Foreign Ministry, at Washington and in the Ministries of Justice and Interior.

Proceeded to England as commissioner of the Iranian Government with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in December 1933, with his wife and two children. Honorary counsellor to the legation in London 1937.

Returned to Iran December 1940. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice from 1941. In 1943 was Acting Minister for a short time. Minister of Finance 1944. Appointed chairman, Industrial and Mining Bank, February 1948. Replaced towards the end of the year. In 1950, on his return to Iran from England, where he had a serious operation, was appointed to the supervisory board for the Seven-Year Plan, remaining there until January 1955. Holds no official position now.

Speaks English and French.

Zarin-Kafsh is honest and socially most pleasant. Has always been friendly and helpful. In 1945 he joined Sayyed Zia's *Erodeh-e-Melli* Party and has a very high regard for the Sayyed. Has a good reputation generally.

161. Zargham, Ali Akbar, Brigadier-General (*Sartip*)

Born c. 1909, Tehran. Educated in Tehran and graduated from Military College. Had a year in the Military Academy and then enjoyed steady promotion from 1934 to 1955, when he reached the rank of general. Head of the 4th Bureau of the General Staff, 1947, and the 3rd Bureau in 1948. Held command of an infantry regiment at Maku 1950, of the Pahlavi regiment of the 1st Division 1951, and of the Mahabad brigade in 1953. Was given an appointment in the War Ministry by Musaddeq but retained the confidence of the Shah from whom he received the Huma-yunfar Order, Grade II, in late 1954. In 1956 he was appointed Director of Customs and did an excellent and forceful administrative job in clearing bottlenecks in the port of Khorramshahr.

162. Zulfaqari, Muhammad

Born in Zenjan in 1890. Son of As'ad-ud-Dauleh. Deputy for Zenjan in 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Majles, and in the Constituent Assembly of April 1949. Appointed Governor-General of Isfahan in June 1955. Well-known landowner of Zenjan. In 14th Majles belonged to Azadi group, but also kept in with the Taheri group. His younger brother, Naser Zulfaqari, was appointed Parliamentary Under-Secretary to Prime Minister Alā in 1955.

Extremely amiable and regarded by the United States Consul in Isfahan as being more effective than he looks. A crony of the Shah.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EP 1902/3

No. 29

IRAN: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Sir Roger Stevens to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 10)

(No. 77. Confidential)

Tehran,

July 1, 1957.

Sir,
With reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 1st of July, 1956, I have the honour to transmit herewith my report on Heads of Missions in Tehran for 1957.

I have, &c.

R. B. STEVENS.

Enclosure

Iran: Heads of Foreign Missions

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

Afghanistan

Chargé d'Affaires, *n.i.*: Mr. Muhammad Yunus Khan, First Secretary since June 17, 1952. Chargé d'Affaires from January 20, 1957.

A somewhat taciturn, retiring character who improves a little on acquaintance.

Argentina

Minister: Jorge Cullen Ayerza (August 9, 1956).

A scion of old Argentine aristocracy (such as it was) and a dug-out by the present Government after many years in protective custody under Perón. Señor Cullen provides an unusual vision of the New World. He wears a stubbly beard which gives him a certain resemblance to Nicolas II of Russia whose coins he carries in his pocket. Most of his colleagues, not without reason, refuse to take him seriously. In English and French, although he speaks quite well, he is a crashing bore. It is only in Spanish and on the subject of Argentina that he really comes to life.

Austria

Minister: Erich Bielka-Karltru (June 23, 1952).

*A career official who has recently served in the Ministry at Vienna and was previously at Cairo. Friendly, and apparently well disposed. He speaks fair English and excellent French. Normally resident at Ankara. (Written in 1952.)

*Visits Tehran from time to time. Makes a favourable impression.

*Mr. Eugen F. Buresch now resides in Tehran as Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires, having arrived at the end of 1955. He is married to a daughter of Allan Dulles (head of the United States Central Intelligence Agency) and niece of John Foster Dulles. They are a pleasant couple, she being perhaps the more effective of the two. He came here from New York. (Written in 1956.)

Mr. Buresch is quite active, both socially and commercially. He and his wife are undaunted travellers.

Belgium

Minister: Paul Bihin (March 16, 1956).

*Born 1911. Doctor of Law at Brussels University. Followed the legal profession. During the war he

worked for the Belgian Government in London as a member of the Prime Minister's office. In 1948 he joined the diplomatic service as Counsellor. Served as Belgian representative on the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, then at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and, 1954-55, on the permanent Belgian Delegation to the United Nations in New York. He is a bachelor. He is extremely shy but energetic, agreeable and with an enquiring mind. He travels extensively, by jeep. (Written in 1956.)

Brazil

Minister: Antonio Mendes Vianna (April 26, 1954).

*Born 1908. Educated at the Law Faculty in Rio de Janeiro. A career member of the Brazilian Foreign Service since 1948, his last post having been Consul-General at Antwerp. Was Brazilian delegate on the United Nations Commission of Enquiry on the Balkans in 1947. (Written in 1954.)

*Although he resembles a grossly inflated toad, he is not without charm, and has cultivated tastes. He speaks excellent French. (Written in 1955.) *His wife is usually absent. In her absence there is ample consolation, including an imported Swiss mistress who is often to be seen with him at parties.

*He knows his way around, but has a malicious tongue, and is cordially disliked by some of his colleagues. (Written in 1956.)

The charm has well nigh evaporated, and "some" of his colleagues should now read "most." He is being moved in July to (according to his own Press blurb) a post worthy of his great abilities; the situation is as yet unidentified.

China (Nationalist)

Ambassador: Nan-Ju-Wu. (March 14, 1956.)

We have no official relations with this Mission, but he seems pleasant enough to meet, and has an agreeable wife.

Czechoslovakia

Minister: Dr. Jindrich Smilda (December 3, 1956).

A former chemical engineer who looks like a German university professor. Spent six months in Hampstead learning English before being appointed to this his first diplomatic post. He formerly held a position as a junior Minister in the Czech Government.

In happier times I think he would make quite a pleasant and even reliable colleague.

Denmark

Minister: Axel Kaspar Frederick Sporon-Fiedler (October 14, 1947).

*Before coming to Iran, he was for many years Consul-General in San Francisco and had obviously taken root there. He is meticulously formal and precise, except when drink takes him, but hospitable and kindly. Mme. Sporon-Fiedler, though vague, is agreeable. (Written in 1951.) Both speak good English and are extremely friendly. (Written in 1954.)

They are leaving shortly; after twenty-five years abroad he is being made to cke out the last stages of his career (in his mid-60's) in the Foreign Office in Copenhagen.

Egypt

Chargé d'Affaires, *et cetera*: Mohamed Khair El-Din Nassar. First Secretary.

Son of a general, now retired, who had a prosperous contracting business in Cairo and built one of the Royal villas on the Mena Road. A career diplomatist, believed to be not over-happy in present circumstances.

Ethiopia

Minister: Ras, Imru Haile Selassie (January 4, 1956).

Resident in New Delhi.

Finland

Minister: Bruno Rafael Kivikoski (November 10, 1954).

Resident in Ankara.

France

Ambassador: Henri Roux (March 11, 1957).

Born 1906. Entered the French Foreign Service in 1928. Served before the war in the French High Commissariat in Syria and at Ankara. Posted to Sofia in 1940 and remained there until his return to the Quai d'Orsay in 1945 as assistant head of the Eastern European Department. 1947. Chargé d'Affaires in New Delhi and made Minister in Kabul later in the same year raised to Ambassador in 1949. 1950. Ambassador in Addis Ababa. Returned to the Quai d'Orsay in 1955 as Directeur d'Afrique/Levant. According to Her Majesty's Embassy at Paris he was a good deal absent from his post owing to bronchial trouble.

Has a minute Spanish wife, formerly a dancer.

He is a pleasant, quiet man who conceals considerable intellectual ability under a very modest exterior. Both he and his wife are good additions to the Corps.

Germany (Federal Republic)

Ambassador: Dr. Lutz Gielhammer (June 20, 1955), formerly Minister (October 1, 1953).

*More of a bank official than a diplomat and consequently seems always a little lost. Worked for a number of years before the war in Iran, with the Bank Mellé (Kermanshah 1929-34; then Tabriz and Tehran, returning to Germany in 1938.)

Speaks Persian and fair English and is a student of Persian history. Is said to have a good anti-Nazi record. His wife is a typical German *hausfrau*. (Written in 1954.)

*He has a pleasant personality and knows a great deal about this country. His standing with the Iranians is high and I think that the remark above about his being "a little lost" should be revised to read "more interested in the realities of his work here than in its social manifestations." (Written in 1956.)

Was very ill last year and hence out of circulation a lot of the time.

Greece

Minister: Jean Callergis (November 10, 1954). Resident in Ankara.

Holy See

Chargé d'Affaires: Mgr. Lino Zanini (March 15, 1957).

An impressive figure, pleasanter and less fanatical than his predecessor.

Hungary

Minister: Istvan Murai (December 22, 1951).

*Believed to have been a carpenter and one-time Mayor of Budapest. Served in Paris (where he was also Chargé d'Affaires to the Spanish Republican Government) and Rome. He is not much seen and is said to be responsible for much covert work for the Soviet. Speaks some French in a high squeaky voice. His wife is a grim woman. (Written in 1952.)

Now resides in Ankara.

Iceland

Minister: Magnús V. Magnússon (March 6, 1957).

Also accredited to Sweden, Finland and Israel. Resides at Stockholm. Served as Counsellor in London during the war and before his appointment to Stockholm was Director-General of the Icelandic Foreign Ministry.

Indonesia

Chargé d'Affaires, *et cetera*: Ahmad Sheikh Bahmid (September 23, 1956).

Appears cheerful and genial. He speaks a little English; his wife none.

Iraq

Ambassador: Abdul Amir Al-Uzri (August 29, 1956).

Born 1899 of a well-known (Shia) land-owning family. Educated in Bagdad and the United States. D.Sc. Michigan University. Spent twelve years in the Department of Irrigation and rose to be Assistant Director-General in 1941. Minister of Communications and Works in 1944. Director-General of Irrigation, 1946-50 and then appointed a member of the Development Board, from which he resigned at the end of 1952. Her Majesty's Embassy at Bagdad reported him to be a rather weak personality, incompetent, unreliable and said to be corrupt.

He has made very little impression here.

Has a hideous wife.

Italy

Ambassador: Renato Giardini (designate).

*Minister at Budapest since early 1954. Served in Tehran 1936-37. Her Majesty's Minister, Budapest, reports that he and his wife were popular and friendly. He is said to be a dull dog, considerably older than her. (Written in 1956.)

Far from being a dull dog he strikes me as being sly, active and not too honest. He comes from Vicenza and is highly anti-clerical. His wife, who was brought up in Brazil, is active and attractive.

Japan

Ambassador: Hisanari Yamada (April 18, 1955).

*Born 1907. Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1928 and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Early in his career he served in London and Peking and thereafter was employed continuously in Japan until his appointment to Tehran. His last post (1952-55) was chief of the Foreign Affairs Office of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. His comparative obscurity is attributed to his unpopularity with Mr. Yoshida and his present appointment to his close association with the Democrats.

Mr. Yamada is married, with three sons. He speaks fair English. In Tokyo he had the reputation of being hearty at all times and boisterous under the influence of alcohol, and this trait persists here. He is ostentatiously Anglophile. His wife is charming. (Written in 1956.)

He has been less ostentatiously Anglophile since Suez, about which he was revoltingly sympathetic—"We know how it feels; we went through it in Manchuria . . ." &c.

Jordan

Chargé d'Affaires, *et cetera*: Kemal Homoud, Counsellor (April 1, 1957).

Mr. and Mrs. Homoud are a handsome couple. He served in London for many years before coming here.

Lebanon

Minister: Abdul Rahman Adra (January 4, 1956).

*Lately Minister in Karachi. A Sunni Moslem of a leading family of Tripoli. His brother is reported to be a well-known intriguer, fanatical on religious matters.

*He is a jittery little man with a pleasant wife. They both speak English and French. Their daughter goes to the Embassy School. (Written in 1956.)

Sly and unreliable. Sometimes talks like a near-Communist.

Netherlands

Minister: Baron W. J. O. Gevers (March 16, 1954).

*A career diplomat who has served for some years in London (latterly as Minister/Counsellor) and speaks excellent English. Urbane, agreeable, friendly and very pro-British. I have seen a lot of Baron Gevers during the oil negotiations and found him pleasant and sensible to work with. He may not be brilliant, but conceals a good deal of ability under an easy-going manner. (Written in 1954.)

Three years experience amply confirms this diagnosis.

Norway

Minister: Ivar Lunde (October 20, 1956).

Also accredited to Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey. Resides at Ankara.

Poland

Minister: Kazimierz Sidor (December 13, 1956).

Also accredited to Afghanistan. Said to have been chief of the Polish Military Mission in Rome and then Military Attaché to the Inter-Allied Control Council in Germany between 1946 and 1948. 1948-50, in the Ministry of Finance. 1951-56, Vice-Director of the Polish Institute for International Affairs.

Anxious to make friends. But he smells too strongly of the Secret Police Headquarters.

Has an attractive wife.

Portugal

Minister: Dr. Luis Norton de Matos (October 15, 1956).

Resident at Ankara.

Roumania

Minister: Traian Micu (August 18, 1952).

*An unimpressive and small man who is less inclined than his Czech and Polish colleagues to mix with Western diplomats. (Written in 1954.)

He is leaving in July 1957.

Saudi Arabia

Ambassador: Hamzeh Gows (September 17, 1955), formerly Minister (May 26, 1948).

*I only know that he is amiable and picturesque, but he talks no European language. His Arab dress adds to the colour of Tehran receptions. (Written in January 1951.)

*Has acquired a young Persian wife and child who are sometimes seen in public. (Written in 1954.)

We are not at present in relations with his mission.

Soviet Union

Ambassador: Nikolay Mikhailovich Pegov (September 19, 1956).

Born 1905. Joined the Communist Party in 1930. A member of the Central Committee of the Party since 1939. 1952, elected a candidate member of the Party's Presidium and a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. On Stalin's death in 1953 appointed Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and relinquished his other appointments. Has had no previous diplomatic experience. Her Majesty's Embassy at Moscow reported that from the personal point of view he seemed fairly well suited to his new career, being more personable than many Soviet diplomats, with good manners and a friendly approach.

He goes out socially (usually accompanied by an interpreter) much more than his predecessor. If he could speak any language other than Russian, Pegov would be an agreeable companion. He has launched quite a social offensive here and has succeeded in some degree in repairing the unpopularity of his boorish predecessor.

Spain

Minister: Tomas Maycas y de Meer (December 7, 1955).

*Aged 65. Has served in Paris, Stockholm, Budapest, The Hague and Melbourne. Latterly Counsellor at Amman.

He looks ill and has a reputation for addiction to drink. Speaks French and fair English. Has an unattractive Roumanian-born wife who speaks fluent French and English. A rather pathetic couple, and no credit to their Government. (Written in 1956.)

Sweden

Minister: Ragnvald Richardson Bagge (February 18, 1953).

*A pleasant, well-informed, friendly, but very talkative colleague with an attractive Finnish wife. Was in charge of the Press Section of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the war. Has previously served as Minister in South America and Minister/Counsellor in Washington. He and his wife talk excellent English. He was born in Canada, where his father was Swedish Representative at the time. While not in the highest flight of Swedish diplomats he is a very satisfactory colleague. (Written in 1954.)

*My regard for his good sense and complete integrity has increased in these two years. (Written in 1956.)

Switzerland

Ambassador: Dr. Roy Ganz (April 29, 1957), formerly Minister (November 30, 1954).

*A German-Jewish Swiss, born in Chicago, with a pleasant French-born wife (his second). Originally a lawyer by profession. Was Minister in Helsinki before coming here and before that in Warsaw.

He is quite intelligent and knowledgeable and is an amusing companion. He has a malicious relish for political gossip, but is lacking in political sense. He had the reputation before coming here of Left-wing views, and has encouraged this impression by taking a holiday last summer in the Caucasus and the Crimea and reporting enthusiastically on everything he saw. But he is not so much pro-Communist as ostentatiously unattached and personally responsible. (Written in 1956.)

Syria

Minister: Mr. Assad Mohaffel (June 20, 1955).

*Born 1907. A Sunni Moslem from Aleppo. Studied in France where he obtained degrees in law and literature. Joined the Foreign Service in 1946 serving in Cairo and London. Appointed Secretary-

(4)

General at the Presidency in 1952 and dismissed when Shishakli fell in 1954. Reinstated in 1955 and appointed to Tehran.

He is a poet, knowledgeable about Arab history and culture. Married with a daughter in her teens. (Written in 1956.)

We are not at present in relations with his mission but for all that we are constantly meeting him. He is a sly, hostile, repellent fellow. Completely sold to Moscow, he is credited with spying on his Arab fellows here and having, in particular, secured the downfall of the last Egyptian Ambassador.

Turkey

Ambassador: General Izzet Aksalur (August 6, 1955).

*Born 1894. Joined Army and served in Dardanelles and Palestine and on the Russian front. 1949—Vice-Chief of the General Staff. 1950—Secretary-General of the Supreme Defence Council. 1952-55 Ambassador to Tokyo.

According to Her Majesty's Embassy at Ankara he was considered to be one of the ablest Turkish commanders in his day. He is friendly but it is difficult to get very far with him as his French and English are both limited and he makes things worse by mixing them up. He describes the part he played in bringing Iran into the Bagdad Pact with a pride which shines even through his linguistic obscurities. This in fact is the only subject on which I have found it possible to converse with him.

His wife, a Turkish blonde, speaks reasonable French. (Written in 1956.)

United States

Ambassador: Selden Chapin (July 19, 1955).

*Born 1899. Served in the United States Navy from 1919 to 1925 when he entered Foreign Service serving at Hankow, Peking, Rome, Quito and Port-au-Prince. In 1936 became Assistant Chief of Division of American Republics in State Department. During the war acted as Liaison Officer on various defence commissions and as Counsellor to the United States Missions to Algiers and Paris. In 1945 he became Director-General of the Foreign Service and then successively Ambassador to Hungary, the Netherlands and Panama.

He was a second choice for Tehran, Mr. Julius Holmes' nomination having been withdrawn because of threatened Senate objections.

He is a solid and experienced career officer with plenty of character and good sense, and well disposed to us. He was unlucky to succeed an Ambassador (Mr. Loy Henderson) who had established an exceptionally high reputation, and at a time when United States aid to Iran was beginning to taper off. These handicaps, combined with a somewhat craggy exterior and a certain lack of social grace, did not help him with the Iranians at first, but I think he has established himself by now. I have always found him a most satisfactory colleague in every way.

He has a very nice wife, something of a character, with a good sense of humour, a perpetual flow of conversation and a constant chuckle. She is a sister of Admiral Kirk. (Written in 1956.)

Has somewhat run to seed in the last twelve months.

Venezuela

Minister: Arturo Lares (March 16, 1955).
Resides at Beirut.

Yugoslavia

Minister: Dusan Ristic (May 14, 1957).

Born 1907. Studied law in Belgrade. Joined the Communist Party in 1940. Joined the Partisan movement from its beginning in 1941. 1950-53, a Deputy of the National Assembly, during which time he was Secretary-General in the Ministry for the Interior of Serbia. In 1953 he joined the diplomatic service and was a Deputy Chief of a department in the Foreign Ministry. He is a major-general on the army reserve and has a number of decorations for war and post-war service.

Has a pleasant straight-forward manner and seems friendly. Speaks fair French and poor English. Does not share his predecessor's open-air tastes, being more inclined to intellectual pursuits. Professes warm friendship for English friends from the heroic days in the mountains of Montenegro, particularly Major Deakin and Brigadier Maclean.